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Low 27 Bitcoin

connectd: Implement sending of `start_batch`

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Dusty Daemon

68/100 · Adequate
connectd: Implement sending of `start_batch`

Implement the sending of `start_batch` and `protocol_batch_element` from `channeld` to `connectd`.

Each real peer wire message is prefixed with `protocol_batch_element` so connectd can know the size of the message that were batched together.

`connectd` intercepts `protocol_batch_element` messages and eats them (doesn’t forward them to peer) to get individual messages out of the batch.

It needs this to be able to encrypt them individiaully. Afterwards it recombines the now encrypted messages into a single message to send over the wire to the peer.

`channeld` remains responsible for making `start_batch` the first message of the message bundle.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a new internal batching mechanism so that multiple Lightning protocol messages can be grouped together, split apart again inside the connection daemon, encrypted individually, and then sent as one stream to the peer. It is a feature implementation, not a clear security fix. There are no disclosed security references or incident claims supplied, and the commit message does not describe it as fixing a vulnerability.

Recommended action

Treat as a normal feature commit. Review the new parsing code for integer overflow when summing element sizes, ensure `tal_resize` cannot be driven to excessive allocation, and verify that malformed `protocol_batch_element` frames cannot desynchronize the peer connection or leak unencrypted bytes. No immediate security response is indicated by the supplied materials.

Security signals we found

01

New internal wire message type used for batch framing

02

connectd parses untrusted-length fields from channeld and resizes buffers

03

Manual cursor/length parsing with early returns on malformed input

04

No explicit bounds or overflow check on total batch size before allocation

05

Feature commit with no vendor security disclosure supplied

Risk score

Why this scored 27/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 4/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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