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Informational 18 Bitcoin

feat(core): display recent THP `host_name` instead of BLE MAC address

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Roman Zeyde

77/100 · Adequate
feat(core): display recent THP `host_name` instead of BLE MAC address

THP `host_name` will be cached during first pairing using its MAC address.

[no changelog]
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides an explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit is a user-experience improvement for Trezor hardware wallets that connect over Bluetooth. It makes the device menu show a friendly computer name (like "Alice's MacBook") instead of a raw Bluetooth MAC address for recently paired devices. The change also stores that friendly name in device flash memory the first time pairing happens. There is no direct security bug visible in the diff, but it slightly increases the amount of untrusted data (the host name supplied by the connecting computer) that is saved and later displayed on the device screen.

Recommended action

No immediate security action is required. As a defensive review, verify that `paired_cache.store()` has appropriate flash wear-leveling and integrity checks, and confirm that `trim_str` handles Unicode correctly so that a 32-byte limit cannot be abused to produce misleading display strings. Review whether the cached host_name needs sanitization for screen rendering beyond length trimming.

Security signals we found

01

Untrusted host_name from pairing message is persisted to flash storage

02

New flash-backed cache keyed by BLE MAC address introduced

03

Host name length is capped at 32 bytes before storage

04

Pairing approval UI is shown before cache write, preserving existing user confirmation flow

05

No new cryptographic, authorization, or memory-safety changes are present

Risk score

Why this scored 18/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 1/25
Stealth signal 1/15
Affected reach 2/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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