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Low 32 Bitcoin

Merge pull request #11292 from ViktorT-11/2026-10-harden-remote-signing-no-op

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Suheb

73/100 · Adequate
Merge pull request #11292 from ViktorT-11/2026-10-harden-remote-signing-no-op

Follow-up of #8754: Harden remote signing no op
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This change is a hardening fix for LND's remote-signing feature. Previously, if a node was configured to act as an outbound remote signer but was compiled without the required 'signrpc' and 'walletrpc' sub-servers, it would silently fall back to a no-op client. That left the signer node running and appearing healthy while never connecting to the watch-only node, and the watch-only node would wait indefinitely for a signer that never arrives. The patch makes this a fatal startup error with a clear message naming the missing build tags and how to rebuild. It also centralizes the 'is this a signer node?' check so future graduation out of experimental mode only needs one code change.

Recommended action

Operators using the outbound remote signer feature should verify their signer node binary includes the signrpc and walletrpc build tags; official release binaries already include them. Source builders should use tags='signrpc walletrpc ...' or 'make build with-rpc=1'. Reviewers should confirm IsSignerNode() is used consistently elsewhere and that the error is surfaced before the wallet unlock stage.

Security signals we found

01

silent-degradation-to-no-op prevented

02

configuration-misconfiguration now surfaces as fatal error

03

build-tag-dependency explicitly validated at runtime

04

encapsulation of experimental feature flag for future hardening

05

follow-up to prior hardening PR #8754

Risk score

Why this scored 32/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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