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Low 29 Bitcoin

feat(rust/trezor-thp): ACK piggybacking

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Martin Milata

57/100 · Thin
feat(rust/trezor-thp): ACK piggybacking
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a new optional transport-layer feature called 'ACK piggybacking' to the Trezor hardware wallet's Rust THP (Trezor Host Protocol) implementation. It lets a device or host include an acknowledgment (ACK) inside the next data packet instead of sending a separate tiny ACK packet, reducing USB/network traffic. The change is feature-gated by protocol version 2.1 and falls back to the older separate-ACK behavior if either side does not advertise support. The diff also includes related test and example-code cleanups, such as stricter error handling and a new API to set the peer's protocol version before the handshake begins.

Recommended action

Review as a normal feature commit. Verify that the version-gating correctly prevents v2.0 peers from interpreting piggybacked ACK bits, and that the new ACK checksum verification and retransmission paths do not introduce denial-of-service or deadlock scenarios. Run the expanded test matrix (especially `test_packet_loss_handshake_v21` and `test_open_piggybacking`) to confirm interoperability and recovery behavior.

Security signals we found

01

New transport-layer feature gated by negotiated protocol version (2.1)

02

ACK bit now included in outgoing sync bits when piggybacking is enabled

03

ACK packet checksum verification added in `handle_ack`

04

Lost ACK retransmission logic added in `handle_invalid_seq`

05

Receive buffer resize size is now wrapped in `Option<NonZeroU16>` to avoid zero-size edge cases

06

Host rejects incoming packets before handshake starts (`HandshakeState::Initial`)

07

Example host CLI now panics on unrecoverable channel errors instead of looping on bad checksums

Risk score

Why this scored 29/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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