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Low 36 Bitcoin

fix(core): fix BLE pairing

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by tychovrahe

57/100 · Thin
fix(core): fix BLE pairing

[no changelog]
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) pairing behavior in the Trezor hardware wallet firmware. It changes how the device advertises itself, handles pairing requests, disconnects existing connections before pairing, and resets the advertising name after pairing ends. The changes are framed as a functional bug fix rather than a security fix, but they touch on sensitive pairing state management that could affect whether an attacker could trick the device into pairing unexpectedly or stay connected when it should not.

Recommended action

Treat this as a functional fix with potential security side effects. Review the BLE state machine for race conditions around pairing_allowed/requested transitions, verify that the new disconnect-before-pairing logic cannot be abused to disconnect a legitimate peer and force pairing with an attacker, and inspect the updated `trezor-ble.bin` blob for corresponding changes. No CVE or advisory is indicated by the commit metadata.

Security signals we found

01

BLE pairing state machine changed to disconnect existing connections before entering pairing mode

02

Pairing flags (`pairing_allowed`, `pairing_requested`) now cleared consistently via `ble_pairing_end`

03

Advertising name reset to model name after pairing completes or fails

04

Switch-off command now disconnects active BLE connections

05

New syscall verifier added for `ble_set_name` to validate caller memory access

06

Precompiled BLE coprocessor binary updated without source diff

Risk score

Why this scored 36/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 7/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 5/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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