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Low 35 Bitcoin

offers: require opt_onion_message for incoming invoices too. Changelog-Fixed: offers: require peers for blinded paths to have `option_onion_messages`, due to reports of LND not forwarding our blinded payments correctly.

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by 21M4TW

85/100 · Strong
offers: require opt_onion_message for incoming invoices too.
Changelog-Fixed: offers: require peers for blinded paths to have `option_onion_messages`, due to reports of LND not forwarding our blinded payments correctly.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This change tightens which network peers Core Lightning will choose when creating hidden (blinded) payment paths for incoming invoices. Previously it only required support for route blinding; now it also requires support for onion messages. The reason given is that LND nodes were reportedly not forwarding these hidden payments correctly, which could cause payment failures or routing problems. It is a robustness fix rather than a clear-cut security patch, and there is no evidence in the commit of funds being stolen.

Recommended action

Treat as a normal bugfix/interoperability improvement. Review whether the feature-bit check is sufficient or whether additional runtime probing of peer forwarding behavior is needed. Monitor for any follow-up patches or advisories from the Core Lightning team regarding LND blinded-payment forwarding.

Security signals we found

01

Change in peer-selection logic for blinded payment paths

02

Interoperability failure with a third-party implementation (LND) cited as motivation

03

No explicit vulnerability disclosure or CVE referenced in commit

04

No input validation, memory safety, or cryptographic changes

05

Small, targeted patch in a single plugin file

Risk score

Why this scored 35/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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