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Low 28 Bitcoin

Add rbf_channel API for initiating splice RBF

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Jeffrey Czyz

68/100 · Adequate
Add rbf_channel API for initiating splice RBF

Expose ChannelManager::rbf_channel as the entry point for bumping the
feerate of a pending splice funding transaction. Like splice_channel,
it returns a FundingTemplate to be completed and passed to
funding_contributed.

Validates that a pending splice exists with at least one negotiated
candidate, no active funding negotiation, and that the new feerate
satisfies the 25/24 increase rule required by the spec.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a new public API called rbf_channel to the Lightning Dev Kit's rust-lightning library. It lets a user bump the transaction fee (via replace-by-fee, or RBF) on a pending splice funding transaction before it is locked on-chain. The change is a feature addition, not a bug fix, and includes several safety checks such as requiring a pending splice, no active funding negotiation, and a minimum 25/24 feerate increase over the previous attempt. There is no direct evidence in the commit that this fixes a security vulnerability.

Recommended action

Review the new API's validation logic and error handling during normal code review. No immediate security response is indicated by the commit content. Ensure documentation and tests cover edge cases such as repeated RBF attempts, tie-breaking with the counterparty, and interaction with zeroconf channels.

Security signals we found

01

New public API added with multiple state and feerate validation checks

02

Enforces 25/24 feerate increase rule required by the Lightning splicing specification

03

Prevents RBF after splice_locked has been sent by either side

04

Prevents RBF while another funding negotiation is active

05

No mention of vulnerability, CVE, bug fix, or security issue in commit message or diff

Risk score

Why this scored 28/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 3/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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