What changed, and why it matters
This commit is a small follow-up cleanup to a previous pull request. It adds one safety step before validating a sorted key map, clarifies documentation about when missing map keys can be trusted, updates a copyright year, tightens a size check on a Bitcoin transaction field, and removes an oversized temporary buffer. The changes look like defensive hardening rather than a fix for an active bug, and the commit message gives no security context.
Treat as routine hardening. Review the preceding PR to confirm whether these nits address reviewer-flagged security concerns. No immediate incident response is warranted based on this commit alone.
Security signals we found
Defensive initialization of `_keys_are_sorted` flag before validation
Documentation warning that MAP_VALUE_ABSENT is a client assertion, not a cryptographic proof of absence
Addition of an upper size bound on PSBT witness UTXO amount reads
Reduction of stack buffer size to match actual usage
Evidence from the diff
The patch makes four minor changes: (1) in check_merkle_tree_sorted.h it explicitly resets _keys_are_sorted to false before starting validation so an unvalidated map cannot be mistaken for sorted; (2) in map_value_status.h it rewrites comments to stress that MAP_VALUE_ABSENT is an unproven client assertion and callers must not treat any negative result as absence; (3) in psbt_fields.h it adds an upper-bound size check for PSBT_IN_WITNESS_UTXO amount reads; and (4) in txhashes.c it shrinks a stack buffer from MAX(32, 8 + 1 + MAX_PREVOUT_SCRIPTPUBKEY_LEN) to 32 bytes because only 32-byte hashes are stored in it. No vulnerability, CVE, or exploit is described in the commit or supplied references.
Changed components
src/handler/lib/check_merkle_tree_sorted.hsrc/handler/lib/map_value_status.hsrc/handler/sign_psbt/psbt_fields.hsrc/handler/sign_psbt/txhashes.cInspect captured patch +18 / −23
### src/handler/lib/check_merkle_tree_sorted.h
@@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ static inline int call_check_merkle_tree_sorted(dispatcher_context_t *dispatcher
*/
static inline int call_check_merkleized_map_sorted(dispatcher_context_t *dispatcher_context,
merkleized_map_commitment_t *map) {
+ // The map is not yet validated; explicitly mark it as such
+ map->_keys_are_sorted = false;
+
int ret = call_check_merkle_tree_sorted(dispatcher_context, map->keys_root, (size_t) map->size);
if (ret >= 0) {
map->_keys_are_sorted = true;
### src/handler/lib/map_value_status.h
@@ -1,27 +1,17 @@
#pragma once
/**
- * Outcome of reading a value by key out of a merkleized map.
+ * Outcome of the by-key merkleized map readers (call_get_merkleized_map_value[_hash],
+ * call_stream_merkleized_map_value): non-negative is success (byte count, or 0 if not meaningful),
+ * negative is one of the statuses below.
*
- * The by-key readers (call_get_merkleized_map_value, call_get_merkleized_map_value_hash,
- * call_stream_merkleized_map_value) all share this contract:
+ * Callers applying a default for an optional field MUST branch on MAP_VALUE_ABSENT, never on
+ * `res < 0`, which would silently apply the default on errors too.
*
- * - a non-negative return means success; where the operation has a natural length (the number of
- * bytes read) it is returned, otherwise 0;
- * - MAP_VALUE_ABSENT means that the client responded that the key is not in the map;
- * - MAP_VALUE_ERROR means the read failed and no conclusion may be drawn about the key.
- *
- * Callers that apply a default value for an optional field MUST branch on MAP_VALUE_ABSENT
- * specifically, and never on `res < 0`: doing the latter would apply the default on failures,
- * swallowing an error condition.
- *
- * SECURITY — MAP_VALUE_ABSENT is a CLIENT ASSERTION, NOT A PROOF.
- * It reflects the client answering `found = 0` to CCMD_GET_MERKLE_LEAF_INDEX. The device requests
- * no proof of absence, so it cannot distinguish an honest omission from a key the client chose to
- * suppress. Do not treat it as evidence that the committed map lacks the key.
- * Where soundness is required, derive presence from the key enumeration performed while validating
- * the map (see input_keys_callback in sign_psbt/preprocess_inputs.c): those flags are computed by
- * walking the keys tree against the committed `keys_root`, so the client cannot lie about them.
+ * SECURITY: MAP_VALUE_ABSENT is only the client asserting `found = 0`; absence is never proved, so
+ * a malicious client can suppress any key. Where soundness matters, use the presence flags computed
+ * while validating the map against the committed `keys_root` (see input_keys_callback in
+ * sign_psbt/preprocess_inputs.c).
*/
typedef enum {
MAP_VALUE_ABSENT = -1, // the key is not in the map (client assertion - see above)
### src/handler/sign_psbt/psbt_fields.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/*****************************************************************************
* Ledger App Bitcoin.
- * (c) 2025, 2026 Ledger SAS.
+ * (c) 2026 Ledger SAS.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
@@ -115,8 +115,9 @@ psbt_field_status_t psbt_get_input_redeem_script(dispatcher_context_t *dc,
/**
* PSBT_IN_WITNESS_UTXO amount: reads the witness UTXO and returns its 8-byte little-endian amount.
- * Only requires the value to be at least 8 bytes; the full structural validation of the witness
- * UTXO is done elsewhere (see get_amount_scriptpubkey_from_psbt_witness).
+ * Only requires the value to be at least 8 bytes and at most 8 + 1 + MAX_PREVOUT_SCRIPTPUBKEY_LEN;
+ * the full structural validation of the witness UTXO is done elsewhere (see
+ * get_amount_scriptpubkey_from_psbt_witness).
*/
psbt_field_status_t psbt_get_input_witness_utxo_amount(dispatcher_context_t *dc,
const merkleized_map_commitment_t *input_map,
### src/handler/sign_psbt/txhashes.c
@@ -590,7 +590,8 @@ bool __attribute__((noinline)) compute_sighash_segwitv1(
// the first 0x00 byte is not part of SigMsg
crypto_hash_update_u8(&sighash_context.header, 0x00);
- uint8_t tmp[MAX(32, 8 + 1 + MAX_PREVOUT_SCRIPTPUBKEY_LEN)];
+ // re-used multiple times below; the largest size we need is a 32-byte hash
+ uint8_t tmp[32];
// hash type
crypto_hash_update_u8(&sighash_context.header, sighash_byte);Why this scored 36/100
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