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Low 26 Bitcoin

channeld: Add extra_tlvs to incomming wire msg

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Peter Neuroth

68/100 · Adequate
channeld: Add extra_tlvs to incomming wire msg

This appends the extra_tlvs to the internal channeld_offer_htlc wire
msg. We also recombine the extra_tlvs with the blinded path key for
forwarding htlcs.

Signed-off-by: Peter Neuroth <pet.v.ne@gmail.com>
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes how Core Lightning passes extra data fields (TLVs) when forwarding or storing payment instructions inside the channel daemon. It adds a new field to an internal message and recombines those extra fields with a blinding key before the HTLC is added to the channel. There is no direct evidence in the commit that this fixes a security bug; it appears to be a protocol-correctness or feature-completeness change for blinded routes.

Recommended action

Treat as a normal code-review item. Verify that malformed extra_tlvs cannot be used to crash channeld or cause memory corruption, since parsing failure is only logged. Confirm that callers forwarding HTLCs actually populate extra_tlvs when required by protocol specs, because the current callers pass NULL. If this change is part of a larger blinded-route feature, review the full series for consistency.

Security signals we found

01

New internal wire field added (extra_tlvs) and parsed with fromwire_tlv using FROMWIRE_TLV_ANY_TYPE

02

Parsed TLV failure is logged via status_unusual but does not appear to abort HTLC handling

03

Blinded path key and extra TLVs are recombined before channel_add_htlc

04

No explicit bounds/sanity checks on parsed TLV contents beyond the generic TLV parser

05

No mention of CVE, security bug, or vulnerability in commit message or diff

Risk score

Why this scored 26/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 4/10
Evidence quality 2/5
Human-validated context

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