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libsecp256k1

High-assurance secp256k1 elliptic-curve library used throughout the Bitcoin ecosystem.

BitcoinCryptographic librariesNormal
Repository coverage

257 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

85security candidates7second-pass queue215AI analyses
28commits · 30 days
53commits · 60 days
152commits · 180 days
206commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 682 seen1 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 625 seen2 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 619 seen1 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 548 seen1 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

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Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

72/100 average clarity
100Strong · 80–100
89Adequate · 60–79
64Thin · 40–59
4Opaque · 0–39
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Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
merge-script482426193
Sebastian Falbesoner502145068
Hennadii Stepanov51746064
Tim Ruffing22622055
furszy13413087
josibake949066
Lőrinc13313077
kevkevinpal626064
Ferdinando Ametrano522074
John Moffett424069
copilot-swe-agent[bot]323074
Bruno Garcia322090
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 43 minutes ago

Informational 21 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1980: examples: randomize the context in musig, erase the keypair in schnorr

This change improves two example programs in the secp256k1 cryptographic library. It adds a recommended side-channel protection step to the multi-signature example (musig.c) and ensures the single-signature example (schnorr.c) also wipes a…

Context randomization added to protect against side-channel leakageSecret key material explicitly erased from keypair object after useChanges are confined to example code, not the core library
5959bed6by merge-script+14−12 files
No security note in commit
Low 36 AI analysisMessage 98 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1998: Avoid unsequenced accesses to volatile variables

This change fixes a subtle compiler-warning/undefined-behavior issue in the code that performs secret math inside Bitcoin's cryptographic library. The code uses 'volatile' variables to prevent the compiler from turning certain operations i…

Touches constant-time arithmetic paths (modular inversion normalization)Fixes undefined behavior involving volatile-qualified variablesCompiler warning (-Wunsequenced) treated as a correctness defect
a0e2e23aby merge-script+42−362 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Low 32 AI analysisMessage 80 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Avoid unsequenced accesses to volatile variables

This commit fixes a subtle C language rule violation in Bitcoin Core's libsecp256k1 cryptographic library. The code was reading a special 'volatile' variable multiple times within the same expression, which modern C standards treat as unde…

Undefined behavior in cryptographic constant-time codeCompiler warning (-Wunsequenced) in security-critical pathVolatile variable used as constant-time execution barrier
e7a34ba3by Hennadii Stepanov+20−142 files
No security note in commit
Informational 16 AI analysisMessage 100 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1898: tests: Silent Payments ctime test never reaches a match or label lookup

This commit fixes a flawed test in the libsecp256k1 cryptographic library. The test was supposed to exercise the Silent Payments constant-time scanning code, but due to a bug in how the test was written, it never actually verified that the…

Test-only change in ctime_tests.cFixes incorrect test key mutation that prevented matching outputAdds label callback to exercise label-candidate serialization/batching path
5d2ff536by merge-script+27−131 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 98 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

ci: Run the Wine jobs on ubuntu-24.04

This is a routine continuous-integration (CI) maintenance change. It pins a Windows cross-compilation test job to an older Ubuntu version because the newer GitHub-hosted runner image breaks Wine's networking syscalls. There is no change to…

ecfe7ab8by Ferdinando Ametrano+2−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 23 AI analysisMessage 96 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1986: examples: exit with failure if signature verification fails

This change fixes two example programs so they return a failure code when a signature check fails. Previously, the examples always reported success even if verification failed, which meant automated tests would pass even when the underlyin…

Incorrect return status masked verification failures in example/test programsAutomated tests would pass despite cryptographic verification failingFix aligns ECDSA and Schnorr examples with existing MuSig example behavior
b97f7f5fby merge-script+2−22 files
No security note in commit
Informational 18 AI analysisMessage 88 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

examples: exit with failure if signature verification fails

This is a small hardening fix to two example programs. Previously, the example programs for ECDSA and Schnorr signatures would print whether a signature was valid but always report success to the operating system. Because the project's bui…

Test/example code silently succeeded on verification failureRegression-test gap for signature verification behaviorFix hardens CI/test signal without changing cryptographic logic
900613a7by Amartya Singh+2−22 files
No security note in commit
Low 35 AI analysisMessage 96 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1974: silentpayments: reject label tweaks that overflow the group order

This change fixes a silent handling problem in Bitcoin's silent payments feature. When a user-supplied label tweak value was larger than the cryptographic group order, the code previously reduced it silently, which could lead to incorrect …

silent modular reduction of attacker/caller-controlled scalarAPI misuse now rejected via ARG_CHECKsensitive scalar clearing before early return to avoid leaking transaction indistinguishability data
1c088b64by merge-script+13−22 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 76 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1983: silentpayments: return 0 instead of `ARG_CHECK`ing for empty inputs/outputs

This update fixes a crash risk in Bitcoin's silent payments scanning code. Before the change, if a transaction had no suitable inputs or no taproot outputs, the library treated that as an illegal argument and could call abort(), killing th…

Denial-of-service vector: maliciously crafted transaction could trigger abort() in a scanning/indexing processAPI contract violation: documented return-0 behavior was not implemented for empty inputs/outputsARG_CHECK removal in two public silentpayments functions
a3a5cd45by merge-script+46−334 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Low 30 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

silentpayments: allow NULL arrays in scan_outputs if n_tx_outputs is 0

This commit fixes a minor API usability issue in the experimental silent payments module. Previously, a function that scans transaction outputs for silent payments would crash if given empty arrays represented as NULL pointers, even though…

NULL pointer argument check relaxed for empty arraysSECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL attributes removed for two parametersNew API test verifying NULL-with-zero-length behavior
e7bb0112by Sebastian Falbesoner+18−113 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 60 AI analysisMessage 78 · Adequate
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

silentpayments: return 0 instead of `ARG_CHECK`ing for empty inputs/outputs

This change fixes two functions in the Silent Payments module so they return a normal failure value (0) instead of triggering an internal abort when given a transaction with no eligible inputs or no taproot outputs. Previously, callers sca…

ARG_CHECK default behavior is abort(), turning an expected non-Silent-Payments transaction into a potential DoS crashAPI contract promised return 0 for non-Silent-Payments transactions, but implementation violated it for empty input/output edge casesCallers scanning blocks would need special-case handling before the fix to avoid crashes
d7821f4aby Sebastian Falbesoner+27−223 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Low 31 AI analysisMessage 100 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

silentpayments: reject label tweaks that overflow the group order

This change tightens error handling in the silent payments scanning code. Previously, if a caller-supplied label tweak was as large as or larger than the elliptic curve group order, it was silently wrapped around (reduced modulo the order)…

silent reduction modulo group order replaced with explicit overflow rejectionsensitive scalars and shared secret explicitly cleared before aborting on invalid inputoutput assignment reordered to avoid partial state update on failure path
95552e16by Sebastian Falbesoner+13−22 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 35 · Opaque
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

remove unused SECP256K1_GE_CONST_INFINITY

This commit simply deletes an unused macro named SECP256K1_GE_CONST_INFINITY from a header file. A macro is a shorthand definition for code, and this one was no longer referenced anywhere in the project. Removing dead code has no functiona…

7b59e1fcby fanquake+0−11 file
No security note in commit
Low 26 AI analysisMessage 100 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1929: silentpayments: perform tweak addition with actual scalars

This change simplifies how Silent Payments scanning adds a small tweak value to a secret-derived value. It replaces a function meant for secret-key tweaking with plain scalar (modular number) addition. The old code had a special case that …

Behavior change: zero-result tweak addition is no longer forced to zero; scalar addition allows zeroBehavior change: label tweaks >= group order N are no longer rejected by the secret-key APIRemoval of defensive comment explaining failure modes of secret-key tweak addition
04b91ce2by merge-script+7−161 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1963: doc: say the sha256 compression callback processes secrets

This commit only adds a documentation comment to a public header file. It reminds developers that a special callback function used for SHA256 hashing may receive secret data such as private keys, so any custom implementation must be consta…

31716e4bby merge-script+3−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 18 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

doc: say the sha256 compression callback processes secrets

This is a documentation-only change. It adds a warning to the public header file telling developers that the optional SHA256 compression callback may receive secret key material, and therefore any custom implementation must run in constant…

Documentation clarifies that a pluggable cryptographic callback receives secret materialDocumentation imposes constant-time and no-logging requirements on callback implementersReferences RFC 6979 nonce derivation as an example of secret-key processing
494d3053by Ferdinando Ametrano+3−01 file
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 96 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1946: doc: clean up lingering ECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE comment

This is a documentation-only cleanup. It moves a comment about the ECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE setting to a better location and fixes an outdated formula in the comment. No code behavior changes.

6f065e9aby merge-script+10−112 files
No security note in commit
Low 37 AI analysisMessage 100 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1933: refactor: introduce `ecmult_const_ge` helper (preventing accidential gej leaks)

This commit is a defensive code cleanup in Bitcoin Core's secp256k1 cryptography library. It introduces a helper function that automatically clears temporary secret data after a constant-time elliptic curve multiplication, and switches exi…

Defensive refactoring to prevent accidental leakage of secret scalar information from Jacobian coordinatesNew helper enforces memory clearing of intermediate group element after constant-time scalar multiplicationAdoption in ECDH and silentpayments modules, which process secret keys
2365dc64by merge-script+35−427 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 93 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1949: ecdsa: Clarify derivation of the r check in `_sig_verify`

This commit only rewrites comments in the source code to make the mathematical explanation clearer. It does not change any actual code instructions, function behavior, or security properties. There is no vulnerability or fix here.

4a264a93by merge-script+21−151 file
No security note in commit
Informational 12 AI analysisMessage 100 · Strong
BC Bitcoin Corelibsecp256k1 BitcoinCryptographic libraries

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1948: tests: add ECDSA verify case where r + n overflows p

This commit only adds a new test case to the project's test suite. It does not change any production cryptographic code. The new test verifies that the ECDSA signature verification function correctly rejects a crafted invalid signature in …

Adds test coverage for ECDSA verification edge case involving r + n overflow against field order pReferences a surviving mutant where the early-rejection check in secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify is removedDoes not modify production code; purely a test-suite enhancement
e23e9201by merge-script+28−01 file
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Security candidateMerge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1923: group: VERIFY input/output ge/gej/fe exhaustivelyby merge-script · a7f26437 · Sep 9, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 100 · StrongInformational 14Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1923: group: VERIFY input/output ge/gej/fe exhaustively

c36269ef95da99498b3b62736f09dc42ffe5d094 group/refactor: Use constant expression for readability (Tim Ruffing)
031dbae6591664cf321bd9b09dd12535a5087533 group: Export secp256k1_ge_set_ge(j)_zinv properly in group.h (Tim Ruffing)
4f3bd158d5edd69cc66f39f20c42c72c776fa2d4 group: Cover all input/output ge/gej/fe with VERIFY calls (Tim Ruffing)
0711443e6da39cc98660fbeef3f989935443caa6 group: Add missing FE_VERIFY checks on rzr outputs (Tim Ruffing)
1bd7492181aca5967bbc690a4b81560101b1408b group: Remove redundant SECP256K1_GEJ_VERIFY (Tim Ruffing)
cddd125f72f6156b360edb760d4ae089c3ae7a0f group: Split functions into pre/post VERIFY and _impl (Tim Ruffing)

Pull request description:

This PR splits the functions in group_impl.h in a wrapper that only performs VERIFY and an `_impl` function that has the actual code. This ensures that the post VERIFY calls are not skipped in case of early returns.

Also, this PR adds VERIFY calls wherever they were missing (inside group_impl.h)

The new structure is similar to field_impl.h but a bit simpler because we don't need to deal with two different implementations. A real difference is that, in non-VERIFY mode, field_impl.h delegates via #defines (ensure there's no overhead due to a function call) and here I decided to delegate via function calls. It keeps the code a bit simpler to read (and maybe also simpler to parser for tools such as language servers). The _impl functions all have SECP256K1_INLINE. I think every sane compiler will inline the function calls in non-VERIFY mode (even without SECP256K1_INLINE) because the body of the wrapper is really just a single function call then with the same signature.

Follow-up PR can cover modifications of ges and fes outside the group and field modules, e.g., ecmult modifies ges/gejs directly. Maybe it will be good that it does this only through group functions but we'll need to see; in C++ this module could legitimately be considered a "friend" of group.

ACKs for top commit:
theStack:
ACK c36269ef95da99498b3b62736f09dc42ffe5d094

Tree-SHA512: 7b5a74de1823434037ba0cf84f0e3a8aba56479da508014b8a4c738dd55c5a437edce5255cb45bf067a437bbf3912bc0f6c4c558dda589b0c2dc4dd6b2a0ed06

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarymerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 14/100

This commit is a code-quality and defensive-programming change. It restructures internal elliptic-curve helper functions so that runtime consistency checks (VERIFY macros) wrap the real implementation and cannot be skipped by an early 'return' statement. It also adds a few missing checks. These VERIFY macros are debug/test-only assertions; they are disabled in production builds, so the change does not alter normal behavior and is not a security fix for a live vulnerability.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1928: tests: add coverage for exact-size DER signature serializationby merge-script · aa0af2fa · Sep 7, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 96 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1928: tests: add coverage for exact-size DER signature serialization

500ccb60f70550332adf6b6f894ce84659cd6831 tests: add coverage for exact-size DER signature serialization (Bruno Garcia)

Pull request description:

The existing tests only serialize into oversized buffers or one that is far too small, so the boundary case where the output buffer is exactly the required size was untested. Check that this succeeds with identical output, and that one byte less fails while reporting the required size.

Kills the following mutant (https://secp256k1.space/src/ecdsa_impl.h#1141):
```diff
diff --git a/src/ecdsa_impl.h b/src/ecdsa_impl.h
index 5963877..499fe03 100644
--- a/src/ecdsa_impl.h
+++ b/src/ecdsa_impl.h
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_serialize(unsigned char *sig, size_t *size, const
secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&s[1], as);
while (lenR > 1 && rp[0] == 0 && rp[1] < 0x80) { lenR--; rp++; }
while (lenS > 1 && sp[0] == 0 && sp[1] < 0x80) { lenS--; sp++; }
- if (*size < 6+lenS+lenR) {
+ if (*size <= 6+lenS+lenR) {
*size = 6 + lenS + lenR;
return 0;
}
```

ACKs for top commit:
real-or-random:
utACK 500ccb60f70550332adf6b6f894ce84659cd6831
theStack:
ACK 500ccb60f70550332adf6b6f894ce84659cd6831

Tree-SHA512: 8ac002a9e67729f5cb09a9ba8244e926e81898abb273ae4f43a13ccf981322e434caee06d27dcae9b840e0b850908c2281399d48a444319bcc11a0af82bb52a3

96/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarymerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds new test code to check that a specific function behaves correctly when given a buffer of exactly the right size. It does not change any production code, fix a bug, or introduce a vulnerability. It is a routine improvement to the test suite.

Security candidatetests: add coverage for exact-size DER signature serializationby Bruno Garcia · 500ccb60 · Sep 3, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 88 · StrongInformational 13Details
Commit message · Bruno Garcia

tests: add coverage for exact-size DER signature serialization

The existing tests only serialize into oversized buffers or one that is
far too small, so the boundary case where the output buffer is exactly
the required size was untested. Check that this succeeds with identical
output, and that one byte less fails while reporting the required size.

88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Informational 13/100

This commit only adds a new test case. It checks that a DER signature can be written into a buffer that is exactly the right size, and that writing into a buffer one byte too small fails correctly. There is no change to the actual library code that handles signatures, so this does not fix or introduce a security issue by itself.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1924: tests: add coverage for the DER long form length encodingby merge-script · a9a61831 · Aug 30, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 96 · StrongInformational 19Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1924: tests: add coverage for the DER long form length encoding

ddb1dfa77038442dff86ba90e6d0a30adfddef17 tests: add coverage for the DER long form length encoding (Bruno Garcia)

Pull request description:

random_ber_signature only emits long form lengths in signatures it marks as certainly_not_der, so run_ecdsa_der_parse asserts that such inputs are rejected but never that a well-formed long form length is accepted. As a result, inverting any of the four conditions in secp256k1_der_read_len that govern the long form goes unnoticed by the test suite.

Add the accepting cases, together with the two rejecting ones that share their boundaries: a length below 128, which must use the short form, and length octets with a leading zero. Since DER permits the long form only for lengths of at least 128, which a signature with two in-range scalars never reaches, the R integers in the accepting cases necessarily overflow to zero; the test checks the parsed values so this stays pinned down.

I noticed this lack in the tests while working on mutation testing for the ecdsa impl. So these tests kill the following mutants: https://secp256k1.space/src/ecdsa_impl.h#863, https://secp256k1.space/src/ecdsa_impl.h#878 and https://secp256k1.space/src/ecdsa_impl.h#896

ACKs for top commit:
real-or-random:
utACK ddb1dfa77038442dff86ba90e6d0a30adfddef17
theStack:
ACK ddb1dfa77038442dff86ba90e6d0a30adfddef17

Tree-SHA512: 281460890a96f3beaa294e3a14dc447316cc698f36f9087b36ae8e2bbaa422152588f083c4b293cad7fe4b84497a24fde55d04977e8f306f35fd51353f41cc28

96/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarymemory safetymerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This commit only adds new test cases to the libsecp256k1 test suite. It does not change any production cryptographic code. The new tests check that the DER signature parser correctly handles an unusual but valid length-encoding format (the 'long form'), and that it rejects certain invalid variants. It is a hardening of test coverage, not a fix for a known bug or vulnerability.

Security candidatetests: add coverage for the DER long form length encodingby Bruno Garcia · ddb1dfa7 · Aug 26, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 88 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Bruno Garcia

tests: add coverage for the DER long form length encoding

random_ber_signature only emits long form lengths in signatures it marks
as certainly_not_der, so run_ecdsa_der_parse asserts that such inputs are
rejected but never that a well-formed long form length is accepted. As a
result, inverting any of the four conditions in secp256k1_der_read_len
that govern the long form goes unnoticed by the test suite.

Add the accepting cases, together with the two rejecting ones that share
their boundaries: a length below 128, which must use the short form, and
length octets with a leading zero. Since DER permits the long form only
for lengths of at least 128, which a signature with two in-range scalars
never reaches, the R integers in the accepting cases are longer than 32
bytes and are therefore parsed as zero; the test checks the parsed values
so this stays pinned down.

88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds new test cases to the project's test suite. It does not change any production parsing code. The tests verify that the existing DER signature parser correctly accepts valid long-form length encodings and rejects invalid ones. There is no security vulnerability being fixed here.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1908: refactor: replace `_get_hash_context` with direct `->hash_ctx` accessby merge-script · bae6b89a · Aug 24, 2026 · 16 filesMessage 96 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1908: refactor: replace `_get_hash_context` with direct `->hash_ctx` access

c8745f6b3ad88a8e2b0ee2953ed3cc099dc9e15c refactor: replace `_get_hash_context` with direct `->hash_ctx` access (Sebastian Falbesoner)

Pull request description:

See issue #1835: https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/issues/1835#issue-4046371933.

ACKs for top commit:
apoelstra:
ACK c8745f6b3ad88a8e2b0ee2953ed3cc099dc9e15c; successfully ran local tests
real-or-random:
utACK c8745f6b3ad88a8e2b0ee2953ed3cc099dc9e15c

Tree-SHA512: 521189c776bae669e43bb5e6ebe6a80668c484701d94320c83403ed30babb08962d61a0d674921481daa68b308ac82bf3fe7f460a15f6451b0be16ab5486dad7

96/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a straightforward code cleanup: it removes a small internal helper function named secp256k1_get_hash_context() and replaces every call with direct access to the context's hash_ctx field. The behavior is identical; no security bug is fixed or introduced.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1915: refactor: Move (de)ser helpers from musig and eckey to groupby merge-script · 86c7cbaf · Aug 19, 2026 · 10 filesMessage 98 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1915: refactor: Move (de)ser helpers from musig and eckey to group

bfd40bd0ce0e7cac4f6bb395ccfe90eaf625feb1 refactor: Rename privkey to seckey in eckey helpers (Fabian Jahr)
d8ee6e6cf6706c00562a584715cb2b8c41df7cb2 refactor: Move parsing helpers from musig to group (Fabian Jahr)
2577fb1888c021752dc6edbfa6df3216daa9ccb1 refactor: Move pubkey parsing and serialization from eckey to group (Fabian Jahr)

Pull request description:

These two helpers, `secp256k1_musig_ge_serialize_ext` and `secp256k1_musig_ge_parse_ext`, aren't really musig-specific. They (de)serialize a group element that can also be the point at infinity. This moves them to `eckey` as `secp256k1_eckey_serialize_ext` and `secp256k1_eckey_parse_ext`. They can't move further down to group.h because they depend on other `eckey` functions internally. There should be no functional change here.

I stumbled upon this while working on #1754 where I would want to reuse these helpers in that module, so it is split out of that. But the change seems to make sense on its own as well, so I wouldn't consider this prep work alone.

ACKs for top commit:
theStack:
ACK bfd40bd0ce0e7cac4f6bb395ccfe90eaf625feb1
real-or-random:
utACK bfd40bd0ce0e7cac4f6bb395ccfe90eaf625feb1

Tree-SHA512: 9e6445e480495baaf14b6d435a513d465116ae517b47b3f76c317e6aa70e9f1bcc0ce3f92498e008d5aa38d8fbeebe4fdf69a0bf90b05da9da084242b9170b01

98/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This is a routine internal code cleanup: it moves helper functions that convert between group elements and byte strings from one internal file to another, and renames a couple of private-key tweak helpers from 'privkey' to 'seckey'. The public behavior of the library is unchanged, and the commit message explicitly states there should be no functional change.

Security candidaterefactor: Rename privkey to seckey in eckey helpersby Fabian Jahr · bfd40bd0 · Aug 17, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 62 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Fabian Jahr

refactor: Rename privkey to seckey in eckey helpers

62/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a simple renaming of internal function names from 'privkey' to 'seckey' to match current project terminology. No behavior of the code changes, and there is no security fix or vulnerability introduced.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1916: ecdh/ellswift: simplify seckey loading with `_scalar_set_b32_seckey`by merge-script · a37d7cc0 · Aug 17, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 98 · StrongInformational 18Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1916: ecdh/ellswift: simplify seckey loading with `_scalar_set_b32_seckey`

c00dc8181054fb31a0149ce03ef8413300a3a8bf ecdh/ellswift: simplify seckey loading with `_scalar_set_b32_seckey` (Sebastian Falbesoner)

Pull request description:

Instead of checking for overflow and zero manually, use the existing `_scalar_set_b32_seckey` helper which does both and returns zero if either of these two conditions apply. This can be seen as a very late follow-up to PR #701, commit 3fec9826086aa45ebbac1ff6fc3bb7b25ca78b1d, where the helper has been introduced and applied to the functions `_ecdsa_sign`, `_pubkey_create` and `_seckey_verify`. The variable name `is_sec_valid` has been chosen as it is currently also used in [`secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_inner`](https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/blob/439278a649d3099d62dde966a76dc04aaca7ccb3/src/secp256k1.c#L555).

Note that introducing parantheses around `!!ret` was necessary to avoid warnings in the following form:
```
/home/thestack/secp256k1_master/src/modules/ecdh/main_impl.h: In function ‘secp256k1_ecdh’:
/home/thestack/secp256k1_master/src/modules/ecdh/main_impl.h:74:12: warning: suggest parentheses around operand of ‘!’ or change ‘&’ to ‘&&’ or ‘
!’ to ‘~’ [-Wparentheses]
74 | return !!ret & is_sec_valid;
| ^~~~~
```

ACKs for top commit:
real-or-random:
utACK c00dc8181054fb31a0149ce03ef8413300a3a8bf

Tree-SHA512: fc28140b09b0d8143b05a21f83b9d24f424384823ca26b8b3fbe103156b2bd2d8d7df76468002d794c43a73d4d7c0532420e2396f2b604a7e65d467baba51600

98/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safetymerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 18/100

This is a small internal cleanup in Bitcoin Core's secp256k1 cryptography library. It replaces a manual secret-key validity check (overflow plus zero) with an existing helper function that does the same thing. The behavior is intended to be identical; no security vulnerability is described or visible in the code change.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1911: refactor: rename `ctx` param to `ecmult_gen_ctx` where applicableby merge-script · 3d69f4ce · Aug 17, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 86 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1911: refactor: rename `ctx` param to `ecmult_gen_ctx` where applicable

81a5a7567d10b358e6e41ef6085adf2ab2abc879 refactor: rename `ctx` param to `ecmult_gen_ctx` where applicable (Sebastian Falbesoner)

Pull request description:

To be more consistent and avoid confusion with regular `secp256k1_context` instances, rename the `ctx` parameter to `ecmult_gen_ctx` in all functions that take `secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context` pointers (see discussion https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/issues/1835#issuecomment-4057203336 ff.).

While at it, move the * in pointer declarations of the touched functions to the right side for consistency across the code base, see PR #1252.

ACKs for top commit:
real-or-random:
utACK 81a5a7567d10b358e6e41ef6085adf2ab2abc879

Tree-SHA512: 1efe35931bb30a5416fb95f95c859d679221aba846af2441a8855967dfc1c58d7c4699db658d4feba570efad5a64c08ad08da304335ed9ae0340713ec0c3ef7b

86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This is a pure code cleanup change: it renames a function parameter from 'ctx' to 'ecmult_gen_ctx' in several internal files and moves the asterisk in pointer declarations for style consistency. No behavior, logic, or security properties of the code are changed.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1910: scratch: reject sizes that overflow when added to headerby merge-script · 439278a6 · Aug 16, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 86 · StrongLow 27Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1910: scratch: reject sizes that overflow when added to header

3d4340d17325a6732108423f9d3e54de99539a60 scratch: reject sizes that overflow when added to header (Sebastian Falbesoner)

Pull request description:

We only use scratch space internally, so this is not an issue for the user (scratch API functions have been removed since 0.6.0, see #1620), but fixing this might still make sense to prepare for the unlikely case that we expose the scratch API again in the future. An alternative could be to simply delete the scratch space functionality already, as e.g. done in PR #1789.

Reported by [Project Loupe](https://github.com/project-loupe)

ACKs for top commit:
apoelstra:
utACK 3d4340d17325a6732108423f9d3e54de99539a60
real-or-random:
utACK 3d4340d17325a6732108423f9d3e54de99539a60

Tree-SHA512: 8e380919a48445d8df46a568e4fcbcbe31b5b5668586942d1eaa1b90b4e0669548d5ca831c8dde484b869c7e95faacb608491738a59c5e1ee15d4084acc7ead6

86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safetymerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Low 27/100

This commit fixes an integer overflow bug in the library's internal scratch-space memory allocator. If a caller requested a scratch space with a size near the maximum possible value, adding the allocator's own bookkeeping header could wrap around to a tiny total size. That tiny allocation would then be used as if it were huge, potentially causing memory corruption. However, the scratch-space API is no longer exposed to users, so normal applications cannot trigger this.

Security candidaterefactor: rename `ctx` param to `ecmult_gen_ctx` where applicableby Sebastian Falbesoner · 81a5a756 · Aug 7, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 93 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Sebastian Falbesoner

refactor: rename `ctx` param to `ecmult_gen_ctx` where applicable

To be more consistent and avoid confusion with regular `_context`
instances, rename the `ctx` parameter to `ecmult_gen_ctx` in all
functions that take `_ecmult_gen_context` pointers.

While at it, move the * in pointer declarations of the touched functions
to the right side for consistency across the code base, see PR #1252.

93/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a pure code cleanup: it renames a function parameter from 'ctx' to 'ecmult_gen_ctx' in several related files and moves the asterisk in pointer declarations from the left side to the right side (e.g., 'type* arg' to 'type *arg'). No behavior changes, no bug fixes, and no security fixes are present.

Security candidatescratch: reject sizes that overflow when added to headerby Sebastian Falbesoner · 3d4340d1 · Aug 5, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 86 · StrongInformational 23Details
Commit message · Sebastian Falbesoner

scratch: reject sizes that overflow when added to header

We only use scratch space internally, so this is not an issue for the
user (scratch API functions have been removed since 0.6.0), but fixing
this might still make sense to prepare for the unlikely case that we
expose the scratch API again in the future. An alternative could be
to simply delete the scratch space functionality already, as e.g. done
in PR #1789.

86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safety
AI analysis · Informational 23/100

This commit fixes a low-level arithmetic overflow check in a special internal memory-pool helper called 'scratch space'. Because the scratch API is no longer exposed to users, the bug cannot be triggered by normal callers today. The change adds a guard so that an impossibly large requested size does not silently wrap around and produce a smaller memory allocation than intended.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1897: tests: check results before using outputsby merge-script · 687155df · Aug 4, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 96 · StrongInformational 20Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1897: tests: check results before using outputs

a2ad68cd81787ba70b2caff0a57998ae8a5b4834 ec: check pubkey sort test results (Lőrinc)
93280c22917c018f4e99d76e4398e66405c887bd silentpayments: check test serialization (Lőrinc)
b8de1bc30f917c0ab9f05aeaeb494834e81513e2 musig: check infinity test setup (Lőrinc)
0618af81317307466e9968592880a54229885edc extrakeys: check test pubkey loads (Lőrinc)
1d3f72d3fa8e476cdc3344dbb5aebeaf7a6efe89 recovery: check exhaustive API results (Lőrinc)
564afb0b06e6124092fd6fa1239b1b397f742e41 ellswift: check test operation results (Lőrinc)
658c7edc24832592969ccbd1bdbc5c59e1ccc5d5 tests: check exhaustive ecmult success (Lőrinc)

Pull request description:

**Problem:** Several tests inspect outputs from deterministic operations without checking the result.
The later output comparisons usually still exercise behavior, but a failed setup call can leave an output that accidentally satisfies a later assertion.
In `pubnonce_summing_to_inf`, `secp256k1_musig_sum_pubnonces` initializes both sums to infinity before a pubnonce load can fail, so the test could pass without constructing a valid opposing-nonce pair.

**Fix:** Check the result of each deterministic operation before reading its output in the affected exhaustive, EllSwift, recovery, extrakeys, MuSig, silent-payments, and public-key sort tests.
Leave deliberately ignored results alone when the test permits either result or validates a mutated value rather than an auxiliary carry, overflow, or sign flag.

ACKs for top commit:
151henry151:
Tested ACK a2ad68cd81787ba70b2caff0a57998ae8a5b4834
real-or-random:
utACK a2ad68cd81787ba70b2caff0a57998ae8a5b4834
theStack:
ACK a2ad68cd81787ba70b2caff0a57998ae8a5b4834

Tree-SHA512: 9955e9170c53d87cd851351234133660d5d4a26190bd9054b5bef75ed11c785a0168f92ca9ec634d9599da019dad473dc30e4f635eeef699abc39407a5e28c5c

96/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safetydefensive validationmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 20/100

This commit fixes test-suite bugs, not the cryptographic library itself. Several test cases were using outputs from functions without first checking whether those functions succeeded. In rare cases a failed setup step could leave a value that accidentally passed a later check, making the test look successful when it shouldn't. The patch adds result checks so tests fail loudly if a setup step fails. There is no direct security risk to users of the library.

Security candidaterefactor: replace `_get_hash_context` with direct `->hash_ctx` accessby Sebastian Falbesoner · c8745f6b · Aug 4, 2026 · 16 filesMessage 85 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Sebastian Falbesoner

refactor: replace `_get_hash_context` with direct `->hash_ctx` access

See issue #1835 ("Follow-ups to #1777").

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a straightforward code cleanup: it removes a tiny internal helper function called secp256k1_get_hash_context() and replaces every call with direct access to the context's hash_ctx field. The behavior is identical; no security bug is fixed or introduced.

Lower-priorityMerge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1907: release cleanup: bump version after 0.8.0by merge-script · 8a700a35 · Aug 3, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 86 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1907: release cleanup: bump version after 0.8.0

78657bf28b59f7069d06e140a584d0b4ee34a3af release cleanup: bump version after 0.8.0 (Sebastian Falbesoner)

Pull request description:

ACKs for top commit:
real-or-random:
utACK 78657bf28b59f7069d06e140a584d0b4ee34a3af

Tree-SHA512: 12d7d0261958f3f326811d03103a56efeeeff61f541924a054b58e4085339873742c27c20e7d623dffbf83f554c3c48c51ffa7edb6e177ae405209f1d776e601

86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
merge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a routine post-release bookkeeping change. It bumps the project's version number from 0.8.0 to 0.8.1, marks the current code as an unreleased development snapshot, and updates the changelog accordingly. There are no code, cryptographic, or build-logic changes that affect security.

Lower-priorityrelease cleanup: bump version after 0.8.0by Sebastian Falbesoner · 78657bf2 · Aug 3, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 45 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Sebastian Falbesoner

release cleanup: bump version after 0.8.0

45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a routine post-release bookkeeping change. It bumps the project's version number from 0.8.0 to 0.8.1, marks the current code as an unreleased development snapshot, and updates the changelog accordingly. There are no code, cryptographic, or build-logic changes that could affect security.

Lower-priorityrelease: prepare for 0.8.0by Sebastian Falbesoner · 5840c19b · Aug 3, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 45 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Sebastian Falbesoner

release: prepare for 0.8.0

45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a routine release preparation for libsecp256k1 version 0.8.0. It only updates version numbers in build files (CMake and autotools) and finalizes the changelog. There are no code changes, no bug fixes, and no security-related modifications in the diff itself.

Security candidatesha256: cross-check caller supplied compression functionby furszy · c84ea465 · Aug 3, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 83 · StrongLow 26Details
Commit message · furszy

sha256: cross-check caller supplied compression function

The existing selftest hashes one 63 byte string against a known digest.
Which catches a compression function that is wrong everywhere, but not
one that is wrong on multi-block calls, unaligned input, or a state
that is not the IV.

This introduces secp256k1_sha256_smoke_test, which hashes messages
of various lengths and starting offsets with both the supplied function
and the built-in one, and fails if the digest differs.

The check runs once during startup, so a faulty compression function
is caught early rather than silently producing incorrect output later.

Measured locally, this takes 1.5ms, which should be negligible for
any application.

See the introduced test for a clear view of the bugs this catches.

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 26/100

This commit strengthens the library's startup self-test for SHA-256 compression functions that users can plug in. It adds a more thorough 'smoke test' that compares the user-supplied function against the built-in one across many message lengths and memory alignments. The goal is to catch buggy or incompatible custom SHA-256 code early, before it silently produces wrong hashes. It is a defensive hardening change, not a fix for an active security hole.

Lower-prioritychangelog: add entry for #1821by Sebastian Falbesoner · 2076b06a · Aug 1, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 19Details
Commit message · Sebastian Falbesoner

changelog: add entry for #1821

Co-authored-by: Tim Ruffing <me@real-or-random.org>

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
documentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This is a documentation-only commit that adds a changelog entry describing a previous code fix. The fix corrected a function in the ellswift module so it now rejects secret keys that are greater than or equal to the curve order, matching its documented behavior. The changelog explicitly states the old behavior is not considered a security issue because such keys are practically impossible to generate by chance.

Security candidaterelease-process: Add signing of tarballby Tim Ruffing · fae22e77 · Jul 31, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 53 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Tim Ruffing

release-process: Add signing of tarball

Resolves #1175.

53/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarydocumentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit updates the project's release instructions to add a new step: creating a GPG-signed source-code tarball when making a release. It is a documentation-only change that improves release integrity and does not modify any code or fix a security bug.

AI review queuedrelease-process: Fix nitsby Tim Ruffing · 4a73b1ae · Jul 31, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 35 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Tim Ruffing

release-process: Fix nits

35/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
documentation-only discountsecond-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only makes minor wording edits to the project's release-process documentation. It changes a few phrases from 'PR is merged' to 'PR has been merged', adds 'a' before 'PR', and adds a new step reminding maintainers to merge release notes before announcing a release. There is no code change and no security relevance.

Lower-priorityrelease-process: Add "cleaning up"by Tim Ruffing · b0a0ae82 · Jul 31, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 45 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Tim Ruffing

release-process: Add "cleaning up"

45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
documentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit simply adds a short 'Cleaning up' section to the project's release-process documentation. It describes administrative tasks like closing a GitHub milestone and removing a label after a release. There is no code change and no security relevance.

AI review queuedrelease-process: Refactorby Tim Ruffing · 34f00ca9 · Jul 31, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 35 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Tim Ruffing

release-process: Refactor

35/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
documentation-only discountsecond-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a simple reorganization of the project's release-process documentation. It renames some sections, splits steps into clearer subsections, and adds minor wording clarifications (for example, reminding maintainers to manually review commits since the last release when writing changelog entries). No code, build scripts, cryptographic logic, or configuration defaults were changed.

Lower-priorityrelease-process: Add attaching output of check-abi.sh to PRby Tim Ruffing · 12d9cfd8 · Jul 31, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 50 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Tim Ruffing

release-process: Add attaching output of check-abi.sh to PR

50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
documentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This is a documentation-only change to the project's release checklist. It adds a step telling release maintainers to attach the output of an ABI compatibility checking tool to release pull requests. There is no code change, no cryptographic change, and no security vulnerability.