AI-generated analysisPublished automatically and not human-verified. Validated context appears in community notes below.
← Watch feed
Moderate 62 Bitcoin

Merge pull request #11373 from starius/commit-fee-rate-floor

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by ziggieXXX

73/100 · Adequate
Merge pull request #11373 from starius/commit-fee-rate-floor

multi: enforce the commitment fee rate floor
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This patch fixes a bug where LND could propose or accept Lightning channel commitment transaction fees that were too low to be valid. Specifically, with a setting of max-commit-fee-rate-anchors=1, LND would propose 250 sat/kw, below the 253 sat/kw floor its own channel state machine requires. This could prevent channels from carrying payments or cause peers to reject or fail to sign updates. The fix enforces the 253 sat/kw minimum when opening channels, updating fees, and at startup configuration.

Recommended action

Upgrade nodes to this commit or later, especially those using anchor or taproot channels. Operators who set max-commit-fee-rate-anchors=1 should raise it to at least 1 sat/vbyte (253 sat/kw is the effective floor) and monitor startup warnings. Peers running older versions with the low setting may experience failed channel opens against upgraded nodes.

Security signals we found

01

Denial-of-service / channel-stalling: too-low commitment fee rates could leave a channel unable to carry HTLCs or unable to be signed by the peer

02

Interoperability failure: older nodes with max-commit-fee-rate-anchors=1 cannot open anchor/taproot channels to upgraded nodes until reconfigured

03

Configuration-hardening: startup warning when user-supplied cap is below enforced floor

04

Protocol sanity enforcement: fee floor applied before channel acceptor, preventing acceptor bypass of a hard consensus-like rule

Risk score

Why this scored 62/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 12/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

Notes can correct, qualify, or add evidence to the AI analysis. Every note shown here has been validated by a human moderator.

No validated notes yet.

The AI analysis stands alone for now. Submit a note if you can add evidence or important context.