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Informational 23 Bitcoin

fix(core): adjust random part of BLE name during pairing

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by tychovrahe

67/100 · Adequate
fix(core): adjust random part of BLE name during pairing

[no changelog]
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes how Trezor T3W1 devices generate their temporary Bluetooth (BLE) name during pairing. Previously the name contained three random characters from a pool of 26 letters plus 10 digits. Now it uses a digit-letter-digit pattern. This reduces the number of possible names from 36×36×36 (about 46,656) to 10×26×10 (2,600), making it easier for a nearby attacker to guess or collide with the advertised name during pairing. The change appears intentional to make the displayed name easier to read or type, but it weakens the randomness that helps distinguish devices.

Recommended action

Review whether 2,600 possible BLE names provides sufficient collision resistance for the intended pairing threat model. If users pair in public or crowded environments, consider restoring higher entropy (e.g., four alphanumeric characters or a larger charset) while still meeting usability goals. Document the security trade-off in the changelog or pairing design docs.

Security signals we found

01

Reduction in randomness/entropy of a user-facing pairing identifier

02

BLE pairing identifier now follows a predictable digit-letter-digit structure

03

No security rationale or threat analysis provided in commit message or changelog

04

Change touches both bootloader and application-layer pairing code, indicating the identifier is security-relevant across boot stages

Risk score

Why this scored 23/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 4/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 2/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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