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Moderate 69 Bitcoin

Merge pull request #724 from Foundation-Devices/sft-8255-passport-core-validate-unauthenticated-timestamp-read

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by mjg-foundation

58/100 · Thin
Merge pull request #724 from Foundation-Devices/sft-8255-passport-core-validate-unauthenticated-timestamp-read

Tighten firmware update state checks
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit tightens how the Passport hardware wallet checks the firmware timestamp stored in its secure element during firmware updates. Previously, the device read the timestamp from encrypted storage but did not verify that the stored block was authentic and fresh. The patch adds a cryptographic check (pairing unlock + MAC verification) before trusting the timestamp, and makes production builds fail the update if the timestamp cannot be read or verified. It also adds tests that simulate tampered or stale secure-element responses. In plain terms: the wallet now makes sure the 'minimum allowed firmware version' number it uses during updates hasn't been forged or replayed by an attacker.

Recommended action

Treat this as a security-hardening fix with defensive value against potential downgrade or rollback attacks during firmware updates. Review whether any earlier firmware version allowed updates to proceed with an unverified timestamp, and consider whether a security advisory or firmware release note is warranted. Users should update to a firmware release containing this commit.

Security signals we found

01

Adds cryptographic authentication (pairing unlock + CheckMac) for a previously encrypted-but-unauthenticated firmware timestamp read

02

Treats a zero/unverifiable timestamp as a hard failure in production builds

03

Zeros sensitive buffer on every failure path to reduce information leakage

04

Adds native unit tests that simulate tampered and stale secure-element MAC responses

05

Centralizes minimum-firmware-timestamp retrieval so both header and signature verification paths enforce the same policy

Risk score

Why this scored 69/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 22/30
Exploitability 14/25
Stealth signal 10/15
Affected reach 12/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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