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Informational 15 Bitcoin

fuzz: inline chanmon finish invariants

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Joost Jager

70/100 · Adequate
fuzz: inline chanmon finish invariants

Move the final chanmon consistency invariant checks into
Harness::finish so the checks can read harness state directly.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit is a minor internal refactoring of a fuzz test file. It moves a small helper function's contents directly into the place where it was called, changing a loop over three hard-coded nodes into a generic loop. There is no change to production code, no change to security behavior, and no fix for a vulnerability.

Recommended action

No action required. This is a non-security refactoring of test/fuzz infrastructure.

Security signals we found

No strong security signals were identified.

Risk score

Why this scored 15/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 0/30
Exploitability 0/25
Stealth signal 0/15
Affected reach 0/15
Confidence 10/10
Evidence quality 5/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

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