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Low 41 Bitcoin

dualopend: keep track of whether we sent our tx_signatures

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Sangbida Chaudhuri

85/100 · Strong
dualopend: keep track of whether we sent our tx_signatures

Add local_funding_sigs_sent to tx_state, set when we write our sigs to
the peer (both the normal path and the reconnect dance). Pass it back
in over dualopend_reinit, since dualopend restarts on every reconnect
and would otherwise start from scratch.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
(cherry picked from commit c654559c471c11e699e39cb2b9eb2d512701911e)
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This change fixes a bookkeeping problem in Core Lightning's dual-funding channel opener (dualopend). The daemon now remembers whether it already sent its transaction signatures to the peer, and carries that memory across reconnects. Without this, after a reconnect the opener could forget it had already sent signatures and behave as if it hadn't, likely causing protocol confusion, duplicate sends, or a stuck channel open. The patch is small and defensive; the commit message does not call it a security fix, but it clearly corrects state-handling behavior that could affect funds safety.

Recommended action

Treat as a recommended stability and safety fix. Review whether the existing inflight->i_sent_sigs persistence in lightningd is correct and whether any other tx_state booleans (e.g., remote_funding_sigs_rcvd, has_commitments) need similar reconnect preservation. No immediate emergency response is indicated by the diff alone.

Security signals we found

01

state-desynchronization across reconnect

02

dual-funding signature replay/duplicate-send risk

03

potential channel open stall or inconsistent commitment state

04

defensive correctness fix in on-chain funding protocol

Risk score

Why this scored 41/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 5/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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