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Low 33 Bitcoin

channeld: Implement receiving of `start_batch`

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Dusty Daemon

60/100 · Adequate
channeld: Implement receiving of `start_batch`

Since `batch_size` has moved into this new message, we can’t ignore it anymore and have to process it
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds code to handle a new peer message called 'start_batch' in Core Lightning's channel daemon. Previously, the message type existed but was ignored (the case just returned). Now the daemon parses the message, checks that it is requesting a batch of 'commitment_signed' messages, and forwards the batch size into the existing batch signature handling logic. The change itself is a feature completion rather than a clear security fix, but it removes a place where a protocol message was silently ignored and could have caused mismatched state between two channel peers.

Recommended action

Review whether batch_size needs an upper-bound sanity check before being passed to handle_peer_commit_sig_batch(), and confirm that peer_failed_warn() on malformed start_batch is the desired failure policy. Audit the interaction between start_batch and the next read message to ensure an attacker cannot desynchronize the channel state by sending an unexpected or malformed start_batch.

Security signals we found

01

Previously ignored protocol message is now parsed and acted upon

02

Message parsing failure calls peer_failed_warn(), terminating the connection

03

Unrecognized batch_info types are logged and ignored rather than failing the peer

04

batch_size is now consumed from a peer-controlled message and passed to batch commitment signature handling

05

No input length or batch_size bounds checks visible in the added code

Risk score

Why this scored 33/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 6/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 4/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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