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Informational 23 Bitcoin

lsp_plugin: add lsps2_buy request and handler

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Peter Neuroth

68/100 · Adequate
lsp_plugin: add lsps2_buy request and handler

Adds the lsps2.buy request to the client and the lsps2.buy handler to
the LSP service.

Signed-off-by: Peter Neuroth <pet.v.ne@gmail.com>
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a new feature to the experimental LSPS (Lightning Service Provider Specification) plugin, allowing a client to request a 'just-in-time' channel purchase from a service provider and the service to handle that request. It is a feature addition to a development plugin, not a fix for a known security bug. The code includes validation of fee parameters and basic bounds checks, but because it is new and touches payment-related logic, it introduces some risk of implementation flaws.

Recommended action

Treat this as a routine feature addition requiring normal review. Reviewers should focus on the fee calculation overflow handling, promise validation correctness, datastore key collision risks, and whether the generated temporary SCID could conflict with real on-chain SCIDs or previously issued JIT SCIDs. Since the plugin is experimental/dev-flagged, no urgent security response is indicated by the diff alone.

Security signals we found

01

New RPC surface added to an experimental plugin (lsps-lsps2-buy)

02

Client-side payment-size bounds check before sending request

03

Client-side opening-fee calculation with overflow handling via compute_opening_fee

04

Service-side HMAC/promise validation via fee_params.validate

05

Service-side datastore persistence of peer_id, fee params, and expected payment size

06

Temporary SCID generation uses current blockheight + 6 and random tx/output indices

07

No explicit duplicate-SCID or datastore collision check (marked FIXME)

08

No explicit rate-limiting or anti-spam controls visible in the diff

09

Default client_trusts_lsp set to false, reducing trust assumptions

Risk score

Why this scored 23/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 3/30
Exploitability 4/25
Stealth signal 3/15
Affected reach 4/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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