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Low 39 Bitcoin

invoices: persist ordinary HTLC outcomes

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by yyforyongyu

68/100 · Adequate
invoices: persist ordinary HTLC outcomes

Discover pending ordinary children across parent states and apply final
outcomes inside the existing invoice transaction. Recompute successful
value and assign the first settlement index once, preserving duplicates.

Reuse the KV scan and SQL query updater. Keep AMP metadata writes on
their existing add-time path and leave ordinary producers unchanged.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes how the Lightning Network Daemon (LND) records the final result of ordinary payment attempts (HTLCs) for invoices. It adds a way to find invoices whose child payments are still awaiting a final outcome, and applies those outcomes inside the existing invoice update process. The change is a correctness/robustness improvement rather than an obvious security fix, but it touches settlement accounting and state transitions, which are security-sensitive in a payment system.

Recommended action

Treat as a normal code-review item. Verify that finalizeHTLCs cannot be invoked in a way that bypasses existing preimage or cancellation invariants, that the new FetchPendingSettleInvoices query does not expose stale or inconsistent state to callers, and that the amount-paid recomputation cannot be manipulated to over- or under-report invoice value. No immediate security response is indicated by the commit alone.

Security signals we found

01

Touches invoice settlement state machine and HTLC finalization

02

Changes amount-paid recomputation after HTLC resolution

03

Adds duplicate/already-settled HTLC rejection (ErrHTLCAlreadySettled)

04

Adds new database query paths for pending-settle invoices

05

No explicit security claim, CVE, or researcher attribution in commit

Risk score

Why this scored 39/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 8/15
Confidence 5/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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