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Informational 18 Bitcoin

Revert "bookkeeper: don't flood logs if we have many channelmoves all at once."

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Rusty Russell

83/100 · Strong
Revert "bookkeeper: don't flood logs if we have many channelmoves all at once."

This reverts commit 1dda0c07530d01dfa50f6121ba30530659a1475b so we can test
what its like to be flooded with logs again.

This benefits from other improvements we've made this release, to handling
plugin input (i.e. converting to use common/jsonrpc_io), so this doesn't
make much difference.

tests/test_coinmoves.py::test_generate_coinmoves (100,000, sqlite3):
Time (from start to end of l2 node): 211 seconds
Worst latency: 108 seconds

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit removes a small log-throttling feature in Core Lightning's bookkeeper plugin. Previously, if many channel balance updates arrived at once, the plugin only logged the first and last one to avoid spamming debug logs. This change reverts that behavior so every update is logged again. The author says this is acceptable because other performance improvements this release make the flood less of a problem. There is no direct security vulnerability here; the main effect is more debug log output, which could slightly increase disk use or log-noise under heavy load.

Recommended action

No immediate security action required. Operators who rely on compact debug logs under heavy channel activity may notice increased log volume. If log flooding becomes problematic in production, consider re-applying the throttling or adjusting log levels. Reviewers should confirm the performance claim (211s/108s worst latency) holds on their target deployment.

Security signals we found

01

Reversion of a log-flooding mitigation

02

Increased debug log volume under high channel-move load

03

No input validation, memory safety, or authorization changes

Risk score

Why this scored 18/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 0/25
Stealth signal 1/15
Affected reach 2/15
Confidence 9/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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