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Low 38 Bitcoin

feat(core): introduce app_loader/cache module

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by cepetr

57/100 · Thin
feat(core): introduce app_loader/cache module

[no changelog]
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit introduces a new application loader and cache subsystem for the Trezor firmware. It adds code that loads external ELF-format applications into memory, manages their execution as isolated applets, and handles memory allocation for them. The change is a feature addition, not a documented security fix. The code includes a prominent warning that the STM32 ELF loader implementation should not be shipped in production devices. There is no evidence in the commit or supplied references that this resolves a known security incident or vulnerability.

Recommended action

Treat this as a high-risk feature commit rather than a security patch. Do not ship the STM32 ELF loader in production until it is replaced or hardened, per the in-source warning. Review the temporary MPU disable in app_cache_write_image for TOCTOU and privilege-escalation risks. Harden ELF parsing against malformed headers, relocation overflows, and section-header abuse. Validate that granting applets access to coreapp code/TLS does not break isolation guarantees. Require a security review and fuzzing of the loader before any production enablement.

Security signals we found

01

New attack surface: kernel now parses and relocates untrusted ELF images from app cache

02

STM32 ELF loader explicitly marked with '#error DO NOT SHIP THIS FILE' in production builds

03

app_cache_write_image temporarily sets MPU_MODE_DISABLED while copying image data

04

Loaded applets are granted access to coreapp code area and coreapp TLS area

05

Single-entry cache and arena allocator limit but do not eliminate memory exhaustion/concurrency issues

06

No input sanitization beyond ELF header/segment bounds checks visible in diff

Risk score

Why this scored 38/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 4/10
Evidence quality 2/5
Human-validated context

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