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Informational 18 Bitcoin

pytest: fix broken message in test_even_sendcustommsg.

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Rusty Russell

83/100 · Strong
pytest: fix broken message in test_even_sendcustommsg.

We can stop listening on the incoming peer while we are closing, so we don't notice if they close:

```
['lightningd-2 2025-09-03T09:48:19.555Z **BROKEN** 0266e4598d1d3c415f572a8488830b60f7e744ed9235eb0b1ba93283b315c03518-connectd: Peer did not close, forcing close', 'lightningd-2 2025-09-03T09:48:22.918Z **BROKEN** 0266e4598d1d3c415f572a8488830b60f7e744ed9235eb0b1ba93283b315c03518-connectd: Peer did not close, forcing close']
=========================== short test summary info ============================
ERROR tests/test_misc.py::test_even_sendcustommsg - ValueError:
```

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This is a tiny fix inside Core Lightning's connection handling code. It makes the daemon wake up its incoming-message listener when a peer connection is being drained and shut down. Without the wake-up, the test suite could hit a race where the daemon did not notice the peer had closed, causing a harmless but noisy 'BROKEN' log and a test failure. There is no indication this is an exploitable security bug; it is a test-flake / cleanup correctness fix.

Recommended action

Treat as a normal bugfix / test-stability patch. No urgent security action required. If backporting, include it with other test-flake fixes.

Security signals we found

01

Fixes a race/cleanup bug in peer shutdown path

02

No input validation, memory corruption, or cryptographic issue visible

03

BROKEN log message was a symptom of missed close notification, not an active exploit

Risk score

Why this scored 18/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 0/25
Stealth signal 2/15
Affected reach 2/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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