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Informational 23 Bitcoin

lightningd: allow another gossip state transition.

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Rusty Russell

81/100 · Strong
lightningd: allow another gossip state transition.

This can definitely happen with zeroconf and the about-to-be-implemented withheld=True:

```
lightningd-1 2025-09-12T13:17:50.848Z **BROKEN** 022d223620a359a47ff7f7ac447c85c46c923da53389221a0054c11c1e3ca31d59-chan#1: Illegal gossip state transition: CGOSSIP_WAITING_FOR_SCID->CGOSSIP_CHANNEL_UNANNOUNCED_DYING
```

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This is a small bug-fix patch for Core Lightning's internal channel gossip state machine. It adds one previously missing allowed transition between two internal states, preventing the daemon from logging a 'BROKEN' error and potentially misbehaving when a special type of channel (zeroconf, or soon a 'withheld' funding flow) is closed before the funding transaction is mined. There is no indication this allows an attacker to steal funds or take control; it is a robustness fix for an edge case in protocol handling.

Recommended action

Treat as a routine bug-fix/robustness improvement. Reviewers may want to confirm no other missing transitions exist for the new withheld=True flow, but no urgent security response is indicated by this commit alone.

Security signals we found

01

Fixes an internal state-machine error path (BROKEN log) for zeroconf/withheld channels

02

No memory safety, cryptographic, or authorization boundary change visible in diff

03

No input validation, parsing, or network message handling change visible in diff

04

Commit message describes the issue as a state transition that 'can definitely happen', not as a vulnerability

Risk score

Why this scored 23/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 0/25
Stealth signal 3/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

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