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Low 43 Bitcoin

channeld: allow outgoing messages through even if they have send STFU.

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Rusty Russell

85/100 · Strong
channeld: allow outgoing messages through even if they have send STFU.

Otherwise, we can hang: we don't send commitment_signed, and they're
waiting to receive it.

1. We defer fee updates, blockheight updates and master requests
(adding and closing htlcs) if we're *trying* or *started* to quiesce.
2. We only stop actually sending commitment_signed if we have sent
STFU.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Changelog-EXPERIMENTAL: Protocol: avoid an occasional hang when splicing with a pending closing HTLC.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This patch fixes a hang in Core Lightning's experimental splicing feature. Previously, once a node decided to enter 'quiet' mode (STFU) for splicing, it would stop sending all outgoing channel update messages, including the commitment_signed message the other side was waiting for. The fix lets messages that are already in flight go out, and only blocks brand-new activity once STFU has actually been sent. This prevents the two peers from deadlocking during a splice when a closing payment is still pending.

Recommended action

Treat as a bug-fix commit with limited denial-of-service security relevance. Users running experimental splicing should upgrade to avoid channel hangs. No immediate emergency response is warranted; review whether the hang is externally triggerable and could be abused to lock up liquidity.

Security signals we found

01

Denial-of-service-like hang in channel state machine

02

Protocol deadlock during experimental splicing

03

STFU/quiescence state machine logic error

04

Missing commitment_signed transmission

Risk score

Why this scored 43/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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