global: use lightning-hsmtool not hsmtool.

diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index f6cd7c1a..361216e3 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -934,8 +934,7 @@ TESTBINS = \
 	$(CLN_PLUGIN_EXAMPLES) \
 	tests/plugins/test_libplugin \
 	tests/plugins/channeld_fakenet \
-	tests/plugins/test_selfdisable_after_getmanifest \
-	tools/hsmtool
+	tests/plugins/test_selfdisable_after_getmanifest
 
 # The testpack is used in CI to transfer built artefacts between the
 # build and the test phase. This is necessary because the fixtures in
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 46bd108b..ca5969bb 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ If the two blockheights drift apart it might be necessary to intervene.
 
 ### HD wallet encryption
 
-You can encrypt the `hsm_secret` content (which is used to derive the HD wallet's master key) by passing the `--encrypted-hsm` startup argument, or by using the `hsmtool` (which you can find in the `tool/` directory at the root of this repo) with the `encrypt` method. You can unencrypt an encrypted `hsm_secret` using the `hsmtool` with the `decrypt` method.
+You can encrypt the `hsm_secret` content (which is used to derive the HD wallet's master key) by passing the `--encrypted-hsm` startup argument, or by using the `lightning-hsmtool` (which you can find in the `tool/` directory at the root of this repo) with the `encrypt` method. You can unencrypt an encrypted `hsm_secret` using the `lightning-hsmtool` with the `decrypt` method.
 
 If you encrypt your `hsm_secret`, you will have to pass the `--encrypted-hsm` startup option to `lightningd`. Once your `hsm_secret` is encrypted, you __will not__ be able to access your funds without your password, so please beware with your password management. Also, beware of not feeling too safe with an encrypted `hsm_secret`: unlike for `bitcoind` where the wallet encryption can restrict the usage of some RPC command, `lightningd` always needs to access keys from the wallet which is thus __not locked__ (yet), even with an encrypted BIP32 master seed.
 
diff --git a/contrib/msggen/msggen/schema.json b/contrib/msggen/msggen/schema.json
index 6a373d1c..8b2e1abc 100644
--- a/contrib/msggen/msggen/schema.json
+++ b/contrib/msggen/msggen/schema.json
@@ -7472,7 +7472,7 @@
               "Value to be decoded:",
               "    * a *bolt11* or *bolt12* string (optionally prefixed by `lightning:` or `LIGHTNING:`) as specified by the BOLT 11 and BOLT 12 specifications.",
               "    * a *rune* as created by lightning-commando-rune(7).",
-              "    * an *emergency_recover* string generated by hsmtool like `lightning-hsmtool getemergencyrecover <path/to/emergency.recover>`. It holds `emergency.recover` contents and starts with `clnemerg1`."
+              "    * an *emergency_recover* string generated by lightning-hsmtool like `lightning-hsmtool getemergencyrecover <path/to/emergency.recover>`. It holds `emergency.recover` contents and starts with `clnemerg1`."
             ]
           }
         }
@@ -30511,7 +30511,7 @@
       "description": [
         "The **recover** RPC command wipes your node and restarts it with the `--recover` option. This is only permitted if the node is unused: no channels, no bitcoin addresses issued (you can use `check` to see if recovery is possible).",
         "",
-        "*hsmsecret* is either a codex32 secret starting with \"cl1\" as returned by `hsmtool getcodexsecret`, or a raw 64 character hex string.",
+        "*hsmsecret* is either a codex32 secret starting with \"cl1\" as returned by `lightning-hsmtool getcodexsecret`, or a raw 64 character hex string.",
         "",
         "NOTE: this command only currently works with the `sqlite3` database backend."
       ],
@@ -30524,7 +30524,7 @@
           "hsmsecret": {
             "type": "string",
             "description": [
-              "Either a codex32 secret starting with `cl1` as returned by `hsmtool getcodexsecret`, or a raw 64 character hex string."
+              "Either a codex32 secret starting with `cl1` as returned by `lightning-hsmtool getcodexsecret`, or a raw 64 character hex string."
             ]
           }
         }
diff --git a/doc/beginners-guide/backup-and-recovery/hsm-secret.md b/doc/beginners-guide/backup-and-recovery/hsm-secret.md
index e1fa3a02..d23ef537 100644
--- a/doc/beginners-guide/backup-and-recovery/hsm-secret.md
+++ b/doc/beginners-guide/backup-and-recovery/hsm-secret.md
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ privacy:
 
 ## Generate HSM Secret
 
-If you are deploying a new node that has no funds and channels yet, you can generate BIP39 words using any process, and create the `hsm_secret` using the `hsmtool generatehsm` command. If you did `make install` then `hsmtool` is installed as [`lightning-hsmtool`](ref:lightning-hsmtool), else you can find it in the `tools/` directory of the build directory.
+If you are deploying a new node that has no funds and channels yet, you can generate BIP39 words using any process, and create the `hsm_secret` using the `lightning-hsmtool generatehsm` command. If you did `make install` then `hsmtool` is installed as [`lightning-hsmtool`](ref:lightning-hsmtool), else you can find it in the `tools/` directory of the build directory.
 
 ```shell
 lightning-hsmtool generatehsm hsm_secret
@@ -25,14 +25,14 @@ You can regenerate the same `hsm_secret` file using the same BIP39 words, which
 
 You can encrypt the `hsm_secret` content (which is used to derive the HD wallet's master key):
 - either by passing the `--encrypted-hsm` startup argument
-- or by using the `encrypt` method from `/tools/hsmtool`. 
+- or by using the `encrypt` method from `/tools/lightning-hsmtool`. 
 
 If you encrypt your `hsm_secret`, you will have to pass the `--encrypted-hsm` startup option to `lightningd`. Once your `hsm_secret` is encrypted, you **will not** be able to access your funds without your password, so please beware with your password management. Also, beware of not feeling too safe with an encrypted `hsm_secret`: unlike for `bitcoind` where the wallet encryption can restrict the usage of some RPC command, `lightningd` always needs to access keys from the wallet which is thus **not locked** (yet), even with an encrypted BIP32 master seed.
 
 
 ## Decrypt HSM Secret
 
-You can unencrypt an encrypted `hsm_secret` using the `hsmtool` with the `decrypt` method.
+You can unencrypt an encrypted `hsm_secret` using the `lightning-hsmtool` with the `decrypt` method.
 
 ```shell
 lightning-hsmtool decrypt ${LIGHTNINGDIR}/hsm_secret
diff --git a/doc/beginners-guide/backup.md b/doc/beginners-guide/backup.md
index dc31df16..9811b9d2 100644
--- a/doc/beginners-guide/backup.md
+++ b/doc/beginners-guide/backup.md
@@ -65,9 +65,9 @@ chmod 0400 hsm_secret
 
 #### Codex32 Format
 
-Run `tools/hsmtool getcodexsecret <hsm/secret/path> <id>` to get the `hsm_secret` in codex32 format.
+Run `tools/lightning-hsmtool getcodexsecret <hsm/secret/path> <id>` to get the `hsm_secret` in codex32 format.
 
-Example `tools/hsmtool getcodexsecret ~/.lightning/bitcoin/hsm_secret adt0`.
+Example `tools/lightning-hsmtool getcodexsecret ~/.lightning/bitcoin/hsm_secret adt0`.
 
 `hsm/secret/path` in the above command is `$LIGHTNINGDIR/hsm_secret`, and
 `id` is any 4 character string used to identify this secret. It **cannot** contain `i`, `o`, or `b`, but **can** contain all digits except `1`.
diff --git a/doc/lightningd-config.5.md b/doc/lightningd-config.5.md
index a905d29e..e63d5b32 100644
--- a/doc/lightningd-config.5.md
+++ b/doc/lightningd-config.5.md
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ connections. Default is 9736.
 
 * **recover**=*hsmsecret*
 
-  Restore the node from a 32-byte secret encoded as either a codex32 secret string or a 64-character hex string: this will fail if the `hsm_secret` file exists.  Your node will start the node in offline mode, for manual recovery.  The secret can be extracted from the `hsm_secret` using hsmtool(8).
+  Restore the node from a 32-byte secret encoded as either a codex32 secret string or a 64-character hex string: this will fail if the `hsm_secret` file exists.  Your node will start the node in offline mode, for manual recovery.  The secret can be extracted from the `hsm_secret` using lightning-hsmtool(8).
 
 * **alias**=*NAME*
 
diff --git a/doc/node-operators-guide/faq.md b/doc/node-operators-guide/faq.md
index aaf8c23d..17ad832d 100644
--- a/doc/node-operators-guide/faq.md
+++ b/doc/node-operators-guide/faq.md
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ There are 3 types of 'rescans' you can make:
 
 ### Database corruption / channel state lost
 
-If you lose data (likely corrupted `lightningd.sqlite3`) about a channel **with `option_static_remotekey` enabled**, you can wait for your peer to unilateraly close the channel, then use `tools/hsmtool` with the `guesstoremote` command to attempt to recover your funds from the peer's published unilateral close transaction.
+If you lose data (likely corrupted `lightningd.sqlite3`) about a channel **with `option_static_remotekey` enabled**, you can wait for your peer to unilateraly close the channel, then use `tools/lightning-hsmtool` with the `guesstoremote` command to attempt to recover your funds from the peer's published unilateral close transaction.
 
 If `option_static_remotekey` was not enabled, you're probably out of luck. The keys for your funds in your peer's unilateral close transaction are derived from information you lost. Fortunately, since version `0.7.3` channels are created with `option_static_remotekey` by default if your peer supports it. Which is to say that channels created after block [598000](https://blockstream.info/block/0000000000000000000dd93b8fb5c622b9c903bf6f921ef48e266f0ead7faedb)  
 (short channel id starting with > 598000) have a high chance of supporting `option_static_remotekey`. You can verify it using the `features` field from the [`listpeers` command](ref:listpeers)'s result.
diff --git a/doc/schemas/decode.json b/doc/schemas/decode.json
index 4a7ed03d..6635eff5 100644
--- a/doc/schemas/decode.json
+++ b/doc/schemas/decode.json
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
           "Value to be decoded:",
           "    * a *bolt11* or *bolt12* string (optionally prefixed by `lightning:` or `LIGHTNING:`) as specified by the BOLT 11 and BOLT 12 specifications.",
           "    * a *rune* as created by lightning-commando-rune(7).",
-          "    * an *emergency_recover* string generated by hsmtool like `lightning-hsmtool getemergencyrecover <path/to/emergency.recover>`. It holds `emergency.recover` contents and starts with `clnemerg1`."
+          "    * an *emergency_recover* string generated by lightning-hsmtool like `lightning-hsmtool getemergencyrecover <path/to/emergency.recover>`. It holds `emergency.recover` contents and starts with `clnemerg1`."
         ]
       }
     }
diff --git a/doc/schemas/recover.json b/doc/schemas/recover.json
index 0112a5e2..9732879c 100644
--- a/doc/schemas/recover.json
+++ b/doc/schemas/recover.json
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
   "description": [
     "The **recover** RPC command wipes your node and restarts it with the `--recover` option. This is only permitted if the node is unused: no channels, no bitcoin addresses issued (you can use `check` to see if recovery is possible).",
     "",
-    "*hsmsecret* is either a codex32 secret starting with \"cl1\" as returned by `hsmtool getcodexsecret`, or a raw 64 character hex string.",
+    "*hsmsecret* is either a codex32 secret starting with \"cl1\" as returned by `lightning-hsmtool getcodexsecret`, or a raw 64 character hex string.",
     "",
     "NOTE: this command only currently works with the `sqlite3` database backend."
   ],
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
       "hsmsecret": {
         "type": "string",
         "description": [
-          "Either a codex32 secret starting with `cl1` as returned by `hsmtool getcodexsecret`, or a raw 64 character hex string."
+          "Either a codex32 secret starting with `cl1` as returned by `lightning-hsmtool getcodexsecret`, or a raw 64 character hex string."
         ]
       }
     }
diff --git a/tests/autogenerate-rpc-examples.py b/tests/autogenerate-rpc-examples.py
index 0a8f880d..89c90660 100644
--- a/tests/autogenerate-rpc-examples.py
+++ b/tests/autogenerate-rpc-examples.py
@@ -1827,7 +1827,7 @@ def generate_backup_recovery_examples(node_factory, l4, l5, l6):
             """Returns codex32 and hex"""
             try:
                 hsmfile = os.path.join(n.daemon.lightning_dir, TEST_NETWORK, "hsm_secret")
-                codex32 = subprocess.check_output(["tools/hsmtool", "getcodexsecret", hsmfile, "leet"]).decode('utf-8').strip()
+                codex32 = subprocess.check_output(["tools/lightning-hsmtool", "getcodexsecret", hsmfile, "leet"]).decode('utf-8').strip()
                 with open(hsmfile, "rb") as f:
                     hexhsm = f.read().hex()
                 return codex32, hexhsm
diff --git a/tests/test_askrene.py b/tests/test_askrene.py
index f5e986ad..bf87287e 100644
--- a/tests/test_askrene.py
+++ b/tests/test_askrene.py
@@ -1671,7 +1671,7 @@ def test_askrene_fake_channeld(node_factory, bitcoind):
     hsmfile = os.path.join(l2.daemon.lightning_dir, TEST_NETWORK, "hsm_secret")
     # Needs peer node id and channel dbid (1, it's the first channel), prints out:
     # "shaseed: xxxxxxx\n"
-    shaseed = subprocess.check_output(["tools/hsmtool", "dumpcommitments", l1.info['id'], "1", "0", hsmfile]).decode('utf-8').strip().partition(": ")[2]
+    shaseed = subprocess.check_output(["tools/lightning-hsmtool", "dumpcommitments", l1.info['id'], "1", "0", hsmfile]).decode('utf-8').strip().partition(": ")[2]
     l1.rpc.dev_peer_shachain(l2.info['id'], shaseed)
 
     TEMPORARY_CHANNEL_FAILURE = 0x1007
diff --git a/tests/test_misc.py b/tests/test_misc.py
index 31a9c3c9..00fc0d6a 100644
--- a/tests/test_misc.py
+++ b/tests/test_misc.py
@@ -1510,7 +1510,7 @@ def test_decode(node_factory, bitcoind):
     """Test the decode option to decode the contents of emergency recovery.
     """
     l1 = node_factory.get_node()
-    cmd_line = ["tools/hsmtool", "getemergencyrecover", os.path.join(l1.daemon.lightning_dir, TEST_NETWORK, "emergency.recover")]
+    cmd_line = ["tools/lightning-hsmtool", "getemergencyrecover", os.path.join(l1.daemon.lightning_dir, TEST_NETWORK, "emergency.recover")]
     out = subprocess.check_output(cmd_line).decode('utf-8')
     bech32_out = out.strip('\n')
     assert bech32_out.startswith('clnemerg1')
@@ -1533,7 +1533,7 @@ def test_recover(node_factory, bitcoind):
     os.unlink(os.path.join(l1.daemon.lightning_dir, TEST_NETWORK, "hsm_secret"))
     l1.daemon.start()
 
-    cmd_line = ["tools/hsmtool", "getcodexsecret", os.path.join(l1.daemon.lightning_dir, TEST_NETWORK, "hsm_secret")]
+    cmd_line = ["tools/lightning-hsmtool", "getcodexsecret", os.path.join(l1.daemon.lightning_dir, TEST_NETWORK, "hsm_secret")]
     out = subprocess.check_output(cmd_line + ["leet", "0"]).decode('utf-8')
     assert out == "cl10leetsllhdmn9m42vcsamx24zrxgs3qrl7ahwvhw4fnzrhve25gvezzyqqjdsjnzedu43ns\n"
 
@@ -4593,7 +4593,7 @@ def test_recover_command(node_factory, bitcoind):
     def get_hsm_secret(n):
         """Returns codex32 and hex"""
         hsmfile = os.path.join(n.daemon.lightning_dir, TEST_NETWORK, "hsm_secret")
-        codex32 = subprocess.check_output(["tools/hsmtool", "getcodexsecret", hsmfile, "leet"]).decode('utf-8').strip()
+        codex32 = subprocess.check_output(["tools/lightning-hsmtool", "getcodexsecret", hsmfile, "leet"]).decode('utf-8').strip()
         with open(hsmfile, "rb") as f:
             hexhsm = f.read().hex()
         return codex32, hexhsm
diff --git a/tests/test_plugin.py b/tests/test_plugin.py
index 3ca02c0a..143069de 100644
--- a/tests/test_plugin.py
+++ b/tests/test_plugin.py
@@ -4428,12 +4428,12 @@ def test_exposesecret(node_factory):
         with pytest.raises(RpcError, match="must be valid bech32 string"):
             l1.rpc.exposesecret(passphrase='test_exposesecret', identifier=invalid)
 
-    # As given by hsmtool:
-    # $ ./tools/hsmtool getcodexsecret /tmp/ltests-10uyxcnw/test_exposesecret_1/lightning-1/regtest/hsm_secret junr
+    # As given by lightning-hsmtool:
+    # $ ./tools/lightning-hsmtool getcodexsecret /tmp/ltests-10uyxcnw/test_exposesecret_1/lightning-1/regtest/hsm_secret junr
     # cl10junrsd35kw6r5de5kueedxyqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqj00m675kxffh
-    # $ ./tools/hsmtool getcodexsecret /tmp/ltests-10uyxcnw/test_exposesecret_1/lightning-1/regtest/hsm_secret junx
+    # $ ./tools/lightning-hsmtool getcodexsecret /tmp/ltests-10uyxcnw/test_exposesecret_1/lightning-1/regtest/hsm_secret junx
     # cl10junxsd35kw6r5de5kueedxyqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq6mdtn5lql6p8m
-    # $ ./tools/hsmtool getcodexsecret /tmp/ltests-10uyxcnw/test_exposesecret_1/lightning-1/regtest/hsm_secret cln2
+    # $ ./tools/lightning-hsmtool getcodexsecret /tmp/ltests-10uyxcnw/test_exposesecret_1/lightning-1/regtest/hsm_secret cln2
     # cl10cln2sd35kw6r5de5kueedxyqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq2v3y60yxxn4mq
     assert l1.rpc.exposesecret(passphrase='test_exposesecret') == {'codex32': 'cl10junrsd35kw6r5de5kueedxyqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqj00m675kxffh',
                                                                    'identifier': 'junr'}
diff --git a/tests/test_wallet.py b/tests/test_wallet.py
index e92d0576..0a2d7ec2 100644
--- a/tests/test_wallet.py
+++ b/tests/test_wallet.py
@@ -1274,10 +1274,10 @@ def write_all(fd, bytestr):
 class HsmTool(TailableProc):
     """Helper for testing the hsmtool as a subprocess"""
     def __init__(self, directory, *args):
-        self.prefix = "hsmtool"
-        TailableProc.__init__(self, os.path.join(directory, "hsmtool"))
+        self.prefix = "lightning-hsmtool"
+        TailableProc.__init__(self, os.path.join(directory, "lightning-hsmtool"))
         assert hasattr(self, "env")
-        self.cmd_line = ["tools/hsmtool", *args]
+        self.cmd_line = ["tools/lightning-hsmtool", *args]
 
 
 @unittest.skipIf(VALGRIND, "It does not play well with prompt and key derivation.")
@@ -1337,7 +1337,7 @@ def test_hsmtool_dump_descriptors(node_factory, bitcoind):
     l1.fundwallet(10**6)
     # Get a tpub descriptor of lightningd's wallet
     hsm_path = os.path.join(l1.daemon.lightning_dir, TEST_NETWORK, "hsm_secret")
-    cmd_line = ["tools/hsmtool", "dumponchaindescriptors", hsm_path, "testnet"]
+    cmd_line = ["tools/lightning-hsmtool", "dumponchaindescriptors", hsm_path, "testnet"]
     descriptors = subprocess.check_output(cmd_line).decode("utf8").split("\n")
 
     # Deprecated or empty line
@@ -1653,7 +1653,7 @@ def test_hsmtool_all_commands_work_with_mnemonic_formats(node_factory):
     ]
 
     for cmd_args, expected_output in test_commands:
-        cmd_line = ["tools/hsmtool"] + cmd_args
+        cmd_line = ["tools/lightning-hsmtool"] + cmd_args
         out = subprocess.check_output(cmd_line).decode("utf8")
         actual_output = out.strip()
         assert actual_output == expected_output, f"Command {cmd_args[0]} output mismatch"
@@ -1711,7 +1711,7 @@ def test_hsmtool_deterministic_node_ids(node_factory):
     assert hsmtool.proc.wait(WAIT_TIMEOUT) == 0
 
     # Get the node ID from the generated hsm_secret
-    cmd_line = ["tools/hsmtool", "getnodeid", hsm_path2]
+    cmd_line = ["tools/lightning-hsmtool", "getnodeid", hsm_path2]
     generated_node_id = subprocess.check_output(cmd_line).decode("utf8").strip()
 
     # Verify both node IDs are identical
@@ -2410,7 +2410,7 @@ def test_upgradewallet(node_factory, bitcoind):
 def test_hsmtool_getnodeid(node_factory):
     l1 = node_factory.get_node()
 
-    cmd_line = ["tools/hsmtool", "getnodeid", os.path.join(l1.daemon.lightning_dir, TEST_NETWORK, "hsm_secret")]
+    cmd_line = ["tools/lightning-hsmtool", "getnodeid", os.path.join(l1.daemon.lightning_dir, TEST_NETWORK, "hsm_secret")]
     out = subprocess.check_output(cmd_line).decode('utf-8').strip()
     assert out == l1.info['id']
 
diff --git a/tests/test_xpay.py b/tests/test_xpay.py
index ed24a4b7..94958412 100644
--- a/tests/test_xpay.py
+++ b/tests/test_xpay.py
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ def test_pay_fakenet(node_factory):
     hsmfile = os.path.join(l2.daemon.lightning_dir, TEST_NETWORK, "hsm_secret")
     # Needs peer node id and channel dbid (1, it's the first channel), prints out:
     # "shaseed: xxxxxxx\n"
-    shaseed = subprocess.check_output(["tools/hsmtool", "dumpcommitments", l1.info['id'], "1", "0", hsmfile]).decode('utf-8').strip().partition(": ")[2]
+    shaseed = subprocess.check_output(["tools/lightning-hsmtool", "dumpcommitments", l1.info['id'], "1", "0", hsmfile]).decode('utf-8').strip().partition(": ")[2]
     l1.rpc.dev_peer_shachain(l2.info['id'], shaseed)
 
     # Failure from final (unknown payment hash)
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ def test_xpay_fake_channeld(node_factory, bitcoind, chainparams, slow_mode):
     hsmfile = os.path.join(l2.daemon.lightning_dir, TEST_NETWORK, "hsm_secret")
     # Needs peer node id and channel dbid (1, it's the first channel), prints out:
     # "shaseed: xxxxxxx\n"
-    shaseed = subprocess.check_output(["tools/hsmtool", "dumpcommitments", l1.info['id'], "1", "0", hsmfile]).decode('utf-8').strip().partition(": ")[2]
+    shaseed = subprocess.check_output(["tools/lightning-hsmtool", "dumpcommitments", l1.info['id'], "1", "0", hsmfile]).decode('utf-8').strip().partition(": ")[2]
     l1.rpc.dev_peer_shachain(l2.info['id'], shaseed)
 
     # Toggle whether we wait for all the parts to finish.
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ def test_xpay_maxfee(node_factory, bitcoind, chainparams):
     hsmfile = os.path.join(l2.daemon.lightning_dir, TEST_NETWORK, "hsm_secret")
     # Needs peer node id and channel dbid (1, it's the first channel), prints out:
     # "shaseed: xxxxxxx\n"
-    shaseed = subprocess.check_output(["tools/hsmtool", "dumpcommitments", l1.info['id'], "1", "0", hsmfile]).decode('utf-8').strip().partition(": ")[2]
+    shaseed = subprocess.check_output(["tools/lightning-hsmtool", "dumpcommitments", l1.info['id'], "1", "0", hsmfile]).decode('utf-8').strip().partition(": ")[2]
     l1.rpc.dev_peer_shachain(l2.info['id'], shaseed)
 
     # This one triggers the bug!
diff --git a/tools/.gitignore b/tools/.gitignore
index a17763bb..fa376c33 100644
--- a/tools/.gitignore
+++ b/tools/.gitignore
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
 headerversions
 check-bolt
-hsmtool
 lightning-hsmtool
diff --git a/tools/Makefile b/tools/Makefile
index 932ed45e..74656a30 100644
--- a/tools/Makefile
+++ b/tools/Makefile
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 #! /usr/bin/make
-TOOLS := tools/hsmtool tools/check-bolt
+TOOLS := tools/lightning-hsmtool tools/check-bolt
 TOOLS_SRC := $(TOOLS:=.c)
 TOOLS_OBJ := $(TOOLS_SRC:.c=.o)
 
@@ -15,10 +15,7 @@ tools/headerversions: $(FORCE) tools/headerversions.o libccan.a
 
 tools/headerversions.o: ccan/config.h
 tools/check-bolt: tools/check-bolt.o libcommon.a
-tools/hsmtool: tools/hsmtool.o libcommon.a
-
-tools/lightning-hsmtool: tools/hsmtool
-	cp $< $@
+tools/lightning-hsmtool: tools/lightning-hsmtool.o libcommon.a
 
 clean: tools-clean
 
diff --git a/tools/hsmtool.c b/tools/hsmtool.c
deleted file mode 100644
index a3f487a1..00000000
--- a/tools/hsmtool.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,765 +0,0 @@
-#include "config.h"
-#include <ccan/array_size/array_size.h>
-#include <ccan/crypto/hkdf_sha256/hkdf_sha256.h>
-#include <ccan/err/err.h>
-#include <ccan/noerr/noerr.h>
-#include <ccan/read_write_all/read_write_all.h>
-#include <ccan/rune/rune.h>
-#include <ccan/tal/grab_file/grab_file.h>
-#include <ccan/tal/path/path.h>
-#include <ccan/tal/str/str.h>
-#include <common/bech32.h>
-#include <common/bech32_util.h>
-#include <common/codex32.h>
-#include <common/derive_basepoints.h>
-#include <common/descriptor_checksum.h>
-#include <common/errcode.h>
-#include <common/hsm_secret.h>
-#include <common/key_derive.h>
-#include <common/memleak.h>
-#include <common/utils.h>
-#include <common/utxo.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <inttypes.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <wally_bip32.h>
-#include <wally_bip39.h>
-
-#define ERROR_USAGE 2
-#define ERROR_LIBSODIUM 3
-#define ERROR_LIBWALLY 4
-#define ERROR_KEYDERIV 5
-#define ERROR_LANG_NOT_SUPPORTED 6
-#define ERROR_TERM 7
-
-/* We don't implement leak detection, since we don't persist. */
-void *notleak_(void *ptr, bool plus_children)
-{
-	return ptr;
-}
-
-static void show_usage(const char *progname)
-{
-	printf("%s <method> [arguments]\n", progname);
-	printf("methods:\n");
-	printf("	- decrypt <path/to/hsm_secret> [LEGACY - binary format only]\n");
-	printf("	- encrypt <path/to/hsm_secret> [LEGACY - binary format only]\n");
-	printf("	- dumpcommitments <node id> <channel dbid> <depth> "
-		"<path/to/hsm_secret>\n");
-	printf("	- guesstoremote <P2WPKH address> <node id> <tries> "
-		"<path/to/hsm_secret>\n");
-	printf("	- generatehsm <path/to/new/hsm_secret>\n");
-	printf("	- derivetoremote <node id> <channel dbid> [<cmt pt>] "
-	       "<path/to/hsm_secret>\n");
-	printf("	- checkhsm <path/to/new/hsm_secret>\n");
-	printf("	- dumponchaindescriptors [--show-secrets] <path/to/hsm_secret> [network]\n");
-	printf("	- makerune <path/to/hsm_secret>\n");
-	printf("	- getcodexsecret <path/to/hsm_secret> <id>\n");
-	printf("	- getemergencyrecover <path/to/emergency.recover>\n");
-	printf("	- getnodeid <path/to/hsm_secret>\n");
-	exit(0);
-}
-
-static bool ensure_hsm_secret_exists(int fd, const char *path)
-{
-	const char *config_dir = path_dirname(NULL, path);
-	if (fsync(fd) != 0) {
-		close(fd);
-		return false;
-	}
-	if (close(fd) != 0)
-		return false;
-
-	fd = open(config_dir, O_RDONLY);
-	if (fd < 0)
-		return false;
-	if (fsync(fd) != 0) {
-		close(fd);
-		return false;
-	}
-
-	close(fd);
-	tal_free(config_dir);
-	return true;
-}
-/* Load hsm_secret using the unified interface */
-static struct hsm_secret *load_hsm_secret(const tal_t *ctx, const char *hsm_secret_path)
-{
-	u8 *contents = grab_file_raw(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
-	const char *passphrase = NULL;
-	struct hsm_secret *hsms;
-	enum hsm_secret_error error;
-
-	if (!contents)
-		err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Reading hsm_secret");
-
-	/* Get passphrase if needed */
-	if (hsm_secret_needs_passphrase(contents, tal_bytelen(contents))) {
-		printf("Enter hsm_secret password:\n");
-		fflush(stdout);
-		passphrase = read_stdin_pass(tmpctx, &error);
-		if (!passphrase)
-			errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not read password: %s", hsm_secret_error_str(error));
-	}
-
-	hsms = extract_hsm_secret(ctx, contents, tal_bytelen(contents), passphrase, &error);
-	if (!hsms) {
-		err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "%s", hsm_secret_error_str(error));
-	}
-	return hsms;
-}
-
-/* Legacy function - only works with binary encrypted format */
-static void decrypt_hsm(const char *hsm_secret_path)
-{
-	int fd;
-	struct hsm_secret *hsms;
-	const char *dir, *backup;
-
-	/* Check if it's a format we can decrypt */
-	u8 *contents = grab_file_raw(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
-	if (!contents)
-		err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Reading hsm_secret");
-
-	enum hsm_secret_type type = detect_hsm_secret_type(contents, tal_bytelen(contents));
-
-	if (type != HSM_SECRET_ENCRYPTED) {
-		errx(ERROR_USAGE, "decrypt command only works on legacy encrypted binary format (73 bytes).\n"
-		                  "Current file is: %s\n"
-		                  "For mnemonic formats, use the generatehsm command to create a new hsm_secret instead.",
-		                  format_type_name(type));
-	}
-
-	/* Load the hsm_secret */
-	hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
-
-	dir = path_dirname(NULL, hsm_secret_path);
-	backup = path_join(dir, dir, "hsm_secret.backup");
-
-	/* Create a backup file, "just in case". */
-	rename(hsm_secret_path, backup);
-	fd = open(hsm_secret_path, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, 0400);
-	if (fd < 0)
-		err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not open new hsm_secret");
-
-	if (!write_all(fd, hsms->secret_data, tal_bytelen(hsms->secret_data))) {
-		unlink_noerr(hsm_secret_path);
-		close(fd);
-		rename("hsm_secret.backup", hsm_secret_path);
-		err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE,
-		    "Failure writing plaintext seed to hsm_secret.");
-	}
-
-	/* Be as paranoïd as in hsmd with the file state on disk. */
-	if (!ensure_hsm_secret_exists(fd, hsm_secret_path)) {
-		unlink_noerr(hsm_secret_path);
-		rename(backup, hsm_secret_path);
-		errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE,
-		    "Could not ensure hsm_secret existence.");
-	}
-	unlink_noerr(backup);
-	tal_free(dir);
-
-	printf("Successfully decrypted hsm_secret, be careful now :-).\n");
-}
-
-/* Legacy function - only works with binary plain format */
-static void encrypt_hsm(const char *hsm_secret_path)
-{
-	int fd;
-	struct hsm_secret *hsms;
-	u8 encrypted_hsm_secret[ENCRYPTED_HSM_SECRET_LEN];
-	const char *passwd, *passwd_confirmation;
-	const char *dir, *backup;
-	enum hsm_secret_error pass_err;
-
-	/* Check if it's a format we can encrypt */
-	u8 *contents = grab_file_raw(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
-	if (!contents)
-		err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Reading hsm_secret");
-
-	enum hsm_secret_type type = detect_hsm_secret_type(contents, tal_bytelen(contents));
-
-	if (type != HSM_SECRET_PLAIN) {
-		errx(ERROR_USAGE, "encrypt command only works on legacy plain binary format (32 bytes).\n"
-		                  "Current file is: %s\n"
-		                  "For mnemonic formats, the passphrase is already integrated into the format.",
-		                  format_type_name(type));
-	}
-
-	/* Load the hsm_secret */
-	hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
-
-	printf("Enter hsm_secret password:\n");
-	fflush(stdout);
-	passwd = read_stdin_pass(tmpctx, &pass_err);
-	if (!passwd)
-		errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not read password: %s", hsm_secret_error_str(pass_err));
-
-	printf("Confirm hsm_secret password:\n");
-	fflush(stdout);
-	passwd_confirmation = read_stdin_pass(tmpctx, &pass_err);
-	if (!passwd_confirmation)
-		errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not read password: %s", hsm_secret_error_str(pass_err));
-
-	if (!streq(passwd, passwd_confirmation))
-		errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Passwords confirmation mismatch.");
-
-	dir = path_dirname(NULL, hsm_secret_path);
-	backup = path_join(dir, dir, "hsm_secret.backup");
-
-	/* Create encryption key and encrypt */
-	struct secret *encryption_key = get_encryption_key(tmpctx, passwd);
-	if (!encryption_key)
-		errx(ERROR_LIBSODIUM, "Could not derive encryption key");
-
-	struct secret legacy_secret;
-	memcpy(legacy_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, 32);
-	if (!encrypt_legacy_hsm_secret(encryption_key, &legacy_secret, encrypted_hsm_secret))
-		errx(ERROR_LIBSODIUM, "Could not encrypt the hsm_secret seed.");
-
-	/* Create a backup file, "just in case". */
-	rename(hsm_secret_path, backup);
-	fd = open(hsm_secret_path, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, 0400);
-	if (fd < 0)
-		err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not open new hsm_secret");
-
-	/* Write the encrypted hsm_secret. */
-	if (!write_all(fd, encrypted_hsm_secret,
-		       ENCRYPTED_HSM_SECRET_LEN)) {
-		unlink_noerr(hsm_secret_path);
-		close(fd);
-		rename(backup, hsm_secret_path);
-		err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Failure writing cipher to hsm_secret.");
-	}
-
-	/* Be as paranoïd as in hsmd with the file state on disk. */
-	if (!ensure_hsm_secret_exists(fd, hsm_secret_path)) {
-		unlink_noerr(hsm_secret_path);
-		rename(backup, hsm_secret_path);
-		errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not ensure hsm_secret existence.");
-	}
-	unlink_noerr(backup);
-	tal_free(dir);
-
-	printf("Successfully encrypted hsm_secret. You'll now have to pass the "
-	       "--encrypted-hsm startup option.\n");
-}
-
-/* Taken from hsmd. */
-static void get_channel_seed(struct secret *channel_seed, const struct node_id *peer_id,
-                             u64 dbid, struct secret *hsm_secret)
-{
-	struct secret channel_base;
-	u8 input[sizeof(peer_id->k) + sizeof(dbid)];
-	const char *info = "per-peer seed";
-
-	hkdf_sha256(&channel_base, sizeof(struct secret), NULL, 0,
-	            hsm_secret, sizeof(*hsm_secret),
-	             "peer seed", strlen("peer seed"));
-	memcpy(input, peer_id->k, sizeof(peer_id->k));
-	BUILD_ASSERT(sizeof(peer_id->k) == PUBKEY_CMPR_LEN);
-	memcpy(input + PUBKEY_CMPR_LEN, &dbid, sizeof(dbid));
-
-	hkdf_sha256(channel_seed, sizeof(*channel_seed),
-	            input, sizeof(input),
-	            &channel_base, sizeof(channel_base),
-	            info, strlen(info));
-}
-
-static void print_codexsecret(const char *hsm_secret_path, const char *id)
-{
-	struct secret hsm_secret;
-	char *bip93;
-	const char *err;
-	struct hsm_secret *hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
-	/* Extract first 32 bytes for legacy compatibility */
-	memcpy(hsm_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, 32);
-
-	err = codex32_secret_encode(tmpctx, "cl", id, 0, hsm_secret.data, 32, &bip93);
-	if (err)
-		errx(ERROR_USAGE, "%s", err);
-
-	printf("%s\n", bip93);
-}
-
-static void print_emergencyrecover(const char *emer_rec_path)
-{
-	u8 *scb = grab_file_raw(tmpctx, emer_rec_path);
-	char *output, *hrp = "clnemerg";
-	if (!scb) {
-		err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Reading emergency.recover");
-	}
-	u5 *data = tal_arr(tmpctx, u5, 0);
-
-	bech32_push_bits(&data, scb, tal_bytelen(scb) * 8);
-	output = tal_arr(tmpctx, char, strlen(hrp) + tal_count(data) + 8);
-
-	bech32_encode(output, hrp, data, tal_count(data), (size_t)-1,
-			   BECH32_ENCODING_BECH32);
-
-	printf("%s\n", output);
-}
-
-static void dump_commitments_infos(struct node_id *node_id, u64 channel_id,
-                                   u64 depth, char *hsm_secret_path)
-{
-	struct sha256 shaseed;
-	struct secret hsm_secret, channel_seed, per_commitment_secret;
-	struct pubkey per_commitment_point;
-	struct hsm_secret *hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
-	/* Extract first 32 bytes for legacy compatibility */
-	memcpy(hsm_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, 32);
-	get_channel_seed(&channel_seed, node_id, channel_id, &hsm_secret);
-
-	derive_shaseed(&channel_seed, &shaseed);
-	printf("shaseed: %s\n", fmt_sha256(tmpctx, &shaseed));
-	for (u64 i = 0; i < depth; i++) {
-		if (!per_commit_secret(&shaseed, &per_commitment_secret, i))
-			errx(ERROR_KEYDERIV, "Could not derive secret #%"PRIu64, i);
-		printf("commit secret #%"PRIu64": %s\n",
-		       i, tal_hexstr(tmpctx, per_commitment_secret.data,
-		                     sizeof(per_commitment_secret.data)));
-		if (!per_commit_point(&shaseed, &per_commitment_point, i))
-			errx(ERROR_KEYDERIV, "Could not derive point #%"PRIu64, i);
-		printf("commit point #%"PRIu64": %s\n",
-		       i, fmt_pubkey(tmpctx, &per_commitment_point));
-	}
-}
-
-static void guess_to_remote(const char *address, struct node_id *node_id,
-                            u64 tries, char *hsm_secret_path)
-{
-	struct secret hsm_secret, channel_seed, basepoint_secret;
-	struct pubkey basepoint;
-	struct ripemd160 pubkeyhash;
-	u8 goal_pubkeyhash[20];
-	char hrp[strlen(address) - 6];
-	int witver;
-	size_t witlen;
-
-	/* Get the hrp to accept addresses from any network. */
-	if (bech32_decode(hrp, goal_pubkeyhash, &witlen, address, 90) != BECH32_ENCODING_BECH32)
-		errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Could not get address' network");
-	if (segwit_addr_decode(&witver, goal_pubkeyhash, &witlen, hrp, address) != 1)
-		errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Wrong bech32 address");
-
-	struct hsm_secret *hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
-	memcpy(hsm_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, 32);
-
-	for (u64 dbid = 1; dbid < tries ; dbid++) {
-		get_channel_seed(&channel_seed, node_id, dbid, &hsm_secret);
-		if (!derive_payment_basepoint(&channel_seed,
-		                              &basepoint, &basepoint_secret))
-			errx(ERROR_KEYDERIV, "Could not derive basepoints for dbid %"PRIu64
-			                     " and channel seed %s.", dbid,
-			                     fmt_secret(tmpctx, &channel_seed));
-
-		pubkey_to_hash160(&basepoint, &pubkeyhash);
-		if (memcmp(pubkeyhash.u.u8, goal_pubkeyhash, 20) == 0) {
-			printf("bech32      : %s\n", address);
-			printf("pubkey hash : %s\n",
-				tal_hexstr(tmpctx, pubkeyhash.u.u8, 20));
-			printf("pubkey      : %s \n",
-				fmt_pubkey(tmpctx, &basepoint));
-			printf("privkey     : %s \n",
-				fmt_secret(tmpctx, &basepoint_secret));
-		return;
-		}
-	}
-
-	errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Could not find any basepoint matching the provided witness programm.\n"
-	                  "Are you sure that the channel used `option_static_remotekey` ?");
-}
-
-static void generate_hsm(const char *hsm_secret_path)
-{
-	const char *mnemonic, *passphrase;
-	enum hsm_secret_error error;
-
-	/* Get mnemonic from user using consistent interface */
-	mnemonic = read_stdin_mnemonic(tmpctx, &error);
-	if (!mnemonic)
-		errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not read mnemonic: %s", hsm_secret_error_str(error));
-
-	/* Get optional passphrase */
-	printf("Warning: remember that different passphrases yield different "
-	       "bitcoin wallets.\n");
-	printf("If left empty, no password is used (echo is disabled).\n");
-	printf("Enter your passphrase: \n");
-	fflush(stdout);
-	passphrase = read_stdin_pass(tmpctx, &error);
-	if (!passphrase)
-		errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not read passphrase: %s", hsm_secret_error_str(error));
-	if (streq(passphrase, "")) {
-		passphrase = NULL;
-	}
-
-	/* Write to file using your new mnemonic format */
-	int fd = open(hsm_secret_path, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, 0400);
-	if (fd < 0) {
-		err(ERROR_USAGE, "Unable to create hsm_secret file");
-	}
-
-	/* Hash the derived seed for validation */
-	struct sha256 seed_hash;
-	if (!derive_seed_hash(mnemonic, passphrase, &seed_hash))
-		errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Error deriving seed from mnemonic");
-
-	/* Write seed hash (32 bytes) + mnemonic */
-	if (!write_all(fd, &seed_hash, sizeof(seed_hash)))
-		err(ERROR_USAGE, "Error writing seed hash to hsm_secret file");
-
-	/* Write the mnemonic */
-	if (!write_all(fd, mnemonic, strlen(mnemonic)))
-		err(ERROR_USAGE, "Error writing mnemonic to hsm_secret file");
-
-	if (fsync(fd) != 0)
-		err(ERROR_USAGE, "Error fsyncing hsm_secret file");
-
-	if (close(fd) != 0)
-		err(ERROR_USAGE, "Error closing hsm_secret file");
-
-	printf("New hsm_secret file created at %s\n", hsm_secret_path);
-	printf("Format: %s\n", passphrase ? "mnemonic with passphrase" : "mnemonic without passphrase");
-	if (passphrase) {
-		printf("Remember your passphrase - it's required to use this hsm_secret!\n");
-	}
-
-	/* passphrase and mnemonic will be automatically cleaned up by tmpctx */
-}
-
-static void derive_to_remote(const struct unilateral_close_info *info, const char *hsm_secret_path)
-{
-	struct secret hsm_secret, channel_seed, basepoint_secret;
-	struct pubkey basepoint;
-	struct privkey privkey;
-
-	secp256k1_ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY
-						 | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN);
-
-	struct hsm_secret *hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
-	/* Copy first 32 bytes of secret_data to the local secret struct */
-	memcpy(hsm_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, sizeof(hsm_secret.data));
-	get_channel_seed(&channel_seed, &info->peer_id, info->channel_id, &hsm_secret);
-	if (!derive_payment_basepoint(&channel_seed, &basepoint, &basepoint_secret))
-		errx(ERROR_KEYDERIV, "Could not derive basepoints for dbid %"PRIu64
-				     " and channel seed %s.", info->channel_id,
-				     fmt_secret(tmpctx, &channel_seed));
-	if (!info->commitment_point)
-		privkey.secret = basepoint_secret;
-	else if (!derive_simple_privkey(&basepoint_secret, &basepoint, info->commitment_point, &privkey))
-		errx(ERROR_KEYDERIV, "Could not derive simple privkey for dbid %"PRIu64
-				     ", channel seed %s, and commitment point %s.", info->channel_id,
-				     fmt_secret(tmpctx, &channel_seed),
-				     fmt_pubkey(tmpctx, info->commitment_point));
-	printf("privkey : %s\n", fmt_secret(tmpctx, &privkey.secret));
-}
-static void dumponchaindescriptors(const char *hsm_secret_path,
-				   const u32 version, bool show_secrets)
-{
-	struct secret hsm_secret;
-	u8 bip32_seed[BIP32_ENTROPY_LEN_256];
-	u32 salt = 0;
-	struct ext_key master_extkey;
-	char *enc_xkey, *descriptor;
-	struct descriptor_checksum checksum;
-	struct hsm_secret *hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
-	/* Extract first 32 bytes for legacy compatibility */
-	memcpy(hsm_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, 32);
-
-	/* The root seed is derived from hsm_secret using hkdf.. */
-	do {
-		hkdf_sha256(bip32_seed, sizeof(bip32_seed),
-			    &salt, sizeof(salt),
-			    &hsm_secret, sizeof(hsm_secret),
-			    "bip32 seed", strlen("bip32 seed"));
-		salt++;
-		/* ..Which is used to derive m/ */
-	} while (bip32_key_from_seed(bip32_seed, sizeof(bip32_seed),
-				     version, 0, &master_extkey) != WALLY_OK);
-
-	if (show_secrets) {
-		if (bip32_key_to_base58(&master_extkey, BIP32_FLAG_KEY_PRIVATE,
-					&enc_xkey) != WALLY_OK)
-			errx(ERROR_LIBWALLY, "Can't encode xpriv");
-	} else {
-		if (bip32_key_to_base58(&master_extkey, BIP32_FLAG_KEY_PUBLIC,
-					&enc_xkey) != WALLY_OK)
-			errx(ERROR_LIBWALLY, "Can't encode xpub");
-	}
-
-	/* Now we format the descriptor strings (we only ever create P2TR, P2WPKH, and
-	 * P2SH-P2WPKH outputs). */
-
-	descriptor = tal_fmt(NULL, "wpkh(%s/0/0/*)", enc_xkey);
-	if (!descriptor_checksum(descriptor, strlen(descriptor), &checksum))
-		errx(ERROR_LIBWALLY, "Can't derive descriptor checksum for wpkh");
-	printf("%s#%s\n", descriptor, checksum.csum);
-	tal_free(descriptor);
-
-	descriptor = tal_fmt(NULL, "sh(wpkh(%s/0/0/*))", enc_xkey);
-	if (!descriptor_checksum(descriptor, strlen(descriptor), &checksum))
-		errx(ERROR_LIBWALLY, "Can't derive descriptor checksum for sh(wpkh)");
-	printf("%s#%s\n", descriptor, checksum.csum);
-	tal_free(descriptor);
-
-	descriptor = tal_fmt(NULL, "tr(%s/0/0/*)", enc_xkey);
-	if (!descriptor_checksum(descriptor, strlen(descriptor), &checksum))
-		errx(ERROR_LIBWALLY, "Can't derive descriptor checksum for tr");
-	printf("%s#%s\n", descriptor, checksum.csum);
-	tal_free(descriptor);
-
-	wally_free_string(enc_xkey);
-}
-
-/* Check HSM secret by comparing with backup mnemonic */
-static void check_hsm(const char *hsm_secret_path)
-{
-	struct secret file_secret, derived_secret;
-	u8 bip32_seed[BIP39_SEED_LEN_512];
-	size_t bip32_seed_len;
-	const char *mnemonic_passphrase, *mnemonic;
-	enum hsm_secret_error err;
-
-	/* Load the hsm_secret (handles decryption automatically if needed) */
-	struct hsm_secret *hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
-	/* Extract first 32 bytes for legacy compatibility */
-	memcpy(file_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, 32);
-
-	/* Ask user for their backup mnemonic passphrase */
-	printf("Warning: remember that different passphrases yield different "
-	       "bitcoin wallets.\n");
-	printf("If left empty, no password is used (echo is disabled).\n");
-	printf("Enter your mnemonic passphrase: \n");
-	fflush(stdout);
-	mnemonic_passphrase = read_stdin_pass(tmpctx, &err);
-	if (!mnemonic_passphrase)
-		errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not read passphrase: %s", hsm_secret_error_str(err));
-	if (streq(mnemonic_passphrase, "")) {
-		mnemonic_passphrase = NULL;
-	}
-
-	/* Ask user for their backup mnemonic using consistent interface */
-	mnemonic = read_stdin_mnemonic(tmpctx, &err);
-	if (!mnemonic)
-		errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not read mnemonic: %s", hsm_secret_error_str(err));
-
-	/* Derive seed from user's backup mnemonic + passphrase */
-	if (bip39_mnemonic_to_seed(mnemonic, mnemonic_passphrase, bip32_seed, sizeof(bip32_seed), &bip32_seed_len) != WALLY_OK)
-		errx(ERROR_LIBWALLY, "Unable to derive BIP32 seed from BIP39 mnemonic");
-
-	/* Copy first 32 bytes to our secret for comparison */
-	memcpy(derived_secret.data, bip32_seed, sizeof(derived_secret.data));
-
-	/* Compare the seeds */
-	if (memcmp(derived_secret.data, file_secret.data, sizeof(file_secret.data)) != 0)
-		errx(ERROR_KEYDERIV, "resulting hsm_secret did not match");
-
-	printf("OK\n");
-}
-
-static void make_rune(const char *hsm_secret_path)
-{
-	struct secret hsm_secret, derived_secret, rune_secret;
-	struct rune *master_rune, *rune;
-	struct hsm_secret *hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
-	/* Extract first 32 bytes for legacy compatibility */
-	memcpy(hsm_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, 32);
-
-	/* HSM derives a root secret for `makesecret` */
-	hkdf_sha256(&derived_secret, sizeof(struct secret), NULL, 0,
-		    &hsm_secret, sizeof(hsm_secret),
-		    "derived secrets", strlen("derived secrets"));
-
-	/* Commando derives secret using makesecret "commando" */
-	hkdf_sha256(&rune_secret, sizeof(struct secret), NULL, 0,
-		    &derived_secret, sizeof(derived_secret),
-		    "commando", strlen("commando"));
-
-	master_rune = rune_new(tmpctx,
-			       rune_secret.data,
-			       ARRAY_SIZE(rune_secret.data),
-			       NULL);
-	rune = rune_derive_start(tmpctx, master_rune, "0");
-	printf("%s\n", rune_to_base64(tmpctx, rune));
-}
-
-static void print_node_id(const char *hsm_secret_path)
-{
-	u32 salt = 0;
-	struct secret hsm_secret;
-	struct privkey node_privkey;
-	struct pubkey node_id;
-	struct hsm_secret *hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
-	/* Extract first 32 bytes for legacy compatibility */
-	memcpy(hsm_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, 32);
-
-	/*~ So, there is apparently a 1 in 2^127 chance that a random value is
-	 * not a valid private key, so this never actually loops. */
-	do {
-		/*~ ccan/crypto/hkdf_sha256 implements RFC5869 "Hardened Key
-		 * Derivation Functions".  That means that if a derived key
-		 * leaks somehow, the other keys are not compromised. */
-		hkdf_sha256(&node_privkey, sizeof(node_privkey),
-			    &salt, sizeof(salt),
-			    &hsm_secret,
-			    sizeof(hsm_secret),
-			    "nodeid", 6);
-		salt++;
-	} while (!secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(secp256k1_ctx, &node_id.pubkey,
-					     node_privkey.secret.data));
-
-	printf("%s\n", fmt_pubkey(tmpctx, &node_id));
-}
-
-int main(int argc, char *argv[])
-{
-	const char *method;
-
-	setup_locale();
-	err_set_progname(argv[0]);
-	secp256k1_ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY
-	                                         | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN);
-
-	method = argc > 1 ? argv[1] : NULL;
-	if (!method)
-		show_usage(argv[0]);
-
-	if (streq(method, "decrypt")) {
-		if (argc < 3)
-			show_usage(argv[0]);
-		decrypt_hsm(argv[2]);
-	} else if (streq(method, "encrypt")) {
-		if (argc < 3)
-			show_usage(argv[0]);
-		encrypt_hsm(argv[2]);
-
-	} else if (streq(method, "dumpcommitments")) {
-		/*   node_id    channel_id   depth    hsm_secret  */
-		if (argc < 6)
-			show_usage(argv[0]);
-		struct node_id node_id;
-		if (!node_id_from_hexstr(argv[2], strlen(argv[2]), &node_id))
-			errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Bad node id");
-		dump_commitments_infos(&node_id, atol(argv[3]), atol(argv[4]),
-		                       argv[5]);
-
-	} else if (streq(method, "guesstoremote")) {
-		/*   address    node_id    depth    hsm_secret */
-		if (argc < 6)
-			show_usage(argv[0]);
-		struct node_id node_id;
-		if (!node_id_from_hexstr(argv[3], strlen(argv[3]), &node_id))
-			errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Bad node id");
-		guess_to_remote(argv[2], &node_id, atol(argv[4]),
-		                argv[5]);
-
-	} else if (streq(method, "derivetoremote")) {
-		/*  node_id    channel_id    [commitment_point]    hsm_secret  */
-		if (argc < 5 || argc > 6)
-			show_usage(argv[0]);
-		struct unilateral_close_info info = { };
-		struct pubkey commitment_point;
-		if (!node_id_from_hexstr(argv[2], strlen(argv[2]), &info.peer_id))
-			errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Bad node id");
-		info.channel_id = atoll(argv[3]);
-		if (argc == 6) {
-			if (!pubkey_from_hexstr(argv[4], strlen(argv[4]), &commitment_point))
-				errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Bad commitment point");
-			info.commitment_point = &commitment_point;
-		}
-		derive_to_remote(&info, argv[argc - 1]);
-
-	} else if (streq(method, "generatehsm")) {
-		if (argc != 3)
-			show_usage(argv[0]);
-
-		char *hsm_secret_path = argv[2];
-
-		/* if hsm_secret already exists we abort the process
-		 * we do not want to lose someone else's funds */
-		struct stat st;
-		if (stat(hsm_secret_path, &st) == 0)
-			errx(ERROR_USAGE, "hsm_secret file at %s already exists", hsm_secret_path);
-
-		generate_hsm(hsm_secret_path);
-	} else if (streq(method, "dumponchaindescriptors")) {
-		char *fname = NULL;
-		char *net = NULL;
-		bool show_secrets = false;
-		bool only_arguments = false;
-		u32 version;
-
-		if (argc < 3)
-			show_usage(argv[0]);
-
-		for (int i = 2; i < argc; ++i) {
-			char *next = argv[i];
-
-			if (only_arguments || next[0] != '-') {
-				// this is an argument
-				if (!fname) {
-					fname = next;
-					continue;
-				}
-				if (!net) {
-					net = next;
-					continue;
-				}
-				errx(ERROR_USAGE,
-				     "Argument '%s' was not expected.", next);
-			}
-
-			if (streq(next, "--")) {
-				only_arguments = true;
-				continue;
-			}
-
-			// we are processing an option here
-			if (streq(next, "--show-secrets")) {
-				show_secrets = true;
-				continue;
-			}
-			errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Option '%s' is not recognized.",
-			     next);
-		}
-
-		if (net && (streq(net, "testnet") || streq(net, "testnet4") || streq(net, "signet")))
-			version = BIP32_VER_TEST_PRIVATE;
-		else if (net && !streq(net, "bitcoin"))
-			errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Network '%s' not supported."
-					  " Supported networks: bitcoin (default),"
-					  " testnet and signet", net);
-		else
-			version = BIP32_VER_MAIN_PRIVATE;
-
-		dumponchaindescriptors(fname, version, show_secrets);
-	} else if (streq(method, "checkhsm")) {
-		if (argc < 3)
-			show_usage(argv[0]);
-		check_hsm(argv[2]);
-	} else if (streq(method, "makerune")) {
-		if (argc < 3)
-			show_usage(argv[0]);
-		make_rune(argv[2]);
-	} else if(streq(method, "getcodexsecret")) {
-		if (argc < 4)
-			show_usage(argv[0]);
-		print_codexsecret(argv[2], argv[3]);
-	} else if(streq(method, "getemergencyrecover")) {
-		if (argc < 3)
-			show_usage(argv[0]);
-		print_emergencyrecover(argv[2]);
-	} else if (streq(method, "getnodeid")) {
-		if (argc < 3)
-			show_usage(argv[0]);
-		print_node_id(argv[2]);
-	} else {
-		show_usage(argv[0]);
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
diff --git a/tools/lightning-hsmtool.c b/tools/lightning-hsmtool.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a3f487a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/lightning-hsmtool.c
@@ -0,0 +1,765 @@
+#include "config.h"
+#include <ccan/array_size/array_size.h>
+#include <ccan/crypto/hkdf_sha256/hkdf_sha256.h>
+#include <ccan/err/err.h>
+#include <ccan/noerr/noerr.h>
+#include <ccan/read_write_all/read_write_all.h>
+#include <ccan/rune/rune.h>
+#include <ccan/tal/grab_file/grab_file.h>
+#include <ccan/tal/path/path.h>
+#include <ccan/tal/str/str.h>
+#include <common/bech32.h>
+#include <common/bech32_util.h>
+#include <common/codex32.h>
+#include <common/derive_basepoints.h>
+#include <common/descriptor_checksum.h>
+#include <common/errcode.h>
+#include <common/hsm_secret.h>
+#include <common/key_derive.h>
+#include <common/memleak.h>
+#include <common/utils.h>
+#include <common/utxo.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <wally_bip32.h>
+#include <wally_bip39.h>
+
+#define ERROR_USAGE 2
+#define ERROR_LIBSODIUM 3
+#define ERROR_LIBWALLY 4
+#define ERROR_KEYDERIV 5
+#define ERROR_LANG_NOT_SUPPORTED 6
+#define ERROR_TERM 7
+
+/* We don't implement leak detection, since we don't persist. */
+void *notleak_(void *ptr, bool plus_children)
+{
+	return ptr;
+}
+
+static void show_usage(const char *progname)
+{
+	printf("%s <method> [arguments]\n", progname);
+	printf("methods:\n");
+	printf("	- decrypt <path/to/hsm_secret> [LEGACY - binary format only]\n");
+	printf("	- encrypt <path/to/hsm_secret> [LEGACY - binary format only]\n");
+	printf("	- dumpcommitments <node id> <channel dbid> <depth> "
+		"<path/to/hsm_secret>\n");
+	printf("	- guesstoremote <P2WPKH address> <node id> <tries> "
+		"<path/to/hsm_secret>\n");
+	printf("	- generatehsm <path/to/new/hsm_secret>\n");
+	printf("	- derivetoremote <node id> <channel dbid> [<cmt pt>] "
+	       "<path/to/hsm_secret>\n");
+	printf("	- checkhsm <path/to/new/hsm_secret>\n");
+	printf("	- dumponchaindescriptors [--show-secrets] <path/to/hsm_secret> [network]\n");
+	printf("	- makerune <path/to/hsm_secret>\n");
+	printf("	- getcodexsecret <path/to/hsm_secret> <id>\n");
+	printf("	- getemergencyrecover <path/to/emergency.recover>\n");
+	printf("	- getnodeid <path/to/hsm_secret>\n");
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+static bool ensure_hsm_secret_exists(int fd, const char *path)
+{
+	const char *config_dir = path_dirname(NULL, path);
+	if (fsync(fd) != 0) {
+		close(fd);
+		return false;
+	}
+	if (close(fd) != 0)
+		return false;
+
+	fd = open(config_dir, O_RDONLY);
+	if (fd < 0)
+		return false;
+	if (fsync(fd) != 0) {
+		close(fd);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	close(fd);
+	tal_free(config_dir);
+	return true;
+}
+/* Load hsm_secret using the unified interface */
+static struct hsm_secret *load_hsm_secret(const tal_t *ctx, const char *hsm_secret_path)
+{
+	u8 *contents = grab_file_raw(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
+	const char *passphrase = NULL;
+	struct hsm_secret *hsms;
+	enum hsm_secret_error error;
+
+	if (!contents)
+		err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Reading hsm_secret");
+
+	/* Get passphrase if needed */
+	if (hsm_secret_needs_passphrase(contents, tal_bytelen(contents))) {
+		printf("Enter hsm_secret password:\n");
+		fflush(stdout);
+		passphrase = read_stdin_pass(tmpctx, &error);
+		if (!passphrase)
+			errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not read password: %s", hsm_secret_error_str(error));
+	}
+
+	hsms = extract_hsm_secret(ctx, contents, tal_bytelen(contents), passphrase, &error);
+	if (!hsms) {
+		err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "%s", hsm_secret_error_str(error));
+	}
+	return hsms;
+}
+
+/* Legacy function - only works with binary encrypted format */
+static void decrypt_hsm(const char *hsm_secret_path)
+{
+	int fd;
+	struct hsm_secret *hsms;
+	const char *dir, *backup;
+
+	/* Check if it's a format we can decrypt */
+	u8 *contents = grab_file_raw(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
+	if (!contents)
+		err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Reading hsm_secret");
+
+	enum hsm_secret_type type = detect_hsm_secret_type(contents, tal_bytelen(contents));
+
+	if (type != HSM_SECRET_ENCRYPTED) {
+		errx(ERROR_USAGE, "decrypt command only works on legacy encrypted binary format (73 bytes).\n"
+		                  "Current file is: %s\n"
+		                  "For mnemonic formats, use the generatehsm command to create a new hsm_secret instead.",
+		                  format_type_name(type));
+	}
+
+	/* Load the hsm_secret */
+	hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
+
+	dir = path_dirname(NULL, hsm_secret_path);
+	backup = path_join(dir, dir, "hsm_secret.backup");
+
+	/* Create a backup file, "just in case". */
+	rename(hsm_secret_path, backup);
+	fd = open(hsm_secret_path, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, 0400);
+	if (fd < 0)
+		err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not open new hsm_secret");
+
+	if (!write_all(fd, hsms->secret_data, tal_bytelen(hsms->secret_data))) {
+		unlink_noerr(hsm_secret_path);
+		close(fd);
+		rename("hsm_secret.backup", hsm_secret_path);
+		err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE,
+		    "Failure writing plaintext seed to hsm_secret.");
+	}
+
+	/* Be as paranoïd as in hsmd with the file state on disk. */
+	if (!ensure_hsm_secret_exists(fd, hsm_secret_path)) {
+		unlink_noerr(hsm_secret_path);
+		rename(backup, hsm_secret_path);
+		errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE,
+		    "Could not ensure hsm_secret existence.");
+	}
+	unlink_noerr(backup);
+	tal_free(dir);
+
+	printf("Successfully decrypted hsm_secret, be careful now :-).\n");
+}
+
+/* Legacy function - only works with binary plain format */
+static void encrypt_hsm(const char *hsm_secret_path)
+{
+	int fd;
+	struct hsm_secret *hsms;
+	u8 encrypted_hsm_secret[ENCRYPTED_HSM_SECRET_LEN];
+	const char *passwd, *passwd_confirmation;
+	const char *dir, *backup;
+	enum hsm_secret_error pass_err;
+
+	/* Check if it's a format we can encrypt */
+	u8 *contents = grab_file_raw(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
+	if (!contents)
+		err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Reading hsm_secret");
+
+	enum hsm_secret_type type = detect_hsm_secret_type(contents, tal_bytelen(contents));
+
+	if (type != HSM_SECRET_PLAIN) {
+		errx(ERROR_USAGE, "encrypt command only works on legacy plain binary format (32 bytes).\n"
+		                  "Current file is: %s\n"
+		                  "For mnemonic formats, the passphrase is already integrated into the format.",
+		                  format_type_name(type));
+	}
+
+	/* Load the hsm_secret */
+	hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
+
+	printf("Enter hsm_secret password:\n");
+	fflush(stdout);
+	passwd = read_stdin_pass(tmpctx, &pass_err);
+	if (!passwd)
+		errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not read password: %s", hsm_secret_error_str(pass_err));
+
+	printf("Confirm hsm_secret password:\n");
+	fflush(stdout);
+	passwd_confirmation = read_stdin_pass(tmpctx, &pass_err);
+	if (!passwd_confirmation)
+		errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not read password: %s", hsm_secret_error_str(pass_err));
+
+	if (!streq(passwd, passwd_confirmation))
+		errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Passwords confirmation mismatch.");
+
+	dir = path_dirname(NULL, hsm_secret_path);
+	backup = path_join(dir, dir, "hsm_secret.backup");
+
+	/* Create encryption key and encrypt */
+	struct secret *encryption_key = get_encryption_key(tmpctx, passwd);
+	if (!encryption_key)
+		errx(ERROR_LIBSODIUM, "Could not derive encryption key");
+
+	struct secret legacy_secret;
+	memcpy(legacy_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, 32);
+	if (!encrypt_legacy_hsm_secret(encryption_key, &legacy_secret, encrypted_hsm_secret))
+		errx(ERROR_LIBSODIUM, "Could not encrypt the hsm_secret seed.");
+
+	/* Create a backup file, "just in case". */
+	rename(hsm_secret_path, backup);
+	fd = open(hsm_secret_path, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, 0400);
+	if (fd < 0)
+		err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not open new hsm_secret");
+
+	/* Write the encrypted hsm_secret. */
+	if (!write_all(fd, encrypted_hsm_secret,
+		       ENCRYPTED_HSM_SECRET_LEN)) {
+		unlink_noerr(hsm_secret_path);
+		close(fd);
+		rename(backup, hsm_secret_path);
+		err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Failure writing cipher to hsm_secret.");
+	}
+
+	/* Be as paranoïd as in hsmd with the file state on disk. */
+	if (!ensure_hsm_secret_exists(fd, hsm_secret_path)) {
+		unlink_noerr(hsm_secret_path);
+		rename(backup, hsm_secret_path);
+		errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not ensure hsm_secret existence.");
+	}
+	unlink_noerr(backup);
+	tal_free(dir);
+
+	printf("Successfully encrypted hsm_secret. You'll now have to pass the "
+	       "--encrypted-hsm startup option.\n");
+}
+
+/* Taken from hsmd. */
+static void get_channel_seed(struct secret *channel_seed, const struct node_id *peer_id,
+                             u64 dbid, struct secret *hsm_secret)
+{
+	struct secret channel_base;
+	u8 input[sizeof(peer_id->k) + sizeof(dbid)];
+	const char *info = "per-peer seed";
+
+	hkdf_sha256(&channel_base, sizeof(struct secret), NULL, 0,
+	            hsm_secret, sizeof(*hsm_secret),
+	             "peer seed", strlen("peer seed"));
+	memcpy(input, peer_id->k, sizeof(peer_id->k));
+	BUILD_ASSERT(sizeof(peer_id->k) == PUBKEY_CMPR_LEN);
+	memcpy(input + PUBKEY_CMPR_LEN, &dbid, sizeof(dbid));
+
+	hkdf_sha256(channel_seed, sizeof(*channel_seed),
+	            input, sizeof(input),
+	            &channel_base, sizeof(channel_base),
+	            info, strlen(info));
+}
+
+static void print_codexsecret(const char *hsm_secret_path, const char *id)
+{
+	struct secret hsm_secret;
+	char *bip93;
+	const char *err;
+	struct hsm_secret *hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
+	/* Extract first 32 bytes for legacy compatibility */
+	memcpy(hsm_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, 32);
+
+	err = codex32_secret_encode(tmpctx, "cl", id, 0, hsm_secret.data, 32, &bip93);
+	if (err)
+		errx(ERROR_USAGE, "%s", err);
+
+	printf("%s\n", bip93);
+}
+
+static void print_emergencyrecover(const char *emer_rec_path)
+{
+	u8 *scb = grab_file_raw(tmpctx, emer_rec_path);
+	char *output, *hrp = "clnemerg";
+	if (!scb) {
+		err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Reading emergency.recover");
+	}
+	u5 *data = tal_arr(tmpctx, u5, 0);
+
+	bech32_push_bits(&data, scb, tal_bytelen(scb) * 8);
+	output = tal_arr(tmpctx, char, strlen(hrp) + tal_count(data) + 8);
+
+	bech32_encode(output, hrp, data, tal_count(data), (size_t)-1,
+			   BECH32_ENCODING_BECH32);
+
+	printf("%s\n", output);
+}
+
+static void dump_commitments_infos(struct node_id *node_id, u64 channel_id,
+                                   u64 depth, char *hsm_secret_path)
+{
+	struct sha256 shaseed;
+	struct secret hsm_secret, channel_seed, per_commitment_secret;
+	struct pubkey per_commitment_point;
+	struct hsm_secret *hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
+	/* Extract first 32 bytes for legacy compatibility */
+	memcpy(hsm_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, 32);
+	get_channel_seed(&channel_seed, node_id, channel_id, &hsm_secret);
+
+	derive_shaseed(&channel_seed, &shaseed);
+	printf("shaseed: %s\n", fmt_sha256(tmpctx, &shaseed));
+	for (u64 i = 0; i < depth; i++) {
+		if (!per_commit_secret(&shaseed, &per_commitment_secret, i))
+			errx(ERROR_KEYDERIV, "Could not derive secret #%"PRIu64, i);
+		printf("commit secret #%"PRIu64": %s\n",
+		       i, tal_hexstr(tmpctx, per_commitment_secret.data,
+		                     sizeof(per_commitment_secret.data)));
+		if (!per_commit_point(&shaseed, &per_commitment_point, i))
+			errx(ERROR_KEYDERIV, "Could not derive point #%"PRIu64, i);
+		printf("commit point #%"PRIu64": %s\n",
+		       i, fmt_pubkey(tmpctx, &per_commitment_point));
+	}
+}
+
+static void guess_to_remote(const char *address, struct node_id *node_id,
+                            u64 tries, char *hsm_secret_path)
+{
+	struct secret hsm_secret, channel_seed, basepoint_secret;
+	struct pubkey basepoint;
+	struct ripemd160 pubkeyhash;
+	u8 goal_pubkeyhash[20];
+	char hrp[strlen(address) - 6];
+	int witver;
+	size_t witlen;
+
+	/* Get the hrp to accept addresses from any network. */
+	if (bech32_decode(hrp, goal_pubkeyhash, &witlen, address, 90) != BECH32_ENCODING_BECH32)
+		errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Could not get address' network");
+	if (segwit_addr_decode(&witver, goal_pubkeyhash, &witlen, hrp, address) != 1)
+		errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Wrong bech32 address");
+
+	struct hsm_secret *hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
+	memcpy(hsm_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, 32);
+
+	for (u64 dbid = 1; dbid < tries ; dbid++) {
+		get_channel_seed(&channel_seed, node_id, dbid, &hsm_secret);
+		if (!derive_payment_basepoint(&channel_seed,
+		                              &basepoint, &basepoint_secret))
+			errx(ERROR_KEYDERIV, "Could not derive basepoints for dbid %"PRIu64
+			                     " and channel seed %s.", dbid,
+			                     fmt_secret(tmpctx, &channel_seed));
+
+		pubkey_to_hash160(&basepoint, &pubkeyhash);
+		if (memcmp(pubkeyhash.u.u8, goal_pubkeyhash, 20) == 0) {
+			printf("bech32      : %s\n", address);
+			printf("pubkey hash : %s\n",
+				tal_hexstr(tmpctx, pubkeyhash.u.u8, 20));
+			printf("pubkey      : %s \n",
+				fmt_pubkey(tmpctx, &basepoint));
+			printf("privkey     : %s \n",
+				fmt_secret(tmpctx, &basepoint_secret));
+		return;
+		}
+	}
+
+	errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Could not find any basepoint matching the provided witness programm.\n"
+	                  "Are you sure that the channel used `option_static_remotekey` ?");
+}
+
+static void generate_hsm(const char *hsm_secret_path)
+{
+	const char *mnemonic, *passphrase;
+	enum hsm_secret_error error;
+
+	/* Get mnemonic from user using consistent interface */
+	mnemonic = read_stdin_mnemonic(tmpctx, &error);
+	if (!mnemonic)
+		errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not read mnemonic: %s", hsm_secret_error_str(error));
+
+	/* Get optional passphrase */
+	printf("Warning: remember that different passphrases yield different "
+	       "bitcoin wallets.\n");
+	printf("If left empty, no password is used (echo is disabled).\n");
+	printf("Enter your passphrase: \n");
+	fflush(stdout);
+	passphrase = read_stdin_pass(tmpctx, &error);
+	if (!passphrase)
+		errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not read passphrase: %s", hsm_secret_error_str(error));
+	if (streq(passphrase, "")) {
+		passphrase = NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* Write to file using your new mnemonic format */
+	int fd = open(hsm_secret_path, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, 0400);
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		err(ERROR_USAGE, "Unable to create hsm_secret file");
+	}
+
+	/* Hash the derived seed for validation */
+	struct sha256 seed_hash;
+	if (!derive_seed_hash(mnemonic, passphrase, &seed_hash))
+		errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Error deriving seed from mnemonic");
+
+	/* Write seed hash (32 bytes) + mnemonic */
+	if (!write_all(fd, &seed_hash, sizeof(seed_hash)))
+		err(ERROR_USAGE, "Error writing seed hash to hsm_secret file");
+
+	/* Write the mnemonic */
+	if (!write_all(fd, mnemonic, strlen(mnemonic)))
+		err(ERROR_USAGE, "Error writing mnemonic to hsm_secret file");
+
+	if (fsync(fd) != 0)
+		err(ERROR_USAGE, "Error fsyncing hsm_secret file");
+
+	if (close(fd) != 0)
+		err(ERROR_USAGE, "Error closing hsm_secret file");
+
+	printf("New hsm_secret file created at %s\n", hsm_secret_path);
+	printf("Format: %s\n", passphrase ? "mnemonic with passphrase" : "mnemonic without passphrase");
+	if (passphrase) {
+		printf("Remember your passphrase - it's required to use this hsm_secret!\n");
+	}
+
+	/* passphrase and mnemonic will be automatically cleaned up by tmpctx */
+}
+
+static void derive_to_remote(const struct unilateral_close_info *info, const char *hsm_secret_path)
+{
+	struct secret hsm_secret, channel_seed, basepoint_secret;
+	struct pubkey basepoint;
+	struct privkey privkey;
+
+	secp256k1_ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY
+						 | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN);
+
+	struct hsm_secret *hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
+	/* Copy first 32 bytes of secret_data to the local secret struct */
+	memcpy(hsm_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, sizeof(hsm_secret.data));
+	get_channel_seed(&channel_seed, &info->peer_id, info->channel_id, &hsm_secret);
+	if (!derive_payment_basepoint(&channel_seed, &basepoint, &basepoint_secret))
+		errx(ERROR_KEYDERIV, "Could not derive basepoints for dbid %"PRIu64
+				     " and channel seed %s.", info->channel_id,
+				     fmt_secret(tmpctx, &channel_seed));
+	if (!info->commitment_point)
+		privkey.secret = basepoint_secret;
+	else if (!derive_simple_privkey(&basepoint_secret, &basepoint, info->commitment_point, &privkey))
+		errx(ERROR_KEYDERIV, "Could not derive simple privkey for dbid %"PRIu64
+				     ", channel seed %s, and commitment point %s.", info->channel_id,
+				     fmt_secret(tmpctx, &channel_seed),
+				     fmt_pubkey(tmpctx, info->commitment_point));
+	printf("privkey : %s\n", fmt_secret(tmpctx, &privkey.secret));
+}
+static void dumponchaindescriptors(const char *hsm_secret_path,
+				   const u32 version, bool show_secrets)
+{
+	struct secret hsm_secret;
+	u8 bip32_seed[BIP32_ENTROPY_LEN_256];
+	u32 salt = 0;
+	struct ext_key master_extkey;
+	char *enc_xkey, *descriptor;
+	struct descriptor_checksum checksum;
+	struct hsm_secret *hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
+	/* Extract first 32 bytes for legacy compatibility */
+	memcpy(hsm_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, 32);
+
+	/* The root seed is derived from hsm_secret using hkdf.. */
+	do {
+		hkdf_sha256(bip32_seed, sizeof(bip32_seed),
+			    &salt, sizeof(salt),
+			    &hsm_secret, sizeof(hsm_secret),
+			    "bip32 seed", strlen("bip32 seed"));
+		salt++;
+		/* ..Which is used to derive m/ */
+	} while (bip32_key_from_seed(bip32_seed, sizeof(bip32_seed),
+				     version, 0, &master_extkey) != WALLY_OK);
+
+	if (show_secrets) {
+		if (bip32_key_to_base58(&master_extkey, BIP32_FLAG_KEY_PRIVATE,
+					&enc_xkey) != WALLY_OK)
+			errx(ERROR_LIBWALLY, "Can't encode xpriv");
+	} else {
+		if (bip32_key_to_base58(&master_extkey, BIP32_FLAG_KEY_PUBLIC,
+					&enc_xkey) != WALLY_OK)
+			errx(ERROR_LIBWALLY, "Can't encode xpub");
+	}
+
+	/* Now we format the descriptor strings (we only ever create P2TR, P2WPKH, and
+	 * P2SH-P2WPKH outputs). */
+
+	descriptor = tal_fmt(NULL, "wpkh(%s/0/0/*)", enc_xkey);
+	if (!descriptor_checksum(descriptor, strlen(descriptor), &checksum))
+		errx(ERROR_LIBWALLY, "Can't derive descriptor checksum for wpkh");
+	printf("%s#%s\n", descriptor, checksum.csum);
+	tal_free(descriptor);
+
+	descriptor = tal_fmt(NULL, "sh(wpkh(%s/0/0/*))", enc_xkey);
+	if (!descriptor_checksum(descriptor, strlen(descriptor), &checksum))
+		errx(ERROR_LIBWALLY, "Can't derive descriptor checksum for sh(wpkh)");
+	printf("%s#%s\n", descriptor, checksum.csum);
+	tal_free(descriptor);
+
+	descriptor = tal_fmt(NULL, "tr(%s/0/0/*)", enc_xkey);
+	if (!descriptor_checksum(descriptor, strlen(descriptor), &checksum))
+		errx(ERROR_LIBWALLY, "Can't derive descriptor checksum for tr");
+	printf("%s#%s\n", descriptor, checksum.csum);
+	tal_free(descriptor);
+
+	wally_free_string(enc_xkey);
+}
+
+/* Check HSM secret by comparing with backup mnemonic */
+static void check_hsm(const char *hsm_secret_path)
+{
+	struct secret file_secret, derived_secret;
+	u8 bip32_seed[BIP39_SEED_LEN_512];
+	size_t bip32_seed_len;
+	const char *mnemonic_passphrase, *mnemonic;
+	enum hsm_secret_error err;
+
+	/* Load the hsm_secret (handles decryption automatically if needed) */
+	struct hsm_secret *hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
+	/* Extract first 32 bytes for legacy compatibility */
+	memcpy(file_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, 32);
+
+	/* Ask user for their backup mnemonic passphrase */
+	printf("Warning: remember that different passphrases yield different "
+	       "bitcoin wallets.\n");
+	printf("If left empty, no password is used (echo is disabled).\n");
+	printf("Enter your mnemonic passphrase: \n");
+	fflush(stdout);
+	mnemonic_passphrase = read_stdin_pass(tmpctx, &err);
+	if (!mnemonic_passphrase)
+		errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not read passphrase: %s", hsm_secret_error_str(err));
+	if (streq(mnemonic_passphrase, "")) {
+		mnemonic_passphrase = NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* Ask user for their backup mnemonic using consistent interface */
+	mnemonic = read_stdin_mnemonic(tmpctx, &err);
+	if (!mnemonic)
+		errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not read mnemonic: %s", hsm_secret_error_str(err));
+
+	/* Derive seed from user's backup mnemonic + passphrase */
+	if (bip39_mnemonic_to_seed(mnemonic, mnemonic_passphrase, bip32_seed, sizeof(bip32_seed), &bip32_seed_len) != WALLY_OK)
+		errx(ERROR_LIBWALLY, "Unable to derive BIP32 seed from BIP39 mnemonic");
+
+	/* Copy first 32 bytes to our secret for comparison */
+	memcpy(derived_secret.data, bip32_seed, sizeof(derived_secret.data));
+
+	/* Compare the seeds */
+	if (memcmp(derived_secret.data, file_secret.data, sizeof(file_secret.data)) != 0)
+		errx(ERROR_KEYDERIV, "resulting hsm_secret did not match");
+
+	printf("OK\n");
+}
+
+static void make_rune(const char *hsm_secret_path)
+{
+	struct secret hsm_secret, derived_secret, rune_secret;
+	struct rune *master_rune, *rune;
+	struct hsm_secret *hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
+	/* Extract first 32 bytes for legacy compatibility */
+	memcpy(hsm_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, 32);
+
+	/* HSM derives a root secret for `makesecret` */
+	hkdf_sha256(&derived_secret, sizeof(struct secret), NULL, 0,
+		    &hsm_secret, sizeof(hsm_secret),
+		    "derived secrets", strlen("derived secrets"));
+
+	/* Commando derives secret using makesecret "commando" */
+	hkdf_sha256(&rune_secret, sizeof(struct secret), NULL, 0,
+		    &derived_secret, sizeof(derived_secret),
+		    "commando", strlen("commando"));
+
+	master_rune = rune_new(tmpctx,
+			       rune_secret.data,
+			       ARRAY_SIZE(rune_secret.data),
+			       NULL);
+	rune = rune_derive_start(tmpctx, master_rune, "0");
+	printf("%s\n", rune_to_base64(tmpctx, rune));
+}
+
+static void print_node_id(const char *hsm_secret_path)
+{
+	u32 salt = 0;
+	struct secret hsm_secret;
+	struct privkey node_privkey;
+	struct pubkey node_id;
+	struct hsm_secret *hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
+	/* Extract first 32 bytes for legacy compatibility */
+	memcpy(hsm_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, 32);
+
+	/*~ So, there is apparently a 1 in 2^127 chance that a random value is
+	 * not a valid private key, so this never actually loops. */
+	do {
+		/*~ ccan/crypto/hkdf_sha256 implements RFC5869 "Hardened Key
+		 * Derivation Functions".  That means that if a derived key
+		 * leaks somehow, the other keys are not compromised. */
+		hkdf_sha256(&node_privkey, sizeof(node_privkey),
+			    &salt, sizeof(salt),
+			    &hsm_secret,
+			    sizeof(hsm_secret),
+			    "nodeid", 6);
+		salt++;
+	} while (!secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(secp256k1_ctx, &node_id.pubkey,
+					     node_privkey.secret.data));
+
+	printf("%s\n", fmt_pubkey(tmpctx, &node_id));
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	const char *method;
+
+	setup_locale();
+	err_set_progname(argv[0]);
+	secp256k1_ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY
+	                                         | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN);
+
+	method = argc > 1 ? argv[1] : NULL;
+	if (!method)
+		show_usage(argv[0]);
+
+	if (streq(method, "decrypt")) {
+		if (argc < 3)
+			show_usage(argv[0]);
+		decrypt_hsm(argv[2]);
+	} else if (streq(method, "encrypt")) {
+		if (argc < 3)
+			show_usage(argv[0]);
+		encrypt_hsm(argv[2]);
+
+	} else if (streq(method, "dumpcommitments")) {
+		/*   node_id    channel_id   depth    hsm_secret  */
+		if (argc < 6)
+			show_usage(argv[0]);
+		struct node_id node_id;
+		if (!node_id_from_hexstr(argv[2], strlen(argv[2]), &node_id))
+			errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Bad node id");
+		dump_commitments_infos(&node_id, atol(argv[3]), atol(argv[4]),
+		                       argv[5]);
+
+	} else if (streq(method, "guesstoremote")) {
+		/*   address    node_id    depth    hsm_secret */
+		if (argc < 6)
+			show_usage(argv[0]);
+		struct node_id node_id;
+		if (!node_id_from_hexstr(argv[3], strlen(argv[3]), &node_id))
+			errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Bad node id");
+		guess_to_remote(argv[2], &node_id, atol(argv[4]),
+		                argv[5]);
+
+	} else if (streq(method, "derivetoremote")) {
+		/*  node_id    channel_id    [commitment_point]    hsm_secret  */
+		if (argc < 5 || argc > 6)
+			show_usage(argv[0]);
+		struct unilateral_close_info info = { };
+		struct pubkey commitment_point;
+		if (!node_id_from_hexstr(argv[2], strlen(argv[2]), &info.peer_id))
+			errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Bad node id");
+		info.channel_id = atoll(argv[3]);
+		if (argc == 6) {
+			if (!pubkey_from_hexstr(argv[4], strlen(argv[4]), &commitment_point))
+				errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Bad commitment point");
+			info.commitment_point = &commitment_point;
+		}
+		derive_to_remote(&info, argv[argc - 1]);
+
+	} else if (streq(method, "generatehsm")) {
+		if (argc != 3)
+			show_usage(argv[0]);
+
+		char *hsm_secret_path = argv[2];
+
+		/* if hsm_secret already exists we abort the process
+		 * we do not want to lose someone else's funds */
+		struct stat st;
+		if (stat(hsm_secret_path, &st) == 0)
+			errx(ERROR_USAGE, "hsm_secret file at %s already exists", hsm_secret_path);
+
+		generate_hsm(hsm_secret_path);
+	} else if (streq(method, "dumponchaindescriptors")) {
+		char *fname = NULL;
+		char *net = NULL;
+		bool show_secrets = false;
+		bool only_arguments = false;
+		u32 version;
+
+		if (argc < 3)
+			show_usage(argv[0]);
+
+		for (int i = 2; i < argc; ++i) {
+			char *next = argv[i];
+
+			if (only_arguments || next[0] != '-') {
+				// this is an argument
+				if (!fname) {
+					fname = next;
+					continue;
+				}
+				if (!net) {
+					net = next;
+					continue;
+				}
+				errx(ERROR_USAGE,
+				     "Argument '%s' was not expected.", next);
+			}
+
+			if (streq(next, "--")) {
+				only_arguments = true;
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			// we are processing an option here
+			if (streq(next, "--show-secrets")) {
+				show_secrets = true;
+				continue;
+			}
+			errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Option '%s' is not recognized.",
+			     next);
+		}
+
+		if (net && (streq(net, "testnet") || streq(net, "testnet4") || streq(net, "signet")))
+			version = BIP32_VER_TEST_PRIVATE;
+		else if (net && !streq(net, "bitcoin"))
+			errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Network '%s' not supported."
+					  " Supported networks: bitcoin (default),"
+					  " testnet and signet", net);
+		else
+			version = BIP32_VER_MAIN_PRIVATE;
+
+		dumponchaindescriptors(fname, version, show_secrets);
+	} else if (streq(method, "checkhsm")) {
+		if (argc < 3)
+			show_usage(argv[0]);
+		check_hsm(argv[2]);
+	} else if (streq(method, "makerune")) {
+		if (argc < 3)
+			show_usage(argv[0]);
+		make_rune(argv[2]);
+	} else if(streq(method, "getcodexsecret")) {
+		if (argc < 4)
+			show_usage(argv[0]);
+		print_codexsecret(argv[2], argv[3]);
+	} else if(streq(method, "getemergencyrecover")) {
+		if (argc < 3)
+			show_usage(argv[0]);
+		print_emergencyrecover(argv[2]);
+	} else if (streq(method, "getnodeid")) {
+		if (argc < 3)
+			show_usage(argv[0]);
+		print_node_id(argv[2]);
+	} else {
+		show_usage(argv[0]);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}