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Low 32 Bitcoin

refactor(zcash): route single-tx FFI through checked-PCZT preflight/sign

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Adam Tucker

62/100 · Adequate
refactor(zcash): route single-tx FFI through checked-PCZT preflight/sign
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes how the Keystone hardware wallet handles Zcash transactions. Previously, the wallet checked a transaction and then signed it in separate steps, with the signing step accepting any raw transaction object. Now, the check step produces a verified, normalized transaction object (a 'checked PCZT'), and the signing and parsing steps require that verified object. This is a defensive refactor designed to prevent a malicious or malformed transaction from bypassing the check step and being signed or displayed. It is a security-hardening change, not an active bug fix for a known exploit.

Recommended action

Treat this as a positive hardening change. Review the corresponding app_zcash preflight/sign implementation to confirm ZcashCheckedPczt cannot be constructed from arbitrary bytes by callers, and verify that all call sites in the C/upper firmware layers were updated to pass the checked object. No immediate incident response is indicated by the commit alone.

Security signals we found

01

Single Zcash signing and parsing paths now require a checked PCZT object produced by preflight

02

Raw ZcashPczt input removed from sign_zcash_tx, sign_zcash_tx_cypherpunk, and parse_zcash_tx entry points

03

Null checks and verified_bytes() validation added before signing/parsing

04

Inline PCZT re-validation in cypherpunk signing replaced by app_zcash::sign_checked_pczt

05

Commit title and message describe the change as a refactor through 'checked-PCZT preflight/sign'

Risk score

Why this scored 32/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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