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Low 44 Bitcoin

feat(core/embed): make pin verification faster on T3W1

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Ondřej Vejpustek

72/100 · Adequate
feat(core/embed): make pin verification faster on T3W1
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes how many times a device 'stretches' (repeats and strengthens) the user's PIN before checking it. On T3W1 devices, when a build-time flag called STRETCHED_PIN_COUNT is greater than 1, the code now reduces both Optiga hardware stretching and software PBKDF2 stretching to a single iteration. The stated goal is to make PIN verification faster. Reducing stretching weakens the protection against brute-force attacks if an attacker obtains the stored secrets, but the change is conditional on a build flag and does not by itself create a direct remote exploit. It is a security-relevant hardening reduction rather than an obvious vulnerability.

Recommended action

Treat as a security-relevant hardening change requiring review. Verify whether STRETCHED_PIN_COUNT > 1 on T3W1 is accompanied by equivalent or stronger stretching elsewhere, and confirm the production build does not accidentally enable this fast path. If the reduction is purely for speed without compensating controls, restore a higher iteration count or add a compensating rate-limit/anti-hammering mechanism. Request a security note or changelog entry from the vendor explaining the threat-model justification.

Security signals we found

01

Reduction of PBKDF2/Optiga PIN stretching iterations to 1 under a build-time condition

02

Conditional bypass of production iteration count via STRETCHED_PIN_COUNT macro

03

Change touches security-critical PIN verification and storage code

04

No explicit security rationale or threat-model discussion in commit message

05

No CVE, advisory, or researcher attribution present in supplied materials

Risk score

Why this scored 44/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 5/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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