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Moderate 60 Bitcoin

lsp_plugin: add client side check for zero_conf

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Peter Neuroth

68/100 · Adequate
lsp_plugin: add client side check for zero_conf

We only allow zero_conf channels if we approved the a jit-channel from
the LSP in advance.

Signed-off-by: Peter Neuroth <pet.v.ne@gmail.com>
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a security check in Core Lightning's LSPS (Lightning Service Provider Specification) plugin so that the client only accepts 'zero confirmation' channels from LSPs it has previously approved for a JIT (just-in-time) channel. Before this change, the plugin blindly allowed any zero-conf channel opening, which could let a malicious or mistaken LSP open a channel the user never requested. The patch stores an approval record when the user approves a JIT channel, then checks that record when an open-channel request arrives, deleting it after use. A new test confirms that unapproved zero-conf channels are rejected.

Recommended action

Review and merge if the LSPS2 plugin is in use; ensure the datastore record deletion failure path does not leave stale approvals that could be reused, and consider completing the FIXME to verify client_trusts_lsp mode before granting zero-conf.

Security signals we found

01

Missing authorization check before patch: on_openchannel previously allowed all zero-conf channels with a hardcoded continue/mindepth=0

02

Added allowlist/datastore lookup to gate zero-conf acceptance on prior user approval

03

Changed datastore key from jit_channel_scid to lsp_id, aligning lookup with peer identity

04

Channel type bits now explicitly include zero-conf/SCID-alias features

05

Regression test added for unapproved zero-conf channel rejection

Risk score

Why this scored 60/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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