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Moderate 61 Bitcoin

Merge pull request #11440 from Roasbeef/fix-longstanding-correctness-bugs

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Olaoluwa Osuntokun

73/100 · Adequate
Merge pull request #11440 from Roasbeef/fix-longstanding-correctness-bugs

multi: tighten wire, fee and transaction invariants
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This is a large bug-fix patch for LND (a Bitcoin Lightning Network node) that tightens correctness rules across many subsystems. It prevents several ways a node could mis-handle channel data, accept bad network gossip, commit corrupted database transactions, miscalculate sweep/close transactions, or read oversized wire messages. The patch is defensive: it adds checks and tests rather than removing functionality, and the release notes describe the changes as fixing 'low-level correctness bugs.'

Recommended action

Operators running LND should upgrade to a release containing this patch. Nodes using the etcd backend and watchtower functionality benefit most urgently. Review release notes for the two operator-visible behavior changes: etcd transactions now fail on read errors, and channels with CSV delay zero are rejected.

Security signals we found

01

Database transaction commit now aborts on read errors (etcd) - prevents silent data corruption / inconsistent state

02

Gossip zombie marking removed for invalid funding script - prevents denial-of-service / channel graph poisoning

03

Wire message length bounding added to watchtower protocol - prevents memory exhaustion / malformed message parsing

04

Dust limit checks corrected for watchtower reward and sweep outputs - prevents creation of non-standard/dust justice transactions

05

HTLC serialization enforces reader-readable size bound - prevents persisted channel state that cannot be reloaded

06

Cooperative close handles omitted-output signature variants correctly - prevents signature/transaction mismatch

07

Aux signatures restricted to taproot-overlay channels - prevents invalid signature data on plain channels

08

CSV delay of zero rejected - prevents commitment transactions with no breach response time

09

Sweeper fee budget and retry invariants tightened - prevents stuck or over-budget sweeps

Risk score

Why this scored 61/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 12/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

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