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Moderate 59 Bitcoin

Merge pull request #668 from Foundation-Devices/fix/refuse-untrusted-multisig

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Jacksper13

73/100 · Adequate
Merge pull request #668 from Foundation-Devices/fix/refuse-untrusted-multisig

Abort signing when a proposed multisig wallet is rejected
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This update changes how Passport handles multisig wallet setups proposed by a transaction file (PSBT). Previously, if the user declined to import a proposed multisig configuration while using a temporary seed, the device would still sign the transaction and only warn that the config wouldn't be saved. Now it cancels signing instead. Also, when a temporary seed is active, the device now asks the user before using a PSBT-proposed multisig wallet rather than silently skipping that step. The goal is to prevent a user from accidentally signing a transaction with an untrusted or unexpected multisig wallet.

Recommended action

Treat this as a security-hardening fix and include it in the next firmware release. Review related PSBT signing paths to ensure no other warn-and-continue behavior exists for unapproved multisig configurations. Consider whether the same abort-on-rejection behavior should apply to non-temporary seeds as well.

Security signals we found

01

Behavioral change from warn-and-continue to abort-on-rejection for untrusted PSBT-proposed multisig wallets

02

Default policy change for temporary seeds from silent skip (MUSIG_SKIP) to explicit ask (MUSIG_ASK)

03

Added unit test covering rejection, approval, and default policy behavior

04

Changelog explicitly describes the change as a security-relevant confirmation requirement

Risk score

Why this scored 59/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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