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Low 26 Bitcoin

Using generic and simpler format_sats_amount() for swap as well

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Ilya Artemov

50/100 · Thin
Using generic and simpler format_sats_amount() for swap as well
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit replaces a custom Bitcoin amount-formatting routine used during Ledger's cryptocurrency swap feature with a shared, simpler utility. The old code converted an 8-byte big-endian amount into a human-readable decimal string with a coin ticker. The new code uses the project's generic `format_sats_amount()` function. The change removes about 120 lines of low-level bit-manipulation code. On its own, the commit does not claim to fix a security bug, and the diff does not show an obvious vulnerability. However, any change to amount display logic in a swap context is security-sensitive because a bug could mislead a user about how much value is being exchanged.

Recommended action

Review the implementation of `format_sats_amount()` and `read_u64_be()` to confirm they correctly handle 8-byte big-endian amounts, enforce buffer sizes for `params->printable_amount`, and behave identically to the removed routine for all valid inputs. Because this code is used during swap transactions, any discrepancy in displayed amounts could have financial impact. Consider adding unit tests covering edge amounts (zero, max uint64, leading zeros, smallest subunit).

Security signals we found

01

Amount formatting code changed in swap context

02

Custom BCD/double-dabble conversion removed in favor of generic helper

03

No explicit security claim in commit title or message

04

No input-length or overflow checks visible in diff

05

Cast comment suggests compiler-specific workaround, not a semantic fix

Risk score

Why this scored 26/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 4/25
Stealth signal 3/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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