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Low 36 Bitcoin

Accept tx_init_rbf for pending splice transactions

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Jeffrey Czyz

73/100 · Adequate
Accept tx_init_rbf for pending splice transactions

When a splice funding transaction has been negotiated but not yet
confirmed, either party may initiate RBF to bump the feerate. This
enables the acceptor to handle such requests, allowing continued
progress toward on-chain confirmation of splices in rising fee
environments.

Only the acceptor side is implemented; the acceptor does not contribute
funds beyond the shared funding input. The initiator side (sending
tx_init_rbf and handling tx_ack_rbf) is left for a follow-up.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds the ability for one side of a Lightning channel (the 'acceptor') to accept a fee-bump request for a pending splice transaction. Previously, such requests were rejected outright. The change is a partial feature implementation: only the acceptor side is implemented, and the code includes several safety checks to prevent misuse. There is no direct evidence in the commit that this fixes an active security vulnerability; it appears to be a protocol feature enhancement.

Recommended action

Review as a normal feature commit. Verify that the 25/24 rule and zero-conf rejection align with the intended protocol semantics, and that serialization changes are backward-compatible. No immediate security response appears warranted based on the supplied materials.

Security signals we found

01

New network message handler for tx_init_rbf replaces prior unconditional rejection

02

Multiple validation gates added before allowing RBF negotiation

03

25/24 feerate increase rule enforced

04

Zero-conf channels explicitly rejected for RBF splice

05

State serialization extended with last_funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight

06

Acceptor contribution hardcoded to SignedAmount::ZERO

Risk score

Why this scored 36/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 6/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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