What changed, and why it matters
This commit only updates a documentation file (docs/misc/update-wipes.md). It explains when the firmware's 'fix_version' value should be increased, including one scenario involving security vulnerabilities. There are no code changes, no bug fixes, and no new functionality. It is purely a documentation clarification.
No action required. Review the documentation change for accuracy and consistency with project policy if desired.
Security signals we found
No strong security signals were identified.
Evidence from the diff
The diff modifies a single Markdown documentation file. It expands the explanation of ‘fix_version’ to state that it is bumped when storage format changes break backward compatibility, and when a firmware release fixes a vulnerability that an attacker with physical device access could exploit against stored data without further owner interaction. It also notes that a fix_version bump is accompanied by a minor version bump. No source code, build scripts, or firmware logic is changed.
Changed components
docs/misc/update-wipes.mdInspect captured patch +13 / −4
### docs/misc/update-wipes.md
@@ -42,10 +42,19 @@ The device gets **wiped on every reboot**:
----
[1] Firmware contains a _fix_version_, which is the lowest version to which that
-particular firmware can be downgraded without wiping storage. This is typically used in
-case the internal storage format is changed. For example, in version 2.2.0, we have
-introduced Wipe Code, which introduced some changes to storage that the older firmwares
-(e.g. 2.1.8) would not understand. It can also be used to enforce security fixes.
+particular firmware can be downgraded without wiping storage. It is bumped in two cases:
+
+- The internal storage format changes in a way that older firmware would not understand.
+ For example, version 2.2.0 introduced Wipe Code, which changed the storage format in a
+ way that older firmwares (e.g. 2.1.8) could not handle.
+- The firmware fixes a vulnerability that an attacker in possession of the device could
+ exploit against data in the device's storage area without further interaction from the
+ owner, e.g. a side channel leaking the seed. Whether the attacker also needs to know
+ the PIN is irrelevant. Vulnerabilities that depend on the owner continuing to use the
+ downgraded device do not warrant a bump, because a wipe would only make the owner
+ recover the seed onto the same vulnerable firmware.
+
+A fix_version bump is accompanied by a bump of the minor version.
[2] The most common example is if you have a device with the official firmware
(SatoshiLabs) and you install the unofficial (UNSIGNED) firmware -> the device getsWhy this scored 15/100
Community notes
Notes can correct, qualify, or add evidence to the AI analysis. Every note shown here has been validated by a human moderator.
The AI analysis stands alone for now. Submit a note if you can add evidence or important context.