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Informational 7 Bitcoin

feat(crypto): implement `noise_xxpsk3`

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by M1nd3r

62/100 · Adequate
feat(crypto): implement `noise_xxpsk3`

[no changelog]

Co-authored-by: kopecdav <32126858+kopecdav@users.noreply.github.com>
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides an explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a brand-new cryptographic module implementing the Noise_XXpsk3_25519_AESGCM_SHA256 protocol for secure encrypted communication. It is a feature addition with no changelog entry and no accompanying security advisory. The code itself is a clean implementation of a well-known cryptographic handshake, but because it is new code handling private keys, pre-shared keys, and AES-GCM encryption, it is security-relevant by nature. There is no direct evidence in the commit or supplied references that this fixes a known vulnerability or introduces a bug.

Recommended action

Treat as a normal security-sensitive feature addition. Conduct a focused review of the Noise_XXpsk3 state transitions, verify the PSK is mixed at the correct protocol point, ensure AES-GCM nonces can never repeat across reboots/resets, and add comprehensive unit/fuzz tests before this module is used in production code paths. No immediate patch or incident response is indicated by the available materials.

Security signals we found

01

New cryptographic primitive handling static private keys, ephemeral keys, and pre-shared keys

02

AES-GCM nonce construction uses 64-bit counter with 4-byte zero padding; nonce reuse would be catastrophic but current code increments per operation and rejects at NONCE_LIMIT

03

No explicit authentication-tag verification failure path beyond gcm_decrypt_message return check

04

State-machine stage values are randomized constants, noted as anti-glitching defense

05

All error paths call deinit and memzero the full structure, which may aid fault resistance but could also be denial-of-service if an attacker can force re-init

06

No unit tests or fuzzing harness visible in the changed files

Risk score

Why this scored 7/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 0/30
Exploitability 0/25
Stealth signal 0/15
Affected reach 0/15
Confidence 5/10
Evidence quality 2/5
Human-validated context

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