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Informational 18 Bitcoin

clnrest: change utoipa to my GH branch with daywalker90's deterministic PR merged.

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Rusty Russell

73/100 · Adequate
clnrest: change utoipa to my GH branch with daywalker90's deterministic PR merged.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Changelog-Fixed: Build: release builds with tools/build-release.sh are deterministic again.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit switches a software dependency (the 'utoipa' Rust library, used by Core Lightning's REST plugin) from the official published version to a personal GitHub branch maintained by the project's own Rusty Russell. The reason given is to include another contributor's fix that makes release builds deterministic again—meaning builds from the same source code produce identical output. There is no direct evidence in the commit of a security vulnerability; the concern is that relying on an unofficial, personal fork instead of a released crate introduces supply-chain and maintenance risks.

Recommended action

Treat this as a supply-chain hygiene issue rather than an active vulnerability. Verify the exact git commit referenced (26f4908b092a4a746cbec935e05165852ea01289) matches the claimed upstream deterministic-build PR, monitor for an official utoipa release that includes the fix, and revert to crates.io once available. Review the fork for unexpected changes beyond the determinism patch.

Security signals we found

01

Dependency source changed from official crates.io registry to a personal GitHub fork

02

No CVE, advisory, or security disclosure referenced in commit or supplied materials

03

Changelog labels this as a build determinism fix, not a security fix

04

Pinning to a specific git commit reduces but does not eliminate supply-chain risk compared to a signed registry release

Risk score

Why this scored 18/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 1/25
Stealth signal 1/15
Affected reach 2/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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