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Low 30 Bitcoin

Derive MuSig2 nonces from the untweaked aggregate key

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Salvatore Ingala

85/100 · Strong
Derive MuSig2 nonces from the untweaked aggregate key

The `aggpk` argument passed to NonceGen was the aggregate key after all the
tweaks, which depends on the input's (change, address_index) and on the
taptree. This, however, depends on the transaction being signed, which in
some cases might not be known until round 2, since wallets might want to
pre-generate nonces in advance.

Therefore, we change the argument passed to `aggpk` so that it takes the
aggrgate key _before_ the tweaks.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes how cryptographic 'nonces' (one-time random numbers used in multi-signature Bitcoin signing) are derived in Ledger's Bitcoin app. Previously, the nonce was tied to details of the exact transaction being signed, which could cause problems if a wallet wanted to prepare nonces before the final transaction was known. The change makes the nonce depend only on secret device randomness and wallet policy, not on transaction details. The commit frames this as a usability/protocol correctness improvement and explicitly states it is not a security vulnerability, because the old design still did not let an attacker predict or control the nonces.

Recommended action

Treat as a protocol-correctness/usability improvement rather than a security fix. Reviewers may still want to confirm that musig_nonce_gen handles the untweaked aggregate key correctly and that the change does not affect partial signature verification against the tweaked key in round 2. No urgent security response is indicated by the supplied materials.

Security signals we found

01

Change to cryptographic nonce derivation input (aggpk) in MuSig2 signing

02

Removal of transaction-dependent tweak from nonce generation entropy

03

Documentation explicitly states prior behavior was not a security risk and that attacker could not predict or control nonces

04

No CVE, advisory, or independent researcher attribution present in commit materials

Risk score

Why this scored 30/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 4/25
Stealth signal 3/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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