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Informational 22 Bitcoin

xpay: correctly identify final node when using a dummy blinded path.

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Rusty Russell

85/100 · Strong
xpay: correctly identify final node when using a dummy blinded path.

We would get WIRE_INCORRECT_OR_UNKNOWN_PAYMENT_DETAILS in this case if
the invoice was unknown, and think it weird because it came from an
intermediate node. In practice the result is the same (as it would remove
the blinded path), but it was misleading.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This is a small bug-fix in Core Lightning's experimental 'xpay' payment plugin. When a payment used a privacy feature called a 'blinded path' (a dummy route that hides the real final recipient), the plugin could misidentify which node reported a payment failure. The actual payment behavior was unchanged, but the internal reasoning used to decide what to do next was misleading. There is no direct security exploit here; it is a correctness fix that prevents a wrong diagnostic from potentially causing a poor routing decision later.

Recommended action

Treat as a routine correctness fix. Review whether other failure-handling paths in xpay make similar assumptions about hop index versus destination identity when blinded paths are present. No urgent security response is indicated by the diff or commit message alone.

Security signals we found

01

Logic error in failure attribution for privacy-preserving payment paths

02

Potential for incorrect routing knowledge updates from misclassified onion errors

03

No input validation, memory safety, or cryptographic flaw visible in diff

Risk score

Why this scored 22/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 4/30
Exploitability 0/25
Stealth signal 3/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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