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High 70 Bitcoin

Merge pull request #11068 from GeorgeTsagk/auxsig-required

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by ziggieXXX

73/100 · Adequate
Merge pull request #11068 from GeorgeTsagk/auxsig-required

lnwallet: reject commitments missing aux HTLC signatures
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a security gap in LND's taproot overlay channels. Previously, a channel peer could send a commitment transaction with missing or mismatched auxiliary HTLC signatures, and LND would still accept it. Those signatures are needed to safely recover funds if the channel is later force-closed. Without them, HTLCs could be left on disk with empty signatures, making them unsweepable at force-close time and potentially locking up funds. The patch now rejects such commitments, causing a force close instead of silently accepting a dangerous state. It also fixes a test helper so that restarting a channel does not drop the auxiliary signer configuration.

Recommended action

Deploy this fix in the next LND release. Operators running taproot overlay channels should ensure their aux signer (e.g., tapd) is running and up to date; peers running older configurations without an aux signer will experience force closes when HTLCs are present. Review any existing taproot overlay channels that may have accepted commitments with empty aux signatures, as those HTLCs could be difficult to sweep on force close.

Security signals we found

01

Missing input validation: aux HTLC signature count was not validated against HTLC count before accepting a commitment

02

Funds-at-risk path: accepted commitment could be stored as local state with empty aux signatures, making second-level HTLCs unsweepable on force close

03

Peer-induced vulnerability: remote peer controls whether aux signatures are sent and could withhold them

04

Behavior change: commitments missing required aux signatures now trigger force close instead of silent acceptance

05

Test coverage added for mismatch, omitted blob, dust HTLC handling, plain channel exemption, and no-aux-signer exemption

Risk score

Why this scored 70/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 24/30
Exploitability 14/25
Stealth signal 10/15
Affected reach 8/15
Confidence 9/10
Evidence quality 5/5
Human-validated context

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