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Low 44 Bitcoin

fix(core): correct Rust UI chunkification logic for non-ASCII text

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Roman Zeyde

89/100 · Strong
fix(core): correct Rust UI chunkification logic for non-ASCII text

Otherwise, `text[..final_index]` would panic.

[no changelog]
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a bug in the Trezor hardware wallet's Rust UI code that splits text into chunks for display. The old code used byte positions instead of character positions when handling non-ASCII text (like accented letters or non-Latin scripts). This could cause the device to crash with a panic when trying to display certain international characters, because Rust would reject a slice that cut through the middle of a multi-byte character. The fix makes the chunking logic respect character boundaries. There is no direct evidence in the commit that this is exploitable as a security attack, but any device panic during rendering of user-facing text is at minimum a denial-of-service concern.

Recommended action

Treat as a reliability/DoS hardening fix. Include in routine firmware updates. If the device displays user-supplied or externally sourced text (e.g., transaction memos, account labels, token names), verify that the fixed code is exercised by such inputs and consider fuzzing the text layout with multi-byte UTF-8 strings. No immediate incident response is indicated absent evidence of active exploitation.

Security signals we found

01

Potential denial-of-service via device panic when rendering non-ASCII text

02

String slicing not aligned to UTF-8 character boundaries

03

Fix located in UI rendering path, not in crypto or authentication logic

04

No changelog entry provided by vendor

Risk score

Why this scored 44/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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