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Low 47 Bitcoin

chanacceptor: map SIMPLE_TAPROOT_FINAL in rpc acceptor

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by George Tsagkarelis

73/100 · Adequate
chanacceptor: map SIMPLE_TAPROOT_FINAL in rpc acceptor

The feature-bits-to-lnrpc-enum switch in sendAcceptRequests covered
every commitment type the RPC acceptor can be asked about, except the
production taproot variant introduced alongside the prod-taproot-chans
work. For a channel open using SimpleTaprootChannelsRequiredFinal (with
any combination of the scid-alias / zero-conf modifiers), the switch
fell through to the default branch, which logs a warning and leaves
commitmentType at its zero value -- lnrpc.CommitmentType_UNKNOWN_COMMITMENT_TYPE.
External acceptor clients then see UNKNOWN rather than the actual
commitment type and either reject or misclassify the channel.

Add the four missing cases so the new commitment type is reported to
acceptor clients correctly.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a bug in LND's channel-acceptor RPC where a newly added taproot channel type was not being translated into the external protocol enum. External channel-acceptor clients would receive an 'UNKNOWN' commitment type instead of the real one, which could cause them to reject or mislabel taproot channel opens. It is a correctness/availability fix for a protocol-mapping gap, not a cryptographic vulnerability or direct funds-loss bug.

Recommended action

Treat as a routine bugfix worth including in release notes for RPC/taproot channel operators, but not as a critical security patch. Operators using external channel acceptors should upgrade to avoid spurious channel rejections or misclassification of Simple Taproot Final channels.

Security signals we found

01

Missing enum mapping causes external RPC consumers to misclassify commitment type

02

Could lead to denial of channel opens by external acceptor clients

03

No direct funds loss or cryptographic weakness in the diff

04

Fix is additive and conservative, only adding the omitted cases

Risk score

Why this scored 47/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 9/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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