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Low 34 Bitcoin

lightningd: allow openchannel_abort up until we send tx_signatures

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Sangbida Chaudhuri

91/100 · Strong
lightningd: allow openchannel_abort up until we send tx_signatures

Previously we refused to abort once commitments were exchanged, but
per BOLT #2 an abort is fine as long as we haven't sent our
tx_signatures yet. Also adds a test for the case where the opener
aborts after the accepter has already sent theirs.

Changelog-Changed: JSON-RPC: `openchannel_abort` can now abort an open after commitments are secured, as long as `tx_signatures` has not been sent.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
(cherry picked from commit dd09e5129f2b4f3516940f1a0d00e822f9e72dd4)
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This change loosens when a user can cancel an in-progress Lightning channel opening. Previously, the software blocked cancellation once both sides had exchanged commitment signatures, even though the protocol rules allow cancellation until the opener has actually sent their transaction signatures. The fix lets users abort later in the process and adds a test confirming the correct behavior. It is a protocol-correctness and usability improvement rather than a fix for an active attack.

Recommended action

Review as normal protocol-correctness change. Verify that the cleanup path after aborting with commitments secured properly forgets the channel on the aborting side and does not leave stale signatures or PSBT data that could be reused. Run the new test and existing dual-funding tests.

Security signals we found

01

Protocol state machine relaxation: abort allowed closer to funding broadcast

02

BOLT #2 compliance: abort permitted until tx_signatures sent

03

New regression test for abort-after-accepter-signatures edge case

04

Potential concern: aborting after commitments are secured changes cleanup path; must ensure no double-spend or state inconsistency

Risk score

Why this scored 34/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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