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Low 41 Bitcoin

lightningd: cancel watching original funding when we switch to the new one via splice.

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Rusty Russell

73/100 · Adequate
lightningd: cancel watching original funding when we switch to the new one via splice.

This happens if the channel is *not* announcable yet. Then we hit the assertion
in funding_depth_cb that the txid is the same as the current funding.txid.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Changelog-EXPERIMENTAL: fixed crash when we splice a channel which hasn't been announced yet.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a crash in Core Lightning that can happen when a user splices a channel that hasn't been publicly announced yet. Splicing is an experimental feature that changes a channel's funding transaction. The bug caused the program to hit an internal consistency check (assertion) because it was still monitoring the old funding transaction after switching to the new one. The commit only adds test stub functions and does not show the actual fix code, so we can only infer the intended change from the commit message.

Recommended action

Obtain the full commit or the actual production code change to verify that the stale txwatch is properly canceled when switching funding during splice. Treat this as a reliability/DoS issue until the real fix is reviewed. If running experimental splicing, ensure this patch (or the complete version) is applied.

Security signals we found

01

Assertion/crash in funding_depth_cb due to stale funding tx watch

02

Splicing on non-announcable channels triggers inconsistency

03

Changelog-EXPERIMENTAL labels this as a crash fix

04

Only test stubs are visible in the diff; production fix is not shown

Risk score

Why this scored 41/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 2/5
Human-validated context

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