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libsecp256k1

High-assurance secp256k1 elliptic-curve library used throughout the Bitcoin ecosystem.

BitcoinCryptographic librariesNormal
Repository coverage

205 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

64security candidates6second-pass queue193AI analyses
18commits · 30 days
55commits · 60 days
106commits · 180 days
184commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 682 seen1 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 625 seen2 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 619 seen1 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 548 seen1 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

70/100 average clarity
63Strong · 80–100
80Adequate · 60–79
59Thin · 40–59
3Opaque · 0–39
Read the scoring rubric →
Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
Sebastian Falbesoner451842066
merge-script191113093
Hennadii Stepanov45645064
Tim Ruffing22622055
furszy13413087
josibake949066
Lőrinc13313077
kevkevinpal626064
John Moffett424069
Bruno Garcia322090
copilot-swe-agent[bot]323074
Jonas Nick717053
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 48 minutes ago

Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 91 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1840: ci: Simplify module configuration and extend test coverage

This change only edits the project's automated continuous-integration (CI) configuration file. It turns on all optional cryptographic modules by default in CI and adds test runs that disable each module one at a time. There is no change to…

No source-code changesNo build-system logic changesCI-only workflow refactor
9701113fby merge-script+29−1001 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 100 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1918: refactor: split `ge_parse` into explicit variants (compressed, uncompressed, uncompressed+hybrid)

This commit is a code cleanup (refactor) that splits one internal public-key parsing helper into three clearly named versions. It does not change what keys the public API accepts or rejects, and it adds more tests. There is no security vul…

Refactor only: no change to accepted public-key formats or validation rulesPublic API behavior preserved: 33-byte compressed and 65-byte uncompressed/hybrid still acceptedInternal fixed-size callers now use size-specific parser, reducing risk of accidental hybrid acceptance in future code
46db7871by merge-script+117−346 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 96 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1893: test: cover schnorrsig_sign_custom in constant-time tests

This commit only adds new test code to check that a specific Schnorr signing function behaves in a constant-time manner under Valgrind. It does not change any production cryptographic code, so it cannot introduce or fix a security vulnerab…

Only test file src/ctime_tests.c changedNo production cryptographic code modifiedAdds constant-time (CHECKMEM/Valgrind) coverage for schnorrsig_sign_custom
99ae2312by merge-script+41−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 14 AI analysisMessage 100 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1923: group: VERIFY input/output ge/gej/fe exhaustively

This commit is a code-quality and defensive-programming change. It restructures internal elliptic-curve helper functions so that runtime consistency checks (VERIFY macros) wrap the real implementation and cannot be skipped by an early 'ret…

Defensive restructuring of assertion wrappersAdds missing VERIFY post-conditions on group element outputsNo functional cryptographic change
a7f26437by merge-script+253−1452 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 96 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1928: tests: add coverage for exact-size DER signature serialization

This commit only adds new test code to check that a specific function behaves correctly when given a buffer of exactly the right size. It does not change any production code, fix a bug, or introduce a vulnerability. It is a routine improve…

aa0af2faby merge-script+12−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 13 AI analysisMessage 88 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

tests: add coverage for exact-size DER signature serialization

This commit only adds a new test case. It checks that a DER signature can be written into a buffer that is exactly the right size, and that writing into a buffer one byte too small fails correctly. There is no change to the actual library …

500ccb60by Bruno Garcia+12−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 19 AI analysisMessage 96 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1924: tests: add coverage for the DER long form length encoding

This commit only adds new test cases to the libsecp256k1 test suite. It does not change any production cryptographic code. The new tests check that the DER signature parser correctly handles an unusual but valid length-encoding format (the…

Adds test coverage for DER long-form length encoding acceptance and rejectionTargets secp256k1_der_read_len boundary conditionsNo changes to src/ecdsa_impl.h or any production parsing logic
a9a61831by merge-script+117−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 88 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

tests: add coverage for the DER long form length encoding

This commit only adds new test cases to the project's test suite. It does not change any production parsing code. The tests verify that the existing DER signature parser correctly accepts valid long-form length encodings and rejects invali…

ddb1dfa7by Bruno Garcia+117−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 96 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1908: refactor: replace `_get_hash_context` with direct `->hash_ctx` access

This commit is a straightforward code cleanup: it removes a small internal helper function named secp256k1_get_hash_context() and replaces every call with direct access to the context's hash_ctx field. The behavior is identical; no securit…

bae6b89aby merge-script+67−7116 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 98 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1915: refactor: Move (de)ser helpers from musig and eckey to group

This is a routine internal code cleanup: it moves helper functions that convert between group elements and byte strings from one internal file to another, and renames a couple of private-key tweak helpers from 'privkey' to 'seckey'. The pu…

86c7cbafby merge-script+114−10710 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 62 · Adequate
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

refactor: Rename privkey to seckey in eckey helpers

This commit is a simple renaming of internal function names from 'privkey' to 'seckey' to match current project terminology. No behavior of the code changes, and there is no security fix or vulnerability introduced.

bfd40bd0by Fabian Jahr+6−63 files
No security note in commit
Informational 18 AI analysisMessage 98 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1916: ecdh/ellswift: simplify seckey loading with `_scalar_set_b32_seckey`

This is a small internal cleanup in Bitcoin Core's secp256k1 cryptography library. It replaces a manual secret-key validity check (overflow plus zero) with an existing helper function that does the same thing. The behavior is intended to b…

No security-relevant behavioral change is described or evidentRefactoring only: equivalent overflow-and-zero check via existing helperReturn value logic preserved with added parentheses for warning avoidance
a37d7cc0by merge-script+8−112 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1911: refactor: rename `ctx` param to `ecmult_gen_ctx` where applicable

This is a pure code cleanup change: it renames a function parameter from 'ctx' to 'ecmult_gen_ctx' in several internal files and moves the asterisk in pointer declarations for style consistency. No behavior, logic, or security properties o…

3d69f4ceby merge-script+41−414 files
No security note in commit
Low 27 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1910: scratch: reject sizes that overflow when added to header

This commit fixes an integer overflow bug in the library's internal scratch-space memory allocator. If a caller requested a scratch space with a size near the maximum possible value, adding the allocator's own bookkeeping header could wrap…

Integer overflow in size calculationHeap allocation size mismatchPotential buffer overflow / out-of-bounds write
439278a6by merge-script+14−22 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 93 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

refactor: rename `ctx` param to `ecmult_gen_ctx` where applicable

This commit is a pure code cleanup: it renames a function parameter from 'ctx' to 'ecmult_gen_ctx' in several related files and moves the asterisk in pointer declarations from the left side to the right side (e.g., 'type* arg' to 'type *ar…

81a5a756by Sebastian Falbesoner+41−414 files
No security note in commit
Informational 23 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

scratch: reject sizes that overflow when added to header

This commit fixes a low-level arithmetic overflow check in a special internal memory-pool helper called 'scratch space'. Because the scratch API is no longer exposed to users, the bug cannot be triggered by normal callers today. The change…

Integer overflow in size calculationPotential heap buffer under-allocationDefensive hardening of internal allocator helper
3d4340d1by Sebastian Falbesoner+14−22 files
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 96 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1897: tests: check results before using outputs

This commit fixes test-suite bugs, not the cryptographic library itself. Several test cases were using outputs from functions without first checking whether those functions succeeded. In rare cases a failed setup step could leave a value t…

Test-only hardeningMissing return-value checks in test codePotential false-positive test passes on setup failure
687155dfby merge-script+21−218 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

refactor: replace `_get_hash_context` with direct `->hash_ctx` access

This commit is a straightforward code cleanup: it removes a tiny internal helper function called secp256k1_get_hash_context() and replaces every call with direct access to the context's hash_ctx field. The behavior is identical; no securit…

c8745f6bby Sebastian Falbesoner+67−7116 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1907: release cleanup: bump version after 0.8.0

This commit is a routine post-release bookkeeping change. It bumps the project's version number from 0.8.0 to 0.8.1, marks the current code as an unreleased development snapshot, and updates the changelog accordingly. There are no code, cr…

8a700a35by merge-script+8−53 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 45 · Thin
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

release cleanup: bump version after 0.8.0

This commit is a routine post-release bookkeeping change. It bumps the project's version number from 0.8.0 to 0.8.1, marks the current code as an unreleased development snapshot, and updates the changelog accordingly. There are no code, cr…

78657bf2by Sebastian Falbesoner+8−53 files
No security note in commit
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Security candidatesilentpayments: API docs and internal comment followupsby Sebastian Falbesoner · 0fa38f3d · Jul 23, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 86 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Sebastian Falbesoner

silentpayments: API docs and internal comment followups

Addresses follow-up comments and Claude nits from #1765, see
- https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/pull/1765#discussion_r3629070333
- https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/pull/1765#discussion_r3628888249
- https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/pull/1765#discussion_r3629066762
- https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/pull/1765#pullrequestreview-4754517850

Note that the "hash output is not a valid scalar" error mentioning in
the API docs for sending is dropped intentionally to reflect the
scanning API docs, where we don't mention this negligible case either.

Co-authored-by: Tim Ruffing <me@real-or-random.org>

86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only updates documentation comments and an example error message in the silent payments module. It does not change any executable code, cryptographic calculations, or security behavior. The changes clarify when the output-creation function can fail and add internal explanatory notes for future maintainers.

Security candidatenonce: terminate RFC6979 loop at UINT_MAXby Lőrinc · b1bc6f3e · Jul 20, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateLow 37Details
Commit message · Lőrinc

nonce: terminate RFC6979 loop at UINT_MAX

The public nonce callback accepts `UINT_MAX`, but `nonce_function_rfc6979_impl` never returns for that attempt.
Its `i <= counter` loop wraps after the final candidate and starts again.

Generate the candidate before checking whether it is the requested attempt.
This preserves the result for every `unsigned int` attempt, including `UINT_MAX`, and exits before the index can wrap.

Co-authored-by: Tim Ruffing <me@real-or-random.org>

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 37/100

This commit fixes an infinite-loop bug in the RFC6979 nonce generation code used for creating cryptographic signatures. If a caller asked for attempt number UINT_MAX (the maximum value of an unsigned integer), the old loop would generate that nonce but then keep going forever because the loop counter would wrap around to zero and never exceed the target. The fix generates the nonce first, then checks whether the requested attempt has been reached and exits. This is a reliability/correctness bug in a critical cryptographic path, though it requires a caller to deliberately request UINT_MAX to trigger.

Security candidatesilentpayments: drop "shuffle outputs" recommendation from API docsby Sebastian Falbesoner · cea6d114 · Jul 20, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 50 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Sebastian Falbesoner

silentpayments: drop "shuffle outputs" recommendation from API docs

50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only changes documentation comments in a header file. It removes a recommendation that callers shuffle transaction outputs before scanning, and instead clarifies that outputs should be passed in their original transaction order. There is no code change, no security fix, and no vulnerability being addressed.

Security candidatetests: add constant time testsby josibake · 936907b0 · Jul 14, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 78 · AdequateInformational 12Details
Commit message · josibake

tests: add constant time tests

Co-authored-by: Jonas Nick <2582071+jonasnick@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Sebastian Falbesoner <91535+thestack@users.noreply.github.com>

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
constant-time or timing behavior
AI analysis · Informational 12/100

This commit only adds new test code. It extends the project's constant-time test suite to also exercise the silent payments module, ensuring that secret key material is not accidentally leaked through timing side channels during those operations. There is no change to the actual cryptographic library code that users rely on.

Security candidatesilentpayments: sendingby josibake · b30ea3eb · Jul 14, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 41 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · josibake

silentpayments: sending

Add a routine for the entire sending flow which takes a set of private keys,
the smallest outpoint, and list of recipients and returns a list of
x-only public keys by performing the following steps:

1. Sum up the private keys
2. Calculate the input_hash
3. For each recipient group:
3a. Calculate a shared secret
3b. Create the requested number of outputs

This function assumes a single sender context in that it requires the
sender to have access to all of the private keys. In the future, this
API may be expanded to allow for a multiple senders or for a single
sender who does not have access to all private keys at any given time,
but for now these modes are considered out of scope / unsafe.

Internal to the library, add:

1. A function for creating shared secrets (i.e., a*B or b*A)
2. A function for generating the "SharedSecret" tagged hash
3. A function for creating a single output public key

Co-authored-by: w0xlt <94266259+w0xlt@users.noreply.github.com>

41/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Provides detailed explanatory context! Too few words to establish purpose
Why it was queued
secret or key materialcryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit adds a new feature to the secp256k1 cryptographic library: the sender-side logic for Bitcoin Silent Payments (BIP352). It lets a wallet create special one-time payment addresses for recipients without revealing which recipient is being paid on the blockchain. The change is a normal, well-documented feature addition with no indication of a security bug or vulnerability fix.

Security candidatebuild: add skeleton for new silentpayments (BIP352) moduleby Sebastian Falbesoner · a93e696a · Jul 14, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 62 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Sebastian Falbesoner

build: add skeleton for new silentpayments (BIP352) module

62/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is purely a build-system and header-file skeleton for a new Silent Payments (BIP352) module. It adds configuration options, dependency checks, and empty placeholder files, but contains no actual cryptographic code or implementation. There is nothing here that could introduce a security vulnerability.

Security candidatesilentpayments: recipient label supportby Sebastian Falbesoner · c83b6783 · Jul 14, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Sebastian Falbesoner

silentpayments: recipient label support

Add function for creating a label tweak. This requires a tagged hash
function for labels. This function is used by the receiver for creating
labels to be used for a) creating labeled addresses and b) to populate
a labels cache when scanning.

Add function for creating a labeled spend pubkey. This involves taking
a label tweak, turning it into a public key and adding it to the spend
public key. This function is used by the receiver to create a labeled
silent payment address.

Add tests for the label API.

Co-authored-by: w0xlt <94266259+w0xlt@users.noreply.github.com>

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit adds new public API functions to the silentpayments module of libsecp256k1 to support recipient-side labels for BIP352 silent payments. It is a feature addition, not a security fix or vulnerability patch. There is no evidence in the commit or supplied references of any security defect, exploit, or incident.

Security candidatesilentpayments: receivingby josibake · d72a7432 · Jul 14, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 70 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · josibake

silentpayments: receiving

Add routine for scanning a transaction and returning the necessary
spending data for any found outputs. This function works with labels via
a lookup callback and requires access to the transaction outputs.
Requiring access to the transaction outputs is not suitable for light
clients, but light client support is enabled in a future release.

Add an opaque data type for passing around the prevout public key sum
and the input hash tweak (input_hash). This data is passed to the scanner
before the ECDH step as two separate elements so that the scanner can
multiply the scan_key * input_hash before doing ECDH.

Finally, add test coverage for the receiving API.

Co-authored-by: w0xlt <94266259+w0xlt@users.noreply.github.com>

70/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification! Too few words to establish purpose
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit adds new code for receiving BIP352 Silent Payments in the libsecp256k1 cryptography library. It introduces functions that let a wallet scan a Bitcoin transaction to find outputs sent to it and compute the secret tweaks needed to spend them later. The change is a feature addition with extensive tests; nothing in the commit message or diff indicates a security bug fix or vulnerability.

Security candidatesilentpayments: respect per-group recipients protocol limit (K_max=2323)by Sebastian Falbesoner · 1c1b2753 · Jul 14, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 73 · AdequateLow 38Details
Commit message · Sebastian Falbesoner

silentpayments: respect per-group recipients protocol limit (K_max=2323)

This affects both the sending and scanning API functions:
* Sending fails if any group is exceeding the limit.
* Scanning doesn't look beyond the limit.

Also add a recommendation to the API docs to shuffle the
`tx_outputs` input array, which improves the worst-case by ~2x.

Co-authored-by: nymius <155548262+nymius@users.noreply.github.com>

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 38/100

This commit fixes the libsecp256k1 Silent Payments implementation so it respects the protocol-defined maximum of 2,323 recipients that share the same scan public key. Previously, the code had a TODO warning about unbounded scanning that could lead to quadratic runtime and possible missed outputs. Now, sending fails if any group exceeds the limit, and scanning stops at the limit. It also documents a recommendation to shuffle transaction outputs to improve worst-case performance.

Security candidateUse __GNUC__ instead of SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQby copilot-swe-agent[bot] · 09870e9c · Jun 17, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 85 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · copilot-swe-agent[bot]

Use __GNUC__ instead of SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ

Replace all SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ version checks with plain
defined(__GNUC__) checks, since the macro was only used for ancient GCC
versions that are no longer worth supporting individually. Moreover, the
macro was misleading because Clang claims to be GCC 4.2 by default.

All GCC versions that we reasonably support have the features previously
gated behind these checks (__inline__, __builtin_expect, __restrict__,
__warn_unused_result__, __nonnull__, and the __builtin_ctz* family).

Co-authored-by: Tim Ruffing <me@real-or-random.org>

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a routine cleanup of compiler feature checks in the secp256k1 cryptographic library. It replaces a custom version-check macro with a simpler check for whether the compiler is GCC (or claims to be GCC, like Clang). The change does not fix a security bug and does not introduce a clear vulnerability; it removes support for very old GCC versions that are no longer targeted.

Security candidateinclude: Remove SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ macroby copilot-swe-agent[bot] · dba4d937 · Jun 17, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 63 · AdequateInformational 16Details
Commit message · copilot-swe-agent[bot]

include: Remove SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ macro

The macro is no longer used anywhere in the codebase. This is
technically a breaking change, but it's not expected any user code
actually uses this macro.

Co-authored-by: Tim Ruffing <me@real-or-random.org>

63/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 16/100

This commit removes an unused internal compiler-version-checking helper macro from the public header file. It is a cleanup change with no security implications. The commit message notes it is technically a breaking change for any external code that might have relied on this macro, but the authors do not expect such usage.

Security candidaterefactor: introduce `_ecmult_gen_ge` helper (preventing accidental gej leaks)by Sebastian Falbesoner · a3296d5e · Jun 7, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 100 · StrongLow 36Details
Commit message · Sebastian Falbesoner

refactor: introduce `_ecmult_gen_ge` helper (preventing accidental gej leaks)

Scalar multiplication with the generator point frequently involves a
conversion to affine coordinates and clearing out the temporary Jacobian
group element object after to avoid leaking secret key material, i.e.
executing the following three steps:
- secp256k1_ecmult_gen(ctx, &rj, ...)
- secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&r, &rj)
- secp256k1_gej_clear(&rj)

This commit introduces a corresponding helper to deduplicate code
and mitigate the risk that last step is forgotten (which can easily
happen and is not detected by tests).

The idea came up during a conversation with furszy, see
https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/pull/1765#issuecomment-4482838033

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
secret or key materialcryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 36/100

This is a defensive code cleanup in a Bitcoin cryptography library. It introduces a helper function that wraps a common three-step pattern when multiplying by the generator point, ensuring that temporary sensitive Jacobian coordinate data is always wiped from memory. The change reduces the chance that a future developer forgets to clear that temporary data, which could theoretically leak tiny fragments of secret key information through memory side channels. It does not fix a known active bug or reported vulnerability.

Security candidatedoc: correct API docs for ECDSA signing out-params (s/array/signature object/)by Sebastian Falbesoner · 40a0d874 · Apr 29, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 55 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Sebastian Falbesoner

doc: correct API docs for ECDSA signing out-params (s/array/signature object/)

55/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarycryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only fixes wording in the API documentation comments. It changes the description of a function output parameter from 'pointer to an array' to 'pointer to a signature object' in two header files. No actual code behavior changed, so there is no security impact.

Security candidatemusig: always clear out secret key in `secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen_counter`by Sebastian Falbesoner · 8479eafa · Apr 28, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateLow 34Details
Commit message · Sebastian Falbesoner

musig: always clear out secret key in `secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen_counter`

Even though `secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen_internal` can currently only fail
if the API is misused (invalid `keypair` or `keyagg_cache` parameters),
clear out the buffer holding secret key data as well in this case to
follow best practices.

The issue was found and reported by l0rinc using GPT 5.5 (Thanks!).

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
secret or key material
AI analysis · Low 34/100

This is a small defensive cleanup in Bitcoin Core's libsecp256k1 MuSig code. The function that generates a cryptographic nonce could, in rare error cases, leave a temporary copy of the user's secret key in memory instead of wiping it. The patch makes sure the secret key buffer is always cleared, even when the internal function fails. The actual failure path can only be reached if the API is misused (bad keypair or cache), so this is best-practice hardening rather than an active exploit.

Security candidateecdsa: VERIFY_CHECK result of _fe_set_b32_limitby Tim Ruffing · 43fca0ff · Mar 23, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 18Details
Commit message · Tim Ruffing

ecdsa: VERIFY_CHECK result of _fe_set_b32_limit

This also avoids a spurious "-Wmaybe-uninitialized" warning emitted by
gcc 16 (snapshot) when compiling with -DDETERMINISTIC.

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 18/100

This is a small code-quality change in Bitcoin Core's secp256k1 cryptographic library. It adds an explicit safety check confirming that a value converted from one internal format to another stays within the expected range, and it silences a compiler warning about an unused return value. The commit message frames this as avoiding a compiler warning, not fixing a security bug.

Security candidateAdd API to override SHA256 compression at runtimeby furszy · 0753f8b9 · Mar 3, 2026 · 11 filesMessage 80 · StrongLow 35Details
Commit message · furszy

Add API to override SHA256 compression at runtime

This introduces `secp256k1_context_set_sha256_compression()`,
which allows users to provide their own SHA256 block-compression
function at runtime.

This is useful in setups where the fastest implementation can only
be determined dynamically based on the available CPU features, and
rebuilding the library is not possible.

The callback is installed on the `secp256k1_context` and is then used
by all operations that compute SHA256 hashes. As part of the setup,
the library performs sanity checks to ensure that the supplied
function is equivalent to the default transform.

Passing NULL to the callback setter restores the built-in
implementation.

80/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 35/100

This commit adds a new public API that lets users of the libsecp256k1 cryptography library swap out the internal SHA-256 compression function at runtime, typically to use a faster hardware-accelerated version. The library checks that the replacement behaves like the real SHA-256 step before accepting it. The change itself is a feature addition, not a bug fix, and there is no evidence in the commit or supplied references that it addresses a known security vulnerability.

Security candidateIntroduce hash context to support pluggable SHA256 compressionby furszy · fdb6a91a · Mar 3, 2026 · 21 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · furszy

Introduce hash context to support pluggable SHA256 compression

This is purely a mechanical change with no behavior change.

It introduces a secp256k1_hash_ctx struct inside secp256k1_context
and propagates it to all SHA256-related operations.

This sets up the ability to provide a hardware-optimized SHA256
compression function at runtime in a follow-up commit.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a large but purely structural refactor of the libsecp256k1 cryptographic library. It threads a new 'hash context' through every SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-256, and RFC 6979 operation so that a different SHA-256 compression implementation (for example a faster hardware version) can be plugged in later. The commit message explicitly calls it a 'mechanical change with no behavior change,' and the code keeps the existing software compression function as the default everywhere. There is no security bug or vulnerability visible in this patch.

Security candidateRevert "ci, docker: Fix LLVM repository signature failure"by Hennadii Stepanov · 76e92cfe · Feb 20, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 70 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Hennadii Stepanov

Revert "ci, docker: Fix LLVM repository signature failure"

This reverts commit 0ffb1749a5811bb63902f00c9fa73b49588d0557.

70/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit removes a temporary workaround in the project's CI Docker build file. The workaround had relaxed a PGP signature policy check so that an older LLVM repository signing key would still be accepted by Debian's package manager during automated testing image builds. Removing the workaround simply restores the normal, stricter policy. There is no direct security vulnerability in the project's own code, and no runtime software is changed.

Security candidateutil: introduce and use `ARRAY_SIZE` macroby Sebastian Falbesoner · 921b9711 · Feb 16, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 76 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Sebastian Falbesoner

util: introduce and use `ARRAY_SIZE` macro

The macro definition matches the one used in Linux, see e.g.
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/9702969978695d9a699a1f34771580cdbb153b33/include/linux/array_size.h#L11
(without the additional check rejecting pointers, as we would need
GNU C for that, see e.g. https://stackoverflow.com/a/19455169)

76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
memory safety
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a simple code cleanup: it introduces a standard ARRAY_SIZE macro and replaces repeated manual array-size calculations with that macro. It does not change any behavior, fix any bug, or alter any security-sensitive logic. There is no security issue here.

Security candidateellswift: fix overflow flag handling in secp256k1_ellswift_xdhby gzJx0DuTRHytnHe7P5RmMbPf3wKy2BztweVGXTf · 307b49f1 · Feb 16, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 100 · StrongModerate 62Details
Commit message · gzJx0DuTRHytnHe7P5RmMbPf3wKy2BztweVGXTf

ellswift: fix overflow flag handling in secp256k1_ellswift_xdh

The secp256k1_ellswift_xdh function uses overflow = secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s) which overwrites the overflow flag from the preceding secp256k1_scalar_set_b32 call. This means secret keys >= the curve order are silently accepted (reduced mod n) instead of being rejected.

The fix changes = to |=, matching the correct pattern already used in secp256k1_ecdh (main_impl.h, line 51).

The ECDH module's test suite explicitly tests overflow rejection (passes secp256k1_group_order_bytes as a key and checks the function returns 0). The ellswift test suite has no corresponding test, which is why this went undetected.

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
secret or key materialmemory safety
AI analysis · Moderate 62/100

This commit fixes a bug in the ElligatorSwift-based ECDH key exchange function. The function was supposed to reject secret keys that are invalid (zero or greater than or equal to the curve order), but due to a one-character bug it only checked for zero keys and silently accepted too-large keys by reducing them modulo the curve order. The fix makes it reject both invalid cases, matching the behavior of the regular ECDH function. There is no evidence this was exploited or that it caused real-world harm, but it is a genuine cryptographic correctness issue.

Security candidatetest: add unit tests for secp256k1_scalar_check_overflowby Rohit Yadav · f47bbc07 · Feb 4, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 72 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Rohit Yadav

test: add unit tests for secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow

72/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
memory safety
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds new unit tests for an existing internal function that checks whether a number has overflowed the secp256k1 group order. It does not change any production code, cryptographic logic, or behavior that could affect users. The change improves test coverage but introduces no security issue.

Security candidaterefactor: remove unnecessary `malloc` result castsby Sebastian Falbesoner · 97b3c478 · Feb 2, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 100 · StrongInformational 19Details
Commit message · Sebastian Falbesoner

refactor: remove unnecessary `malloc` result casts

It seems that there is no good reason to do this and it's even
considered bad practice, see e.g. https://stackoverflow.com/a/605858

This commit touches mostly test code, the only two functions used
in production are `secp256k1_context_{create,clone}`.

Instances were found manually via `$ git grep "malloc("`

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
memory safetycryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This commit is a straightforward code cleanup: it removes unnecessary type casts in front of memory allocation calls like malloc. In modern C, casting the result of malloc is not needed and is generally discouraged. The change does not alter program behavior, fix a bug, or address a security issue. It touches mostly test and benchmark code, with only two small changes in production functions that create or clone a cryptographic context.

Security candidaterefactor: Remove trailing whitespaceby Hennadii Stepanov · 13e3bee5 · Feb 2, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 47 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Hennadii Stepanov

refactor: Remove trailing whitespace

47/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only removes invisible trailing spaces at the ends of three lines across three source files. It does not change any program logic, function behavior, or security properties. There is no security relevance.

Security candidateci, docker: Fix LLVM repository signature failureby Hennadii Stepanov · 0ffb1749 · Feb 1, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 91 · StrongInformational 16Details
Commit message · Hennadii Stepanov

ci, docker: Fix LLVM repository signature failure

The LLVM apt repository uses legacy SHA1 signatures which are now
rejected by the stricter Sequoia PGP policy.

This change extends the 'sha1.second_preimage_resistance' cutoff date to
9999-01-01 in the default Sequoia config. This effectively whitelists
the legacy signature algorithm, preventing "OpenPGP signature
verification failed" errors during `apt-get update`.

See https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/153385.

91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarydefensive validation
AI analysis · Informational 16/100

This commit changes a CI Docker build script so that an older SHA-1-based PGP signature from the LLVM apt repository is still accepted. It is a build-infrastructure workaround, not a change to the secp256k1 cryptographic code, and it does not introduce a vulnerability in the library itself.

Security candidatedoc: include arg -DUSE_EXTERNAL_DEFAULT_CALLBACKS=1 for cmakeby kevkevinpal · 0406cfc4 · Dec 19, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 50 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · kevkevinpal

doc: include arg -DUSE_EXTERNAL_DEFAULT_CALLBACKS=1 for cmake

50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This is a one-line documentation update in a header file comment. It adds the CMake equivalent of an existing Autotools build option so developers know how to enable external default callbacks when building with CMake. No code behavior changes.