BitBox02 firmware

This firmware update changes how long merchant or recipient names are shown when approving Bitcoin payments. Instead of breaking the name across two lines, which could be cut off or hidden, the name now appears on a single line that the user can scroll through. This helps users actually see and verify long names like 'SWAPKIT (...)' during payment approval. The change is a usability and anti-spoofing improvement, not a vulnerability fix in the traditional sense, but it does close a small security gap where truncated or wrapped names might mislead a user.

This commit adds an extra on-device confirmation step when signing Ethereum typed messages (EIP-712). Before walking through the message fields, the BitBox02 now shows the user the 'primary type' (for example 'Authorize' or 'Revoke'). The goal is to prevent a malicious computer program from swapping one message type for another that has the same field shapes, because the device would then bind the user-approved signature to the wrong type. It is a hardening fix rather than a clear-cut vulnerability patch.

This commit adds support for timestamp-based Bitcoin transaction locktimes in the BitBox02 hardware wallet. Previously, locktimes at or above 500,000,000 were rejected; now they are accepted and shown to the user as a UTC date and time. The commit also removes the on-screen 'RBF' (Replace-By-Fee) indicator because RBF is a network policy, not a guaranteed property of the signed transaction. This is a normal feature addition with no obvious security bug, though it changes what transaction details users see before signing.

This commit is a large merge that adds a new Rust crate called bitbox-test-vectors. It is purely a testing and quality-assurance change: it creates shared Bitcoin transaction test vectors (sample PSBTs and expected firmware behavior) so that the firmware, the Go client library, and the Rust client library can all use the same test data. There is no change to the actual device firmware logic, no new runtime feature, and no fix for a security bug. It is a test-infrastructure improvement.

This commit simply updates a version number in a JSON file from v9.26.5 to v9.27.0. There are no code changes, no security fixes, and no functional changes visible in the diff.

This commit is a build-system and test-infrastructure fix. It changes Rust conditional-compilation flags so that unit tests can compile and run on a normal computer (host target) instead of only on the embedded device. It also limits the custom panic handler to bare-metal ARM builds and exposes some test-only helper functions under the test configuration. There is no change to runtime security behavior for end users.

This commit improves the user warning shown when a Bitcoin transaction has an unusually high fee. Previously, the device calculated the fee as a percentage of the amount being sent. For transactions that send nothing to an outside recipient (for example, sending everything back to yourself or only carrying an OP_RETURN memo), the denominator was zero, so no percentage warning could be shown and the user might not be alerted if the fee consumed most of the funds. The patch now falls back to comparing the fee against the total value of all transaction inputs, and tells the user whether the warning is based on the send amount or on all inputs. It is a defensive hardening change, not a fix for an active exploit.

This commit tightens validation for Ethereum addresses used when signing typed messages (EIP-712). Previously, an address of any hex length after the '0x' prefix was accepted and padded to 32 bytes. Now only exactly 20-byte (40 hex character) addresses are allowed. This prevents malformed or truncated addresses from being silently encoded and signed, which could lead to a user approving a signature for an unintended address or contract.

This commit improves how sensitive cryptographic key material is erased from memory in the BitBox02 hardware wallet. It wraps temporary derived keys (SHA-512 outputs and a stretched seed encryption key) with a Rust helper that automatically clears the memory when the value is no longer needed. This reduces the chance that fragments of private-key-related material remain in RAM longer than necessary, but it is a hardening change rather than a fix for an obvious, directly exploitable bug.

This firmware update fixes several security issues in the BitBox02 hardware wallet. The most important change is that when signing Bitcoin transactions, the device now verifies that the previous transaction output's script (the 'pubkey script') matches the keypath the wallet is being asked to sign with. This closes a gap where a malicious or buggy host app could ask the wallet to sign an input while claiming it belongs to a different address/key than it actually does. The update also hardens the U2F/FIDO workflow so that an attacker cannot swap or replay a different request while the user is still confirming one on screen, and it prevents Bluetooth pairing prompts from popping up on top of other wallet tasks. The changelog simply says 'Security improvements', so the vendor has not publicly detailed the exact vulnerabilities.

This change makes sure that production versions of the BitBox03 hardware wallet do not include SEGGER RTT (Real-Time Transfer) debug sections. RTT is a debugging feature that lets a connected computer exchange data with the device while it runs. In a production device, leaving those debug sections linked into the final firmware could give an attacker with physical access an extra channel to read memory or interact with the device. The patch marks release builds as 'production' and makes the linker throw an error if any RTT control or buffer sections are still present.

This update changes how the BitBox02 hardware wallet displays very large transaction and swap amounts. Previously, long amounts were simply cut off with '...' on the device screen, which could hide important digits. Now the firmware either uses a smaller font to fit the full amount, or shows the full amount on a separate scrollable screen. The change also adds a length limit on externally supplied payment-request amounts to prevent abuse. This is a user-interface improvement that reduces the risk of a user approving a transaction whose displayed amount has been misleadingly truncated.

This commit only adds documentation comments and does not change any code behavior. It explains that when a host computer does not provide an anti-klepto nonce commitment during Bitcoin or Ethereum signing, the device falls back to a historical signing mode that lacks anti-klepto protection. The actual fallback behavior already existed; this change just documents it more clearly.

This commit fixes a fee-warning gap in the BitBox02 Bitcoin signing flow. Previously, transactions that only sent money back to yourself (change outputs) or only carried an OP_RETURN message had no 'send amount' to compare the fee against, so the device would not warn even if the fee was huge. The patch now compares the fee to the total value of all transaction inputs in those cases, and still warns the user when the fee exceeds 10% of that total. It also updates the on-screen wording to say whether the percentage is relative to the send amount or to all inputs.

This commit only adds documentation comments and does not change any program behavior. It explains that when a security feature called anti-klepto is left out of older Bitcoin and Ethereum signing requests, the device falls back to a historical, deterministic signing method that lacks anti-klepto protection. For EIP-712 typed messages, it falls back to plain RFC6979. No code logic is altered.

This commit improves how the BitBox02 hardware wallet generates the secret seed used to back up cryptocurrency. It adds an extra source of randomness—derived from the user's password—into the seed creation process. The change also documents that the seed already mixes randomness from the device's main chip, its secure chip, and factory-installed randomness. There is no direct evidence in the commit that this fixes a known exploitable vulnerability; it appears to be a defense-in-depth improvement to make the seed harder to predict or weaken.

This commit changes how the BitBox02 hardware wallet shows large transaction and swap amounts on its small screen. Previously, long amounts were silently cut off with '...', which could hide the true value from the user. Now the device either shrinks the font or shows the full amount on a scrollable screen. The change also adds checks to reject absurdly long externally supplied swap amount strings. The main security benefit is that users can now verify the complete amount they are approving, reducing the chance of being tricked by a truncated value.

This commit only adds and updates comments in the code to better explain where the randomness used to create wallet seeds comes from. It does not change any actual behavior, logic, or security properties of the firmware.