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Low 35 Bitcoin

gossipd: don't shortcut dying phase for local channels.

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Rusty Russell

73/100 · Adequate
gossipd: don't shortcut dying phase for local channels.

This means that we won't complain to peers which gossip about our
channels, but it does mean that our channel graph (like other nodes on
the network) will show two channels, not one, for the duration.

For this reason, we need askrene to omit local dying channels.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This change adjusts how Core Lightning handles its own closing payment channels on the network map. Previously, the node immediately erased its own spent channels from the gossip map, while other nodes kept them in a temporary 'dying' state. Now local channels follow the same dying-phase rules as everyone else's, and the routing plugin is told to ignore those local dying channels when finding payment routes. The main visible effect is that the network graph briefly shows two channel entries during a splice or close, instead of one. The commit does not describe this as a security fix, but the old shortcut could have caused routing confusion or inconsistent gossip handling.

Recommended action

Treat as a correctness/robustness improvement rather than an urgent security patch. Review whether the old immediate-deletion behavior could have caused routing loops, failed payments, or inconsistent channel state during splices or closes. No immediate emergency action is indicated by the commit alone.

Security signals we found

01

Behavior change in gossip state machine for local channels

02

Routing plugin now explicitly excludes local dying channels

03

Removal of asymmetric local-channel shortcut

04

Test expectations updated to reflect delayed deletion

Risk score

Why this scored 35/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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