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Low 29 Bitcoin

fetchinvoice: don't bother with checking recurrence timing.

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Rusty Russell

73/100 · Adequate
fetchinvoice: don't bother with checking recurrence timing.

We don't actually need to enforce this check here: we can make that
the users' responsibility. This simplifies our work quite a lot,
since createinvoicerequest won't have to do a lookup any more.

This can be done by the repeatpay plugin itself.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit removes local timing checks in Core Lightning's fetchinvoice plugin for recurring payments. Instead of the plugin refusing too-early or too-late invoice requests, it now lets the remote node decide and report back. The change is described by the author as a simplification, moving responsibility to a separate plugin and the user. It is not presented as a security fix, and the tests are updated to expect remote error messages rather than local ones.

Recommended action

Review whether the remote node reliably enforces the same recurrence limits and pay windows, and confirm the repeatpay plugin or user-facing tooling now performs the checks that were removed. If enforcement gaps exist, consider reintroducing validation at an appropriate layer and adding regression tests.

Security signals we found

01

Removal of local input-validation checks for recurring invoice requests

02

Reliance on remote-party enforcement for recurrence period limits and pay windows

03

Test expectations changed from local rejection to remote failure messages

04

No explicit security framing or CVE reference in commit or supplied references

Risk score

Why this scored 29/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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