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Low 41 Bitcoin

chore(core): Allow backup check only when the backup exists

TZ94cda445 View source ↗
Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Lukas Bielesch

62/100 · Adequate
chore(core): Allow backup check only when the backup exists
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit tightens when a Trezor device lets the user run a 'backup check' (also called a dry-run recovery). Previously, the device allowed the check as long as it was initialized, even if the seed had never been backed up, was marked as not needing a backup, or the backup was unfinished. The change now blocks the backup-check menu item and the RecoveryDevice dry-run command when no real backup exists. This prevents a user from being misled into thinking an unbacked-up seed is safe, and stops a dry-run from being started in states where it has no meaningful purpose.

Recommended action

Treat this as a low-to-moderate hardening fix. Users and integrators should update to a firmware containing this commit if they rely on the backup-check/dry-run behavior, and verify that any custom clients no longer expect dry-run to succeed on no-backup or pending-backup devices. No immediate incident response is indicated by the diff alone.

Security signals we found

01

State-machine validation hardened: backup check/dry-run is now gated on a completed backup

02

UI menu item `backup_check_allowed` no longer exposed for unbacked-up or no-backup devices

03

Protocol-level `RecoveryDevice` dry-run rejects no-backup and pending-backup states with explicit errors

04

New negative tests assert rejection for `no_backup=True` and `needs_backup=True` setups

05

Changelog categorizes the change as a fix ('5763.fixed')

Risk score

Why this scored 41/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 7/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 8/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

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