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Moderate 64 Bitcoin

Merge pull request #11151 from Roasbeef/reject-absurd-feerates

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Yong

73/100 · Adequate
Merge pull request #11151 from Roasbeef/reject-absurd-feerates

funding+lnwallet: reject absurdly high channel feerates
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds two safety checks to LND's channel-opening process. When someone tries to open a Lightning channel with LND, LND now rejects the request if the proposed on-chain fee rate is absurdly high (more than 10 times LND's own fee estimate, with a minimum floor of 100 sat/vbyte), or if the initial balances are so low that neither party could actually use the channel. These checks prevent attackers or misconfigured peers from tying up LND's resources on channels that would be useless or economically harmful.

Recommended action

This is a defensive hardening patch. Operators should upgrade to a release containing this commit. No immediate incident response is indicated, but node operators may wish to review logs for rejected channel opens with 'unreasonably large' or 'below their channel reserve' errors to identify misconfigured or probing peers.

Security signals we found

01

New inbound-channel fee-rate cap enforcing BOLT-02 'unreasonably large' rejection

02

New balance-reserve validation preventing dead-on-arrival channels

03

Fee cap scales with local estimate but is floored to avoid rejecting sane channels during low-fee periods

04

Sentinel errors added for programmatic identification of rejections

05

Extensive unit and integration test coverage for both rejection and acceptance cases

Risk score

Why this scored 64/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 12/15
Confidence 9/10
Evidence quality 5/5
Human-validated context

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