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High 74 Bitcoin

lnwallet: require an aux sig per HTLC on taproot overlay channels

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by George Tsagkarelis

88/100 · Strong
lnwallet: require an aux sig per HTLC on taproot overlay channels

The aux signature blob is peer supplied and carries no count of its own.
Verification jobs were only built for HTLCs an entry was received for,
so a peer could withhold the aux signature for an HTLC simply by
omitting it: no job was produced, nothing reported the omission, and the
commitment became our state carrying a signature we never received. At
force close the resolver then reads an empty signature out of that
HTLC's custom records, and the second level HTLC cannot be swept.

An aux signer emits exactly one entry per non-dust HTLC, in lockstep
with the BTC level signatures, so the count is now checked the same way
those already are, right beside them.

The check is gated on the tapscript root bit rather than merely on an
aux signer being configured. The signer is attached node wide, so it is
also present on plain channels, whose peers correctly send no aux
signatures at all, and requiring them there would force close those
channels. That bit is set at funding time if and only if the negotiated
commitment type is a taproot overlay, so it names exactly the channels
whose peers owe us aux signatures.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a bug in LND's taproot overlay Lightning channels where a peer could deliberately leave out an extra signature (aux sig) for one or more HTLCs. Because the code only checked the main Bitcoin signatures, the missing aux signature went unnoticed. Later, if the channel was force-closed, the affected HTLC could not be swept on-chain, potentially locking up funds. The fix adds a count check so that every non-dust HTLC must have a matching aux signature on taproot overlay channels.

Recommended action

Upgrade LND nodes running taproot overlay channels to a release containing this commit. Nodes not using taproot overlay channels or not configuring an aux signer are not affected. Monitor channels for force-close scenarios and verify that all HTLCs can be swept.

Security signals we found

01

Missing input validation on peer-supplied aux signature blob length

02

State acceptance despite incomplete signature set

03

On-chain fund recovery failure (second-level HTLC unsweepable) after force close

04

Peer-triggered omission could strand HTLC value

05

Fix is narrowly scoped to taproot overlay channels with active aux signer

Risk score

Why this scored 74/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 22/30
Exploitability 16/25
Stealth signal 12/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 9/10
Evidence quality 5/5
Human-validated context

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