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Informational 19 Bitcoin

Allow intercepting HTLCs based on the source channel

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Matt Corallo

73/100 · Adequate
Allow intercepting HTLCs based on the source channel

It may be useful in some situations to select HTLCs for
interception based on the source channel in addition to the sink.
Here we add the ability to do so by adding new flags to
`HTLCInterceptionFlags`.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds new configuration options that let a Lightning node operator choose to intercept (pause and manually handle) forwarded payments based on whether the payment arrived over a publicly announced channel or a private one. It is a feature addition, not a fix for an existing security flaw. The code does not bypass fee or time-lock requirements, so it cannot be used to steal funds or force free routing on its own. The main risk is operational: a node operator who enables these new flags and then mishandles intercepted payments could cause payment delays or failures.

Recommended action

No immediate security action required. Treat as a normal feature review: verify the new flags behave as documented, ensure interception handlers validate fees and CLTV deltas before forwarding, and confirm the held-HTLC drop-on-closed-channel behavior matches operational expectations.

Security signals we found

01

Feature addition to HTLC interception configuration flags

02

New source-channel visibility used in routing interception decisions

03

Fee and CLTV requirements explicitly retained for intercepted HTLCs

04

Held-HTLC release path now checks whether the inbound channel has closed and drops the HTLC if so

05

Expanded unit tests cover new flag combinations

Risk score

Why this scored 19/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 1/25
Stealth signal 1/15
Affected reach 3/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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