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Moderate 59 Bitcoin

lnwallet: refine revocation validation order

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Olaoluwa Osuntokun

78/100 · Adequate
lnwallet: refine revocation validation order

In this commit, we refine revocation processing and extend its transition
coverage. The state-transition and key checks now run before their
corresponding revocation bookkeeping updates.

The tests cover the rejected cases for tweakless and taproot channels,
verify that their revocation bookkeeping stays unchanged, and confirm that
the next valid transition succeeds.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This change tightens the order of checks when LND processes a revocation message from the other party in a Lightning channel. Previously, the code could add a secret to its revocation store before confirming the revocation was actually expected and matched the right commitment point. Now it checks those conditions first, so a malformed or unexpected revocation cannot partially update local state. The patch is defensive hardening rather than a clear fix for an active exploit.

Recommended action

Review the change as a defensive security improvement. No immediate incident response is indicated, but operators should upgrade to a version containing this commit to reduce the risk of state corruption from malformed or unexpected revocation messages. Continue monitoring for related disclosures from Lightning Labs.

Security signals we found

01

State-transition validation moved before persistent revocation bookkeeping

02

New explicit error for revocation received in invalid commitment state

03

Wrong-secret revocation now rejected before RevocationStore is mutated

04

Tests added for rejected revocation cases in tweakless and taproot channels

05

Defensive hardening of revocation processing order

Risk score

Why this scored 59/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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